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SUMMARY 
The 9/11 terrorist attacks in the USA had wide-ranging consequences for 
security issues in Western societies. Within civil aviation, the attacks became 
grim evidence that the security system constructed to prevent intentional 
attacks was deficient. In Europe, the European Union took on the 
responsibility to gather European civil aviation security under one banner, 
relieving the EU members’ national legislation on aviation security, uniting it 
through implementing one common supranational regulation for all EU 
countries.  
As a non-EU member, Norway was obligated by the European Economic 
Area Agreement (EEA Agreement) to implement the same regulations as the 
EU countries to avoid being banned from the One-Stop Security regime that 
had been in effect prior to the 9/11 attacks. The bearing principle in the One-
Stop Security regime is that any passenger who is security screened at any 
entry point within the system will forego any new screenings whilst travelling 
within the system. Therefore, every airport participating in this system must, 
regardless of size, implement measures that ensure that the EU regulative 
level is maintained at the same predefined level. In order to achieve this, a 
highly prescriptive regulation was developed, based on main documents from 
the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) that had previously been 
applied as guiding documents for the national civil aviation regulations and 
legislation. These documents had previously provided recommendations that 
each country was only obliged to report deviations from, but after 9/11 these 
became mandatory in the new EU regulation.  
This thesis aims at describing the consequences of this regulatory 
transition by investigating the following research problem: “What are the 
consequences of implementing EU security regulation in the Norwegian civil 
aviation system?” 
 The main aim is, thus, to discover possible consequences of the regulatory 
system instated post 9/11, both on the authority and airport levels, connecting 
regulatory types to organisational challenges. 
In order to study these issues, a charting of the Norwegian civil aviation 
system and the regulatory landscape was performed by interviewing the main 
actors and authorities within Norwegian civil aviation. Thereafter, fieldworks 
were conducted at three different sized airports. In addition, to understand the 
findings of the Norwegian implementation, a comparative case was made by 
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conducting interviews with key actors in the Icelandic civil aviation system. 
This comparison was intriguing since Iceland, like Norway, is obligated 
through the EEA Agreement, yet Iceland chose a different implementation 
than Norway. 
Airport security can be defined as a High Reliability Organisation (HRO), 
as defined by Weick et al. (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 1999, p. 90). These 
are organisations that operate in a highly unforgiving environment which, in 
case of errors, has the potential for disastrous outcomes. As security is 
threatened by different kinds of risks than those with which HRO theory and 
literature normally have been occupied, I argue that this has less importance 
when the purpose is to investigate which factors produce reliable outcomes in 
organisations, regardless of whether the threats are intentionally caused 
(security) or accidentally caused (safety). Thus, studies on security can be 
profitably incorporated into the vast literature on organisational safety and 
reliability.  
The findings from this study reveal a high degree of constraint at the 
airport level, both among leaders and employees, caused by the construction 
of the security regulation and its implementation. Possibilities for action, 
through influence and involvement in regulatory processes, decreased 
exponentially with the increase in details and prescription after 9/11.  
Possibilities for action, or ‘space for action’ as it has been labelled in this 
thesis, is what facilitates the organisation to adapt and adjust regulation into 
the context. Seen in relation to HRO principles, limited possibilities for action 
may lead to mindlessness and, thus, threaten the overall reliability in an 
organisation.  
Consequences will necessarily follow a groundbreaking event like what 
occurred on 9/11. Not only did the security system demonstrate its limitations, 
but the symbolic value was also high. Consequently, this will affect people’s 
perception of the trustworthiness of the system. Authoritative action will be 
essential, and speed will demonstrate vigour. The regulatory work inaugurated 
in the hours following the terrorist act on 9/11 has unquestionably heightened 
the security level for civil aviation. However, more than a decade later, it is 
possible to explore the transition in hindsight to see its consequences in the 
actual context of the airport. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
What if 9/11 had never happened? What if the four hijacked aircraft had 
not been applied as weapons to create maximum collateral damage? What 
would this mean for civil aviation, not only in the US where the attacks took 
place, but also for the rest of the world? Asking these counterfactual questions 
at the beginning of this thesis reflects the profound impact 9/11 had for civil 
aviation and civil aviation security. Although there are no single or simple 
answers to these questions, it is reasonable to assume that the rapid, 
comprehensive, and extensive transformation that aviation security went 
through in the aftermath of the attacks would have developed differently. 
Aviation accidents, such as air crashes or engine fires, which are often both 
dramatic and lethal, are well known within civil aviation. While these 
certainly cause fear and anxiety for future passengers, terrorism acts, which 
are intentional and wilfully carried out, are created to cause fear. That the 
attacks were successfully accomplished demonstrated the system’s 
vulnerability, a vulnerability that demanded immediate action. When there is a 
need for immediate action, evolution and development of rules and 
regulations take different paths from those that are not steered by an event or a 
catastrophe. Choices must be taken rapidly, amendments must be made and 
time-consuming assessments and evaluations must give way to other 
priorities. The effects and consequences of such choices will only be possible 
to analyse after the dust has settled. The main aim of this thesis is to explore 
some of the choices that were made regarding aviation security regulation in 
Europe post 9/11, as seen in the Norwegian context, and the consequences the 
regulation has had for the organisation of aviation security in Norway.  
In the following part of this introductory chapter, I introduce the field and 
aviation security’s reason and rationale. In the continuance, the research 
problem and empirical questions guiding the study will be presented, 
including the approach that has been applied to the research, and, lastly, the 
thesis outline is described.  
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1.1 Aviation security’s ‘raison d'être’1 
The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon as well 
as the attempted attack on Washington, DC, on September 11, 2001 (9/11), 
marked a shift in the view of risk and especially security related to aviation. 
The main reason for this shift was the nature of the attacks. They were attacks 
directly aimed at society in which aircraft were used as weapons. Since the 
beginning of commercial civil aviation, aircraft and their crews have been 
utilised in harmful plots with varying impacts and consequences. The types of 
threats and attacks have changed over time from people using the aircraft to 
escape prosecution to more political terrorism (for example, to press states 
into accommodating certain demands), and, lastly, the application of the 
aircraft as weapons, with 9/11 standing out as a forceful example. Although 
the threats and attacks have changed over time, it is clear that there have been 
undeniable threats to civil aviation with the potential to cause great harm and 
loss of life. Terrorism is the main threat that security measures are constructed 
to prevent. There are several reasons why aviation is particularly interesting to 
terrorists, but the main reason, according to Hougham, is that “[a]irlines are 
seen as national symbols. Airline disasters receive media attention 
disproportionate to the death toll and, if mass casualties are the goal, an 
airplane provides hundreds of people at 30,000 feet with no chance of 
survival” (Hougham, 2009, p. 143). Terrorism and intentional attacks on 
society have made the security field grow rapidly, both as a science and as a 
practice. When attacks are made on what societies value, a need to act arises –
a need to handle, to predict and to protect. This is also where the field of 
security becomes complicated. Security is simultaneously about people’s 
perception of security as much as it is about the physical moves of securing, 
for example, air travel. As Burgess (2011) explains, the aim of terrorists is not 
the actual disruption of services of railways or oil production or, as in this 
case, aviation. The aim is to achieve a loss of confidence with these services 
and to produce fear of future threats. It plays on producing signal effects on 
our already existing insecurities that lie at the core of our societies’ psyches. 
Recovering from a terrorist attack like 9/11 will therefore be a two-part 
operation in which the first is to create a more secure system that can prevent 
                                                     
1 Justification or reason for existence. 
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similar attacks from happening again and the second is to restore people’s 
belief that it is safe to travel by air.  
This duality is also what makes it difficult to rate the security system’s 
‘success’2 because it depends on how one understands success. If the aim is to 
return to the state of affairs (considering passenger volume and its steady 
increase) found prior to 9/11, which presupposes that passengers’ confidence 
in the level of security provided by the current system is restored, this is one 
way to measure success. Another way to measure success may be through the 
absence of attacks. The fact that civil aviation has not been subject to attacks 
anywhere near the magnitude of the 9/11 attacks may demonstrate success in 
the implemented measures post 9/11. However, not to dismiss this 
explanation, the absence of attacks may also be the result of other reasons. 
Security measures go way beyond the actual regulation and implementation of 
security at airports and on aircraft. A highly simplified contextualisation of 
security measures can be to separate three main defence mechanisms. The 
first we call foreign policy, since terrorism is also about the message that is 
sent to the attacked nation. A terrorist act can therefore be understood as a sort 
of reaction to a country’s foreign policy (though I will not go deeper into this 
issue since that is not the aim for this argument). The second defence can be 
labelled ‘intelligence’. Intelligence services attempt to unravel intentional 
plans of doing harm before they are realised. The third security mechanism is 
the security system and measures implemented at airports and airlines. This 
third mechanism is a sort of ‘last frontier’ in counteracting, stopping and/or 
identifying possible harm doers before they can inflict any damage on civil 
aviation. This thesis focuses on the third part of the security system, while 
acknowledging that these three mechanisms of the security system are 
intertwined but also complicate the possibility of evaluating the success of 
any single part of the system. Success in one part of the system may therefore 
be caused by another part of the system. In the attempt to somewhat simplify 
this structure, we can say that we cannot automatically equate the absence of 
serious attacks against civil aviation with the implementation of regulation 
and security measures at airports and airlines alone. While it may be the 
reason for the absence, there is also a possibility that the answer is more 
compound. An additional complicating factor for the difficulty of measuring 
                                                     
2 By ‘success’, I mean the system’s ability to achieve the intended goals. 
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the success of the system is the possibility that there have been no further 
attempts to harm civil aviation. Although the Christmas Day bomber, who 
accomplished entering an aircraft with explosives in his underwear in 2009 
(see the next chapter for an elaboration), demonstrated that there have been 
attempts to harm aviation, we cannot know whether the security system 
implemented post 9/11 has cooled off possible terrorists who would otherwise 
have intended to copy the 9/11 attacks or whether there have simply not been 
any plans or intentions to do so. Nevertheless, what these continuous attacks 
and intents to harm civil aviation show us is that there is a justification for 
having security systems and measures. The main point here, however, is to 
underscore how difficult and complex the task of evaluating the success of the 
security system is in reality.   
The main question thus remains: If all the issues discussed above are so 
connected to uncertainty that it becomes difficult to evaluate the ‘goodness’ or 
success of the system, are there other things one can examine in their place? I 
suggest that a way around this problem is to ask which processes and factors 
render possible and facilitate the organisation of good security with safe and 
reliable outcomes – in other words, asking which factors facilitate and which 
factors hamper this achievement. In this thesis, I have chosen to apply the 
theory of High Reliability Organisations (HRO) to explore this theme. HRO 
theory provides insights for organisations that operate in high-hazard 
industries in understanding how it is possible to organise for high reliability. 
In understanding reliability, I apply Eede’s definition: “Reliability is the 
system outcome that can be described as safe, effective and efficient, in terms 
of average and variance” (Eede, 2009, p. 5), in which average refers to an 
expectation that a system works ‘most of the time’, and variance refers to 
expected unreliable occurrences.3 This definition works well with the main 
focus of this thesis, which is a high reliability organisation that produces 
security. However, because organisations, especially organisations that are 
connected to high hazards, have to operate within a landscape that tends to be 
heavily regulated, I believe that these two elements must be seen in relation to 
one another. I see regulation as a framework that the HRO has to operate 
within and which thus restricts or facilitates the organisational possibilities 
                                                     
3 For further elaboration of average reliability and variance in reliability, see Eede 
(2009), pp. 3-5. 
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available to the HRO. I will return to this connection between regulation and 
organisation in Chapter 3.  
I now turn to the application of the concepts of security and safety, which 
are key concepts in this thesis.  
1.2 Security and Safety 
In aviation, the distinction between security and safety has classified the 
types of undesirable risks to which aviation may be subjected. Intentionality is 
a characteristic that separates these two areas. Within safety, the goal has been 
to eliminate accidents. Maintenance, training, and detailed routines and 
procedures have been implemented to avoid accidents. Both the goal and the 
method for achieving this goal are quite straightforward since there is much 
knowledge about cause and effect relationships. The erring in maintenance 
and/or routines has caused accidents, such as doors on aircraft ripping off in 
mid-air or landing gear that does not open while the aircraft is landing on the 
runway. Tragic and costly as the outcomes of these kinds of accidents may be, 
they are, to some extent, predictable and explainable. It is also possible to 
learn from these accidents and to improve construction, maintenance and 
routines to prevent them in the future. Security, on the other hand, does not 
follow the same principles. There is a much larger degree of uncertainty and 
unpredictability connected to security because it revolves around intentional 
incidents in which someone plans to cause harm to the system. In other words, 
security incidents are a product of someone’s imagination. Attacks on security 
are always intended to do harm. If something happens accidentally, it is a 
safety issue, not a security issue. Terrorism thus falls under the category of 
intended incidents, which is also why security in many ways is much less 
tangible and manageable than safety issues.  
Security as a field is not new, and the study of security has roots as far 
back as the Second World War (WWII). The main focus of security studies 
can, in short, be described as ‘the phenomenon of war’ (Walt, 1991) or “the 
study of threat, use, and control of military force” (Nye and Lynn Jones 1988 
in Walt, 1991, p. 212). Originally, security was an area exclusively operated 
by professional military personnel and was not open to the public or 
academia. However, during WWII, civilians became increasingly involved in 
military planning (Walt, 1991). Security studies have inherently been state 
centred. This was further aggregated by the Cold War, during which the 
INTRODUCTION 
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outlook for war was always at the surface. With the end of the Cold War, the 
focus shifted, and questions arose around the borders and limits of security 
and security studies, which up until then had been little contested and 
challenged (Lipschutz, 1995 p. 5). During the 1980s, there was a general trend 
to broaden the security agenda (Wæver, 1995, p. 48) Some of these 
approaches shifted the focus from a purely state-centric one (national security) 
and broadened it to include the security of people (individuals individually 
and collectively). The more modern security studies have been part of the 
‘International Relations (IR) -family’ of studies. In short, IR studies can be 
described as the study of relationships and/or roles between countries or 
states, including their relationships with both governmental and non-
governmental organisations.  
Where does this leave aviation security? According to Szyliowicz, 
“aviation security is predominantly seen within a national security or policing 
frame” (Szyliowicz (2004) in Salter, 2008, p. 245). We can say that, prior to 
9/11, this was still valid in both Norway and Europe, but with the 
implementation of the European Union’s Security Regulation No. 2320/2002, 
this was moved from the national setting and to the European one as a sort of 
‘regional security’ or ‘supranational security’.  
In the literature, the regulation of security has yet to be given the same 
place and space as the regulation of safety. This depends, of course, on 
whether one considers security as part of safety studies or whether it is 
considered as a field in its own right. Another reason for this, and perhaps the 
main reason, is that the focus security is taking and receiving in contemporary 
society is a quite recent event. This recent shift in focus has thus moved 
security out of the safety studies, where it received less specific focus, and has 
instead given it a field of its own. In some ways, this manoeuvring has left 
security without the theoretical anchor it had by being included in safety 
studies, and the study of security is often considered either as a practical 
matter (good or bad security, more or less security, the right to security, etc.) 
or on a more conceptual/philosophical basis (political/philosophical/ethical 
discussions). This is, of course, a highly simplified classification, and the 
development of security studies will be elaborated below. But for now, it 
serves as a vantage point for one of the main issues in this thesis, which is to 
apply typical safety literature to the security field to see if it can give any new 
insights into the security arena.  
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In regulation, to regulate safety and security the same way can be difficult 
because they struggle, as described above, with different kinds of risks. If we 
look to the Normal Accident Theory (NAT) for a moment, Perrow claims that 
organisational accidents are inherently normal and should be anticipated. 
Thus, although better procedures, regulations and training help keep 
organisations accident free, or at least keep accidents to a minimum, it is 
never possible to arrive at a 100% error-free rate. However, when a typical 
safety industry, like the petroleum industry, can celebrate 100 days without 
accidents, it may be explained by good procedures, well-executed operations 
and vigilant employees. In security, this description falls short since it does 
not necessarily have the same connotations. One hundred days without 
incidents may, of course, mean that the security system has been successful in 
not letting anyone with bad intentions cause harm to the system, but it may 
also mean that no one has tried. This illustrates one of the main differences 
between security and safety.  
However, focusing on organisational processes as processes producing 
high reliability may deflate some of the differences between safety and 
security because one shifts the focus from variance in uncertainty to 
organisational principles that produce reliability.   
1.3 Problem statement and the ‘integrated approach’ 
As already outlined, the 9/11 attacks had major consequences for civil 
aviation. Although the attacks were executed over US airspace and soil, the 
impacts spread all over the Western world. New precautions and measures 
had to be implemented to secure aviation in this new risk scenario. This was 
also the case for European civil aviation, and the European Union quickly 
prepared a new regulation for the EU countries. This new security regulation, 
(EC) No. 2320/2002,4 was intended to unite all regulation for aviation security 
within Europe and was constructed based upon the main documents from the 
European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC).5 Setting aside the national rules 
and regulations of the EU member states, 2320/2002 would establish common 
standards for aviation security. The EU Commission was given executive 
                                                     
4 From here on referred to as 2320/2002 
5 Which again was constructed on the main documents of the International Civil 
Aviation Organisation (ICAO). 
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powers in the adaptation of the detailed implementation measures (European 
Parliament & European Council, 2002), thus relieving the national 
governments of their legislative powers and duties regarding aviation security 
regulation. The new regulation was officially passed in the EU on 16 
December 2002, well over a year after the 9/11 attacks. As a member of the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) obligated to follow the European 
Economic Area Agreement (EEA Agreement), Norway, even as a non-EU 
member, accommodated this new regulation and developed national 
legislation that was intended to comply with the new EU level of security 
regulation in order to maintain open borders with the EU and avoid excluding 
Norwegian aviation from the rest of European civil aviation.  
Although attempts have been made in the EU to change and facilitate the 
regulatory system to make it more open and more risk-based, the changes 
have been few and small. Thus, we can state that for the most part, the 
regulatory system for civil aviation security is highly prescriptive. By 
implementing a detailed regulation for all of Europe, the strengths of the 
national organising principles had to recede. The new way of organising 
security in Europe therefore had great consequences at the national level. 
In systems that demand a high level of reliability, the level of detail is 
typically also high. Here, prescriptive systems are often applied where actions 
and/or procedures are predefined and thoroughly described in order to avoid 
discrepancy, ambiguity, slack, etc. At the core lies an assumption that 
compliance equals reliability. Studies performed within safety industries have 
described the consequences of regulatory types on organisation (see for 
instance Hutter, 2010; Kirwan, Hale, & Hopkins, 2002b; May, 2003, 2007; 
Peterson & Fensling, 2011; Wilpert, 2008). I have not yet found that any 
corresponding studies have been done in security environments or within the 
aviation security system. This thesis aims to fill that gap. 
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By bringing together the issues of regulation and organisation in aviation 
security, this thesis aims to contribute to an understanding of how prescriptive 
regulation has influenced the organisation of aviation security in Norway and 
to discern consequences this regulation has produced. The general problem to 
be addressed in this thesis is as follows:  
 
What are the consequences of implementing EU security 
regulation in the Norwegian civil aviation system? 
 
In order to answer this research problem, a set of four specific empirical 
questions have been developed: 
 
1. How was the security system for civil aviation transformed 
after 9/11 from a Norwegian perspective? 
2. How was that transformation perceived by different agents 
within the civil aviation security system? 
3. What challenges caused by the security regulations were described by 
people working at the selected airports? 
4. What are the consequences attached to implementing a 
common security regulation, regardless of airport size? 
These questions have guided the empirical endeavour and have been 
decisive in forming the research case, the methods, and the theory and 
literature chosen in this thesis. These questions also guide the empirical 
chapters and form the basis for the discussion chapter.  
1.3.1 An ‘integrated approach’ 
In this thesis, I have applied what I have called an integrated approach. 
The word integrated in relation to research often connotes cross-disciplinary 
approaches or the application of mixed methods. In relation to risk research, 
scholars such as Ortwin Renn have argued for integrating different 
perspectives on risk to give deeper understandings of both risk and the role of 
risk perception (Rohrmann & Renn, 2000). This has culminated into an 
integrative analytical framework, which integrates scientific, economic, social 
and cultural aspects in assessment and management strategies coping with 
risks (International Risk Governance Council, 2005).  
INTRODUCTION 
 
10 
 
However, the word integrated in this thesis alludes to my approach, which 
integrates several types of data collection from different levels of the civil 
aviation system. I have combined lengthy traditional ethnographic field work 
with structured and semi-structured interviews with officials from both the 
government and the authority levels in Norway and Iceland. Hence, the term 
integrated approach originally pointed to the methods applied in the research 
and the integration of data from many levels of the aviation system. This was 
a deliberate choice since I believed that this approach would create more 
layers to the research than it would have if the focus had been confined to 
either the organisational setting or the authority/government level. However, 
the analytical framework of regulation and organisation emerged along the 
way through the analysis of the empirical data that was collected and created 
yet another dimension to the integrated approach through the application of 
theory and literature from different disciplines.  
Being a social anthropologist, this rendered possible an integrated study of 
risk regulation in practice, framing it through Norwegian strategic choices for 
the national implementation of a European security regulation.  
1.4 Thesis outline 
In this chapter, issues concerning security regulation in the civil aviation 
context have been outlined as the main area of interest in this study. Through 
the main research problem and the empirical questions, this issue has been 
situated and delineated in the setting of the Norwegian civil aviation system. 
In Chapter 2, I outline the background for the development of civil aviation 
security that has led to the system as it appears today. In addition, the most 
important organisations/institutions and documents are accounted for to 
provide an overall picture of how the aviation security system is constructed, 
interwoven and connected, both internationally and nationally.  
Chapter 3 outlines the main concepts of risk and security applied in this 
thesis, resulting in a problematisation of how security risks can be perceived. 
In addition, a distinction between the regulatory types of prescriptive versus 
performance-based regulation is made to form an understanding of the range 
of regulatory types. The possibilities for the many variations can be 
comprehended by seeing these two types as belonging to two sides of a scale 
in which ‘real’ regulation is placed somewhere between the two. In this 
chapter, the main theoretical contribution of High Reliability Organisation 
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theory is accounted for, providing a foundation for understanding the 
organisation of security in aviation.  
Chapter 4 describes my methodological approach. Because the case study 
has been complex, with several research fields and methods (integrated 
approach), I have attempted to provide the reader with more details about how 
I have conducted the research. This chapter includes descriptions of how I 
have planned and have realised the study for the reader to be able to, as far as 
possible, follow the road from the planning stages to how I came to the 
findings I present in later chapters. I also try to point out how my choice of 
methods has served well to generate profound and rich data, but I also 
describe the difficulties and challenges I have met throughout the study, 
which are connected to the kind of research I have done. Additionally, I 
provide some reflections around my interpretation, preconceptions and biases.  
Chapters 5 and 6 form the empirical part of this thesis. In Chapter 5, I 
answer the first two empirical questions by accounting for the regulatory 
transition regarding aviation security described by the main actors in the 
Norwegian civil aviation system. I also present the Icelandic transition and 
strategic choices to provide an alternative view to the Norwegian system and 
Iceland’s reasons for making choices different from what the Norwegian 
authorities chose. In addition, properties of the post 9/11 security regulation 
are described by the main actors in the Norwegian civil aviation system. 
Chapter 6 proceeds from the more superior layers of the civil aviation system 
down to the airport level, where rules and regulations are put into play. This 
chapter answers the last two empirical questions. Descriptions of the 
regulatory transition and how it has affected different agents at the 
organisational level are illustrated through accounts from the three main 
organisations/groups affected by the security regulations at the airport. Data 
presented here were gathered from three Norwegian airports of different sizes 
and geographical locations. It also includes the airline crew perspective, 
which is presented separately, since airline crew is, to a large extent, more 
detached from any specific airport.  
Chapter 7 connects the findings from the two empirical chapters with the 
theoretical approach of regulation and HRO theory. Here, the consequences of 
the choice of regulatory types are discussed along with the impacts it has for 
the possibilities to organise security in civil aviation. In addition, I also 
demonstrate the relationship between the choice of regulatory type and the 
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possibility of airport security operating according to the principles of High 
Reliability Organisations. The chapter concludes by outlining current trends 
in the regulation of aviation security seen in relation to some of the main 
outcomes of this study.  
Chapter 8 is the concluding chapter where conclusions, contributions and 
limitations are provided. I end the chapter with suggestions for further 
research.  
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2 AVIATION SECURITY: BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
Following the birth of commercial aviation in the 1920s, it was not long 
before aircraft and crew were used for malicious intents. There have been 
many attempts to use aircraft in attacks, from the first ‘recorded’ hijacking in 
Arequipa in 19316 to the intent of the 2009 ‘Christmas Day Bomber’ or 
‘Underwear Bomber’ (further described below) to bomb Northwest Airlines 
Flight 253 headed for Detroit. The development of security measures in 
aviation corresponds, to a large extent, to the attacks made against 
commercial civil aviation. Responding to those attacks and threats, 
international organisations and regulatory frameworks have evolved to 
safeguard the continuance of aviation.  
The main objective of this chapter is twofold; first, to depict the 
relationship between intentional attacks against civil aviation and the 
concurrent development of organisations, documents and regulations. This 
will describe how the regulatory system for aviation security is event-based 
and retrospective and also place regulation within an international and 
European framework. Secondly, I want to situate aviation security in the 
Norwegian setting. In order to understand how the current regulatory system 
for civil aviation security is constructed, I will firstly take a closer look at the 
main evolution of what we can call an international aviation system, involving 
first international, then later, European organisations and regulations. 
Secondly, I will examine the Norwegian aviation system by describing its 
main actors and regulations. This background knowledge is necessary to 
understand how Norwegian regulation is connected to European regulation 
and to see how the EU regulation obliges member (and non-member) 
countries. This will facilitate the discussion of the main research problem 
which is the discussion of the consequences of EU regulation in Norway.  
                                                     
6 The hijacking occurred after a flight between Lima and Arequipa in Peru, where 
pilot Byron Rickards was ‘arrested’ by a revolutionary organisation upon landing. He 
was released almost two weeks later (Guinnes World Records, 2013) 
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2.1 Development of security in aviation 
The 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre stand out as the largest and 
most far-reaching attack to date, mainly because of the consequences the 
incident produced in how aviation security became organised. However, there 
have been various periods of attacks from early on in aviation history, which 
have caused a continuous development of rules, recommendations and 
regulations. There are three main phases in the kind of threats that have 
formed the basis for general development of security in aviation: 
 
 Phase 1: 1948 – 1968: Flight from persecution or prosecution 
 Phase 2: 1968 – 1994: The political phase 
 Phase 3: 1994 – present: The aircraft as a weapon of destruction 
(Irish Aviation Authority & Aviasolution, 2004) 
 
Phase 1 
This was the era of hijacking aircraft as a way for individuals to avoid 
persecution or prosecution. The airplane could be used as a quick and 
effective way to flee from a state to avoid prosecution. An example of this 
was the hijacking where three crew members (the pilot included), together 
with 21 of the 26 passengers, hijacked an airplane on the 6th of April, 1948. 
The plane was hijacked on a domestic flight between Prague and Bratislava 
(Czechoslovakia); it landed in the U.S. occupation zone in Munich (Irish 
Aviation Authority & Aviasolution, 2004). The hijackers were fleeing from 
the Iron Curtain of the East to apply for asylum in the West. The episode 
intensified the Cold War between the East and West. 
 
Phase 2 
This has been called the political phase and is seen as the beginning of 
‘modern terrorism’, with a link between politics and terrorism. The goal in 
this period was to exert pressure on the state through embarrassment, 
extortion or damage to the economy of the state. One of the most well-known 
examples of this was when Pan Am Flight 103, going from London to New 
York, was bombed on the 21st of December 1988. An explosive device placed 
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on board killed 243 passengers, 16 crew members and another 11 people on 
the ground where the plane crashed in Lockerbie, Scotland. Libya later 
admitted responsibility for the bombing (Gillen & Morrison, 2014). 
 
Phase 3 
In this phase, aircraft were beginning to be used as weapons. Phase 3 is 
considered the most dangerous and the most difficult to defend against. The 
third phase of attacks was introduced by the hijacking of Air France flight 
8969 by Algerian terrorists on the 24th of December 1994. Their intention, 
supposedly, was to blow up the aircraft over the city of Paris, but the aircraft 
was diverted to Marseille and stormed by commandos who rescued both 
passengers and crew (Irish Aviation Authority & Aviasolution, 2004). Here 
we see that the purpose of the aircraft attack had changed to being 
intentionally applied as a weapon. This ongoing phase also comprises the 
attacks on the 11th of September, 2001, where aircraft were intentionally 
crashed into high profiled buildings in the US. Two aircraft crashed into the 
World Trade Centre, one crashed into the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and 
the last aircraft crashed in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, reportedly headed for 
the White House.  
Since the 9/11 event also caused the major changes in European regulation 
of aviation security, it will be elaborated more thoroughly below in relation to 
its impact on regulatory development. In addition, other incidents that have 
had a direct or indirect effect on aviation security regulations will be 
described.  
 
2.2 Major intentional attacks in civil aviation post 9/11 
The 9/11 attacks 
As outlined above, within the third phase we find the most well-known 
attack against commercial aviation, the intentional attacks on the 11th of 
September 2001, or 9/11. By hijacking four aircraft, terrorists were able to 
deliberately fly two of them into the two buildings that constituted the World 
Trade Centre in New York, demolishing both buildings and causing the death 
of more than 2,800 people (the combined death tolls from both the World 
Trade Centre and the airplanes). In addition, a third aircraft was flown into the 
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Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and the fourth (which was supposedly 
intended to crash into the White House) crashed in Pennsylvania after 
passengers tried to regain control over the hijacked aircraft. The events of 
9/11 demonstrated a change in the nature of the attacks, wherein the intention 
was to inflict maximum collateral damage (Irish Aviation Authority & 
Aviasolution, 2004).  
The attacks on the 11th of September, 2001, had major impacts on several 
levels. One of the main findings from the 9/11 Commission7 was that “The 
most important failure was one of imagination” (National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004a, p. 9), underscoring the 
commission’s belief that the leaders of the U.S had not understood the gravity 
of the terrorist threat prior to 9/11. Similarly they stated that “The 9/11 attacks 
were a shock, but they should not have come as a surprise” (ibid, p. 2), since 
Islamic extremists had given several warnings that they aimed to 
indiscriminately harm Americans in large numbers. This lack of imagination 
led to failures at several levels, including the political, intelligence and border 
levels, including aviation security. The aviation security level was deemed 
‘permeable’, whereby the terrorists in practice were only subjected to a single 
layer of security control, which was the one they went through at the airport. 
The report recommended several improvements to aviation security measures 
that would prevent the possibility of any similar attacks.  
The results found in the aftermath of 9/11 are unparalleled. No other 
incident has ever had such widespread consequences for the organising of 
security. Security procedures have always been reactive, responding to 
previous attacks. Prior to 9/11, however, improvements in aviation security 
put forward by international organisations, such as the International Civil 
Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and the European Civil Aviation Conference 
(ECAC) (see below), were not mandatory. The policies have always been 
based on voluntary, not mandatory, compliance, which means that the 
countries have adopted (or not) the international organisations’ 
recommendations (Szyliowicz, 2004). This has resulted in a disjointed and 
                                                     
7 The 9/11 Commission was an independent commission created to account for the 
circumstances surrounding the 9/11 attacks. The commission was appointed by the 
President George W. Bush in late 2002 (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
Upon the United States, 2004b) 
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incremental approach rather than a unified standardised system between states 
(ibid). If we use the Lockerbie airliner bombing as an example, there had been 
policy proposals prior to the incident. These proposals recommended both full 
security screening of passengers and cabin luggage and reconciliation of 
baggage, meaning that if a passenger does not board the plane, the baggage is 
removed. This is to avoid people potentially checking in baggage holding 
bombs or anything intended to harm the aircraft, without travelling 
themselves. By 11th of September, 2001, most states had still not implemented 
national regulations in accordance with these recommendations. Expressed 
differently, the need for such procedures to avoid similar attacks as the one 
over Lockerbie, was identified and the procedures were developed and 
recommended, but the voluntary compliance nature of the recommendations 
had resulted in most countries not implementing the corresponding 
regulations. Aviation security improvements prior to 9/11 were developed 
through documents as ICAO’s Annex 17 and ECAC’s Doc 30 (elaborated 
below). Although these were voluntary, they were made mandatory after 9/11 
and became the bases for the development of regulatory changes in the U.S. 
and in Europe’s regulation EC No. 2320/2002, which is further described 
below.  
 
The liquid ban 
The liquid ban was implemented after an attempted terrorist attack and 
demonstrates the very reactive way regulation is developed. In 2006, a 
terrorist plot was foiled before it was carried out. This plot intended to 
detonate liquid explosives carried on board at least 10 airliners travelling from 
the United Kingdom to the United States and Canada. The plot was 
discovered by British police before it could be carried out. On the night of 
August 9th, the police arrested 24 men who planned to place liquid explosives 
in soda bottles onboard the planes. According to British terrorism experts, this 
resembled an Al-Qaeda plot, especially since the militant Islamic organisation 
had threatened to attack British aviation only weeks prior to the arrests.  
The main result of this attempted attack was the implementation of the 
‘liquid ban’. First, liquids were banned completely, but in the following 
weeks this was adjusted to the limit of allowing passengers to bring 100ml 
containers in their hand luggage. A recent regulatory development in the EU 
opens for removing the restrictions in 2014 (European Commission, 2013).  
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The Christmas Day Bomber 
One of the most recent terrorism attempts against civil aviation is the so-
called ‘Christmas Day bombing attempt’, also known as the ‘underwear 
bomber’. The attempt was made on Northwest Airlines Flight 253 between 
Amsterdam, Netherlands and Detroit, USA. On the 25th of December, 2009, a 
23-year-old Nigerian, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab had concealed plastic 
explosives sown into his underwear and attempted to detonate it before 
landing in Detroit. He failed to detonate the explosives properly and drew 
attention from passengers and crew before he could carry it out. He was 
overpowered by a passenger, and the burning, undetonated device was 
extinguished by flight attendants. Al-Qaeda later announced that they had 
been responsible for the attempted attack. If the bomb had been successfully 
detonated, the 290 persons on board would have died, and it would have been 
the deadliest aviation incident on U.S. soil. Although this incident did not 
generate any direct regulatory changes, it demonstrates the continuing threat 
facing civil aviation. 
 
The Kato Air incident 
There have been no direct, grand scale attacks on Norwegian civil aviation. 
There have, however, been hijackings on Norwegian aircraft or foreign 
aircraft hijacked to land on Norwegian soil (Tønnessen, 2008). These fall 
under the first and second phase categories, which are either hijackings to 
escape or politically motivated hijackings. The perhaps most well-known 
attack against Norwegian civil aviation was the Kato Air incident in 2004. On 
the 29th of October, 2004, on a morning flight between Narvik and Bodø, a 
small Dornier 228 airplane operated by Kato Air was subjected to a mid-air 
drama. A passenger onboard this flight entered the cockpit and attacked both 
pilots with an axe he had brought with him. After attacking them, he threw 
himself on the navigation controls and caused the plane to go into a spin. 
Thirty meters from the ground, the pilots retrieved control over the plane and 
were able to level it. While the pilots were struggling with the attacker, they 
managed to call for help and two passengers came to their aid. Together they 
were able to overpower the man, holding him down until they landed at the 
airport and the police took over. While three people were submitted to 
hospital care, all seven passengers and the two pilots survived in what was an 
incident only a hair’s breadth away from a disaster (Aftenposten, 2004). The 
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attacker himself was an asylum seeker from Algiers whose application for 
Norwegian asylum had just been rejected. He claimed insanity in court but 
was found to be sane and sentenced to 15 years in prison. He was later 
expelled from Norway back to Algiers, where he had been sentenced in 
absentia for other offenses (Moe & NTB, 2007).  
Hence, while there have been no terrorist attacks directly aimed at 
Norwegian civil aviation, the Kato Air incident became influential for 
Norway, accelerating the implementation of the EU Regulation 2320/2002. 
Within 48 hours, security was implemented on all Norwegian regional (small) 
airports, which, until then, had been exempted for the full implementation 
because of an interim arrangement with the European Union. Although it had 
been decided that security regulations would be instated on the 1st of January, 
2005, it was immediately implemented after this incident. Although the Kato 
Air incident was not defined as a terrorist attack, it was an intentional attack 
aimed at harming aircraft and passengers.   
 
The Blenheim hijacking in New Zealand in 2008 
During the interviews with the Norwegian Civil Aviation Authority 
(CAA)8, one of the interviewees brought up a case from New Zealand where 
the Norwegian government had been contacted by the New Zealandian 
government. They enquired how the Norwegian authorities had handled the 
Kato Air incident, because there had been an incident in 2008 that resembled 
the Kato Air attack; the so-called ’Blenheim hijacking’. The CAA used this 
case as an example of other variations of security measure implementation on 
domestic flights, since the result of the Blenheim case had not resulted in the 
same, immediate implementation of security measures as had happened in 
Norway after the Kato Air incident. I account below for the New Zealandian 
incident and the New Zealandian Governments’ assessment after the incident.  
On the 8th of February, 2008, Eagle Airways Flight 2279 between 
Blenheim and Christchurch, New Zealand, was hijacked. There were two 
pilots and six passengers, besides the hijacker, a 33-year-old Somali woman 
living in Blenheim. Ten minutes after takeoff, she attacked the two pilots with 
                                                     
8 The Civil Aviation Authority contributed with data through several interviews. 
See below for a description of their position within the Norwegian Civil Aviation 
system and also chapter 4 ‘Methodology’ for an elaboration of data generating. 
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knives and demanded the plane be flown to Australia. The pilots informed her 
that the aircraft had insufficient fuel. She then demanded that the plane crash 
into the ocean. She also tried to interfere with the controls of the aircraft, 
stating that she was going to crash the plane and kill everybody, claiming she 
had bombs in her luggage. The aircraft landed safely in Christchurch, where 
the pilots overpowered her and the police took her into custody (The Sydney 
Morning Herald, 2008). The woman was a Somali refugee who had stated 
previously that she had trouble coping in New Zealand society. In the court 
trial, she pleaded guilty to the charge of attempted hijacking of an aircraft and 
was sentenced to nine years in prison.  
This case significantly resembles the Norwegian Kato Air incident, which 
is why it is presented here. Although New Zealand is distant from the 
European Union and Norway, it is interesting to see how the incident created 
consequences for aviation security. Neither the Kato Air incident nor the 
Blenheim hijackings were defined as terrorist acts. The New Zealandian 
Cabinet (Government) directed officials to review domestic aviation security 
after the Blenheim incident. The review stated that “the threat from acutely 
disaffected people [is currently assessed] to be MEDIUM (feasible and could 
well occur). The threat posed to domestic aviation by terrorism is currently 
assessed to be VERY LOW (unlikely)” (Ministry of Transport, 2009a, p. 2 
(original emphasis)). At the time of the review, only 57 per cent of all 
passengers were screened. The review committee developed alternative 
strategies in which additional security screening procedures would be 
“broadly consistent with international best practice and would bring New 
Zealand into line with other OECD countries” (Ministry of Transport, 2009a, 
p. 1). A large percentage of the OECD members are also EU members 
(Norway included), and it is therefore reasonable to juxtapose what the New 
Zealandian Government describes as ‘OECD level’ of security and the EU 
level of security regulation. However, on the 18th of May, 2009, New Zealand 
Transport Minister, Steven Joyce, announced that the government would not 
extend security screening for domestic air travel. He announced that, 
“fortunately, events like the alleged hijacking in February 2008 are very rare 
in New Zealand. While there will always be some risk with unscreened 
passengers on domestic aircraft, the cost of implementing additional screening 
would have a disproportionate impact on domestic aviation and is therefore 
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unjustified, particularly in these tough economic times” (Ministry of 
Transport, 2009b).  
The Blenheim case is interesting when seen in relation to the Kato Air 
incident, as they ended up having quite different impacts. While the Kato Air 
incident was not decisive on whether regional Norwegian airports should have 
full security screening or not, since this had already been decided by the 
Norwegian authorities, it had an immediate effect. In Norway, full security 
screening was in place two days after the incident. In New Zealand, the 
Blenheim case initiated a public review of the system and based on this 
review, the New Zealandian government, through the Ministry of Transport, 
decided that implementing the same measures on the domestic flights as they 
had on international flights was disproportionate in relation to the threat level 
and, therefore, unjustified. Instead, they implemented additional flight deck 
security on domestic flights, which would make it more difficult to 
accomplish a Blenheim-style or Kato Air-style incident.  
2.3 Development of international organisations concerning 
aviation 
In order to understand Norway’s obligation in and to the European Union, 
it is vital to understand the main background for the EU, since the European 
Economic Area agreement (EEA) in a way evolved as an alternative to the EU 
for countries that, for different reasons, did not join the Union. The EEA 
agreement is what obliges Norway to follow much of the EU regulation and 
not the EU directly. I will here outline the main development of the European 
Union and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), in addition to the 
EEA agreement between the two organisations, to explain the connection 
between them and how their members this way are obligated through the EEA 
agreement, not only in trade but also in legislation. 
 
The development of the European Union 
After the 2nd World War, there were movements in the direction of 
unifying the European continent as a counter to extremist nationalist 
movements. That was the onset of the European Coal and Steel Company 
(ECSC), which attempted to unite the member states to avoid further wars by 
pooling resources. The Rome Treatise was signed in 1957, further elaborating 
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the ECSC and starting the European Economic Community (EEC), which 
established a customs union and the European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom) for the further development of nuclear energy. Although the EEC 
and Euratom were established separately from the ECSC, they shared the 
same courts and Common Assembly. In 1967 the Merger Treaty was signed, 
gathering the three communities under the name of the European Community 
(or European Communities) and creating common institutions for them. 
During the 1970’s, more countries joined the Community, and the first 
democratic election to the European Parliament was held in 1979. The 
Schengen Agreement opened up the borders between the EU countries and 
some non-EU countries (such as Norway) in 1985. In 1993, the Maastricht 
Treaty formally established the European Union. The last great change 
happened in 2009, when the Lisbon Treaty changed especially the legal 
structure, merging the three pillar systems into a single legal entity. 
What we today know as the European Union began in the aftermath of the 
large World Wars with the intention to unite Europe through common 
interests. This developed further into having more political and legal content 
and, ultimately, opening the borders between the member countries to 
facilitate the movement of people, labour and goods. Not all countries entered 
this union, and this rendered certain things difficult when it came to free 
movement.  
 
The development of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the 
European Economic Area (EEA) 
The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) was established in 1960 as 
an alternative for states that did not join the European Community (EC), 
which today is the EU. The Stockholm Convention established EFTA in 1960, 
which was then signed by seven countries9. Today only four countries – 
Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland – are still part of the 
association. These countries (except Switzerland) are part of the European 
Internal Market through the European Economic Area agreement (EEA), an 
agreement between the member states of the EU and the member states in 
EFTA. Although Norway is not an EU member, the agreement between the 
EU and EFTA makes Norway part of the European Internal Market (also 
                                                     
9 Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom 
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known as the European Single Market), comprising free movement of people, 
goods, services and capital. Because of this membership, Norway has to 
implement and comply with all regulations found relevant to the EEA 
Agreement, which for aviation security ordinarily comprises about all of the 
EU legislation.   
Although Norway chose by referendum not to seek membership in the EU, 
the EEA agreement can be considered as a compromise or possibility to be 
able to participate in the European market on the same level as the other EU 
countries. Switzerland, however, chose by referendum not to be part of the 
EEA agreement, although they are EFTA members, and is not obliged to 
follow the EU regulation in the same way. Membership in the European 
Internal Market has advantages, but it simultaneously obliges; hence 
Norway’s obligation to follow the security regulation for civil aviation.  
 
The Convention on International Civil Aviation  
In 1944, the Convention on International Civil Aviation (also known as the 
Chicago Convention) established a specialised agency of the United Nations, 
the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), to be responsible for 
regulating international civil aviation. It was originally ratified and 
implemented in 1947 by 52 states and has been revised eight times since then. 
The convention established rules of airspace, aircraft registration, and safety 
and comprises 18 annexes. Annex 17 treats security issues and includes 
requirements the civil aviation sector must accommodate. The Chicago 
Convention was not legally binding, but member states agreed to report any 
deviations from the rules. Norway ratified the convention on the 30th of 
January 1945, and the national regulations have been adjusted to 
accommodate the intentions of the convention. The EU Regulation 2320/2002 
for civil aviation was based upon the European Civil Aviation Conference’s 
(see below) Document 30 (DOC 30), which again was built on ICAO’s Annex 
17. The largest difference between the Chicago Convention’s annexes and the 
EU regulations is that, while the Chicago Convention based their regulation 
on voluntary compliance, which implied that the members were obliged to 
report deviations from recommended regulations, the EU required all member 
countries to comply with the regulations. 
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European Civil Aviation Conference  
The European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) was founded in 1955 by 
the ICAO and the Council of Europe10. Starting with 19 member states, 
ECAC today has 44 member states, including the EU’s 27 members. ECAC’s 
main task is to promote a safe, efficient, and sustainable European air 
transport system (ECAC, 2012). Its main strategic priorities are safety, 
security, and the environment. ECAC was a major agent in the development 
of the EU regulatory system for aviation security. 
2.4 Important documents and regulations 
Thus far, the main organisations related to aviation security internationally 
and in Europe have been described as well as documents and regulations 
governing aviation security given cursory treatment. These documents and 
regulations form the basis and framework within which the aviation security 
system operates (both internationally and nationally) and will, therefore, be 
described next in more detail. 
 
2.4.1 International 
Annex 17 
As outlined under The Convention on International Civil Aviation, ICAO 
established 18 Annexes. These constitute the Standards and Recommended 
Practices (SARPs) for international civil aviation. The annexes treat 
recommendations and standards for airspace, aircraft registration, and safety. 
Some examples are Annex 3, which treats Meteorological Service for 
International Air Navigation; Annex 12, which treats Search and Rescue; and 
Annex 18, which treats The Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air. 
Annex 17 treats security and was instituted to “prevent and suppress all acts 
of unlawful interference against civil aviation throughout the world” (ICAO, 
2013). This manual provides guidance and procedures on how to safeguard 
civil aviation against unlawful acts (ICAO, 2010). The Annex comprises 5 
chapters: 1. Definitions, 2. General Principles, 3. Organisation, 4. Preventive 
                                                     
10 Not to be confused with the European Council of the European Union. The 
Council of Europe is not a part of the European Union but is an independent 
organisation working for, among other things, human rights and democracy in Europe 
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Security Measures and 5. Management of Response to Acts of Unlawful 
Interference.  
 
Doc 30 
The ECAC  developed Doc 30 as a common security manual for Europe to 
be used by the member states (Irish Aviation Authority & Aviasolution, 
2004). It was first authorised in 1985 largely based on ICAO’s Annex 17. 
During the last decade, developments made in Doc 30 were later implemented 
in Annex 17, coming full circle (ibid).  
 
(EC) No. 2320/2002 
The regulation (EC) No. 2320/2002 established a common regulation on 
security for the European Union member states in 2002. The main objectives 
of the regulation were to: 
 
 Establish and implement appropriate Community measures, in order 
to prevent acts of unlawful interference against civil aviation 
 Provide a basis for a common interpretation of the related provisions 
of the Chicago Convention, in particular its Annex 17 
(European Parliament, 2015) 
 
By setting common standards that member states were obliged to follow, 
instead of recommendations that were not legally binding, security in Europe 
would be better and more consistent. “The level and quality of aviation 
security in Europe is widely considered to have improved significantly since 
the introduction of Regulation (EC) No 2320/2002 together with a system of 
legally-binding inspections” (Irish Aviation Authority & Aviasolution, 2004, 
p. 29). 
 
EC No. 300/2008 
The regulation (EC) No 300/2008 is the overhauled replacement 
framework of the 2320/2002 and was put in effect on the 29th of April, 201011. 
According to the interviewee from the Ministry of Transport and 
Communication (see Chapter 5), the main aim of the new regulation was to 
                                                     
11 It was therefore not instated during the time of the data collection for this thesis 
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simplify the regulation (2320/2002), and for it to become more risk based, 
which was a clear wish especially from the industry. As stated by industry 
sources, “the replacement of EC No 2320/2002 with No 300/2008 [is] a step 
toward a more flexible and better-harmonized aviation security system within 
Europe” (Poole, 2008, p. 15). Although one can see the new regulation as a 
move in the ‘right’ direction, a Policy Manager in ACI Europe stated in 
November 2008 that, “We are still in the early processes of a truly risk-
assessment-based system in aviation security” (Poole, 2008, p. 15).  
 
The principle of ‘One-Stop Security’ 
Neither a document nor a regulation, the principle of ‘One-Stop Security’ 
is a fundamental principle in aviation security. The objective of One-Stop 
Security is that people travelling within the aviation system should only be 
screened for prohibited items once, at the beginning of their journey (IATA, 
2013). In practice this means that when a passenger is security cleared, no 
matter which airport he originates from, he is considered ‘clean’ within the 
whole system and should not be subject to a new security screening. The One-
Stop Security principle was set as a desirable goal within European aviation 
and was practiced prior to 9/11. 
The principle of One-Stop Security explains why a security control needs 
to have the same level of thoroughness, regardless of which airport performs 
the security screening. The essential point is that when a passenger is ‘inside’ 
the system, he has received the label of being clean independently of his 
original departure location. For ‘clean’ passengers to be of the same ‘quality’ 
it demands that they be screened equally thoroughly, no matter where they 
enter the system. 
 
2.4.2 National 
The Aviation Act 
The Aviation Act, established in Norwegian law in 1993, is administered 
by the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA). The CAA is responsible for 
presenting regulations, called BSLs (Bestemmelser for Sivil Luftfart), that 
regulate all parts of Norwegian civil aviation.  In this law, there are 
established directions on how to act according to the EEA Agreement; in the 
first chapter, it is stated that “For air traffic that is comprised by the resolution 
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of the EEA Agreement, rules of complementing and implementation of the 
EEA Agreement on the area of aviation is valid in preference to the other 
law’s regulations” (Samferdselsdepartementet, 1993 [my translation]). This 
means, in practice, that a regulation found to be valid for the EEA agreement 
takes precedence over the original regulations of the Norwegian Aviation Act.  
 
The Public Administration Act 
The Public Administration Act (PAA) of the 10th of February, 1967, is a 
law stating general rules on how cases should be handled and/or treated in 
public administration (SNL, 2013). The law is valid for procedures in 
caseworks regarding both individuals and public organs. Describing the 
Public Administration Act and its mission, KS12 writes that “The PAA 
contains rules of procedure important for a good ethical standard. It contains 
practical rules to ensure equality and due process of law and to counteract 
misuse of power in administration” (KS, 2010 [my translation]). In addition, 
the PAA states that every case should be thoroughly illuminated, that all 
parties shall be given the opportunity to comment on the case and that a 
correct and adequate decision should be based on facts. In other words, the 
ethical values expressed here say something about the foundation upon which 
decisions are to be taken. They should be thoroughly elaborated, exposed to 
critique, equally applied for all, and all groups/individuals affected by the 
issue should be able to comment.  
2.5 National Aviation System 
Next I briefly present the main agents of the Norwegian civil aviation 
system, how they are associated internally, and what their responsibilities are. 
2.5.1 The Norwegian Civil Aviation System 
Until the year 2000, the Authority of the Norwegian Air Traffic and 
Airport Management Agency (Luftfartsverket) directed all areas related to 
aviation and airport operations. In 2000, it was decided to subdivide this 
agency into three new agencies (see Fig. 1), in which the Civil Aviation 
Authority (CAA) would work in a control function, the Accident Investigation 
                                                     
12 The Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities 
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Board13 would work as an investigative organ, and AVINOR, established in 
2003, would function as a government-owned limited company and owner 
and operator of the majority of airports in Norway (46) (Avinor, 2013b). By 
dividing the aviation authority, each division was to become more specialised 
in their own areas.  
Figure 1: The Norwegian Civil Aviation System (2008) 
 
 
The Ministry of Transport and Communications (MTC) 
The Ministry of Transport and Communications is one of 17 ministries 
subordinate to the Norwegian Government, led by the Prime Minister’s office. 
The Ministry is a political body that develops and promotes transportation 
policy in Norway. The superior aim for the transportation policy is to “offer 
an effective, available, safe, and environmental sustainable transport system 
that covers the society’s need for transportation in addition to regional 
                                                     
13 Will not be treated in this thesis, due to its main focus on safety-related 
accidents 
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development” (Samferdselsdepartementet, 2010, p. 1 [my translation]). The 
connection between the Ministry and the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) is 
that the CAA has the main responsibility for the supervision and inspection of 
Norwegian civil aviation. As described by the Norwegian Government, “It 
[the CAA] should be an active pushing agent for safe and public useful 
aviation according to the superior goals for the Government’s transport 
policy” (Samferdselsdepartementet, 2010, p. 1 [my translation]).  
 
The Civil Aviation Authority 
The CAA has six key areas, the security department among them. The 
main goal for the security department is to participate in developing the body 
of rules nationally and internationally regarding aviation security and to 
perform inspections of airports, airlines, cargo companies, airport suppliers, 
security guard training companies, and so on. The work of the CAA is 
subjected to control and inspection by the EFTA Surveillance Authority 
(ESA). In practice this means that the ESA performs inspections of the 
different areas for which the CAA is responsible, and the CAA will, therefore, 
be held accountable for all eventual errors, lacks or malpractice in these areas. 
In other words, the CAA inspects the airports and airport companies and the 
ESA inspects the CAA.  
 
Avinor 
Avinor is a government-owned, limited company that operates 46 of 
Norway’s commercial aviation airports. In addition to the employees at the 
various airports, Avinor has a main office located in Oslo (Bjørvika). This is 
where they not only plan and prepare everything for the airports, but also 
manage the cooperation with the CAA, the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications and international organisations, committees and forums. 
Security is one of the company’s four divisions. Avinor is responsible for 
implementing and executing security measures at all airports, which in 
practice means they are responsible for ensuring that all companies at the 
airport operate according to the security regulations. These companies can be 
anything from companies that provide fuel for the airplanes to the cafeterias 
located within the security-restricted area or the security companies that 
screen passengers, luggage and cargo. Regulations come from the CAA to 
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Avinor, and the CAA controls and inspects the airports. These inspections 
may be either unannounced or announced.  
2.6 The airports 
As elaborated above, Avinor operates most Norwegian airports for 
commercial aviation. In addition to Avinor’s 46 airports, there are a number 
of private airports; the two largest are the Rygge and Torp airports and 
municipal airports like Skien and Notodden. If we do not count Rygge and 
Torp, the private and municipal airports are small with departures mainly 
aimed at the West coast, the main area for the petroleum industry. All airports, 
whether private, municipal, or governmental, are subject to follow the EU 
regulations.  
To create an image of how an airport functions, regarding its composition 
and administration, we can say that the airport is operated by Avinor, which 
administrates the airport. The size of the work force depends on the airport’s 
size. Avinor is responsible for administration, fire and rescue and airport 
patrol (only applicable at the large airports). Many companies work at the 
airport. We can separate these into two main groups. The first comprises the 
companies that are mainly doing business aimed at the passengers, including 
restaurants, cafeterias, shops, etc. These companies mainly make contracts 
with Avinor at the local airport. The second group comprises the companies 
that must comply with the security (and safety) regulations and are subject to 
control by the Civil Aviation Authority. This means that, in addition to 
relating to Avinor, they also have to relate to the CAA directly. Examples of 
these companies are airlines, handling companies and suppliers of fuel and 
catering services. The CAA publishes the regulation these companies must 
comply with, and they are also subject to inspections. If breaches of the 
regulation (security and/or safety) are revealed, the company may lose its 
license and will be unable to continue operating at the airport. 
In selecting which groups should be part of my research case, some 
companies were chosen based on their interaction with the security regulation. 
This delineation is further described in Chapter 4, but here I will depict these 
companies as part of the description of the composition of the airport.  
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2.6.1 The Security Companies 
In Norway, Securitas and G4S are the only two companies operating at 
Norwegian airports. G4S has only been used at Oslo Airport Gardermoen 
(OSL). OSL operates somewhat independently due to its status as a subsidiary 
company of Avinor. In Norway the security screening services are selected 
through an open bid process. Different companies have been used since 
passenger and baggage screening started, but in 2008, Securitas won the bid 
on a five-year contract with Avinor as security providers at all Avinor airports 
except OSL.  
 
SECURITAS 
Securitas is a Swedish security company that operates internationally. It 
provides security personnel for everything from shopping malls to concerts, 
buildings, etc. Airport Security is a division within the Securitas organisation, 
which is certified by the CAA to educate its own security guards. They are 
also subjected to continuous testing and inspections by Avinor and the CAA 
and through their automatic computer testing system, ‘Threat Image 
Projection’ (TIP). They are also tested by markers (people with prohibited 
items on themselves or in their luggage). Avinor will hold the security 
company responsible in these tests, while the CAA will hold Avinor 
responsible.  
 
G4S 
G4S is an international security providing company with headquarters in 
England. In Norway they provide airport security only at Oslo Airport 
Gardermoen (OSL), where there were approximately 700 employees in 2009. 
G4S has much of the same company structure as Securitas and provide 
security for many different areas in addition to the airport security division. 
Since OSL operates more freely, it was able to solicit its own bids for the 
security services contract, which G4S won in 2007. G4S is subjected to the 
same testing and inspections as Securitas and is also certified to educate its 
own security guards.  
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2.6.2 Handling Companies 
The handling companies at the airports are responsible for all aircraft, 
passengers, luggage, and cargo entering the airport by redistributing or 
redirecting them and/or turning them around. This means receiving the 
aircraft after landing, guiding it to gate, getting people off the aircraft and 
giving them their luggage while receiving cargo that either needs redirecting 
or sending on, and then managing the turnaround of the aircraft by boarding 
passengers, luggage and cargo and guiding the aircraft out of the gate.  
The handling personnel are one of the employee groups most subject to 
security screenings, as they often have to move between security-restricted 
areas and non-security restricted areas14. An example is gate personnel who, 
in a typical workday, begin at the check-in desks (non-restricted) and later 
move over to the gates (restricted) to board passengers. When boarding is 
finished, they return to check-in for the next flight. Thus, they are moving 
back and forth between the restricted and non-restricted areas and also back 
and forth through the security check. Security checks for employees are not 
lighter or more superficial than the passenger security check. The ramp agents 
represent another employee group within the handling company who move 
continuously between lesser or more restricted areas at the airport and go 
through security checks for each passing. At some airports, workers 
experience up to 20-30 checks during a shift. 
 
SGS – SAS GROUND SERVICES 
SGS is part of SAS (Scandinavian Airlines), the largest Scandinavian 
airline. They mainly provide ground services for their own company but are 
open for contracts with other airlines also. All ground service contracts are 
open for bids.  
 
NORPORT 
Norport Handling is a competing company to SGS that provides ground 
services for different airlines. Norport is a younger company than SGS, as 
they were established during the process when new airlines, national and 
international, were being introduced into the Norwegian market around 2002. 
                                                     
14 For an elaboration of the security restricted areas, see chapter 6. 
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Norport operates at five Norwegian airports, including Sola Airport which is 
one of the airports in this study. 
2.7 Summarising comments 
In this chapter I have accounted for some of the major development 
characteristics of aviation security. As we have seen, aviation was considered 
early on as an international matter, and the International Civil Aviation 
Organisation (ICAO) initiated the work to develop rules and 
recommendations that would strengthen aviation against unwanted incidents. 
We can see that the framework for supranational regulation was already 
anchored on the international scene several decades before 9/11. The big 
difference was in the extent and magnitude of the regulation framework 
before and after 9/11. National regulation, which had been guided by the 
recommendations from the ICAO and ECAC, was replaced by a common 
regulation for all European countries, taking precedence over the national 
regulation. How this was accomplished in practice will be more thoroughly 
described in Chapter 5.  
Through the descriptions in this chapter, it is clear that aviation security 
can be labelled as event-based, meaning that regulation emerges in response 
to events. A very evident example of this was the liquids ban implemented in 
2006 after an attempted use of liquid explosives to harm aircraft.  
In this chapter I have outlined how the Norwegian civil aviation system is 
composed in order to create an image of their areas of responsibility. I also 
described the airport companies that are included in this study. The empirical 
material presented in Chapter 6 is principally gathered from within these 
companies. 
This chapter provides the background and context for understanding the 
empirical material presented in chapters 5 and 6. In the next chapter, I 
continue with my theoretical perspectives and present the main concepts.  
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3 THEORY 
3.1 Introduction 
Much of society’s activities are about the handling and controlling of risks 
that threaten our way of life, people and activities. This is also true for 
aviation security. Aviation has been shown to be a risky activity with 
potentially disastrous outcomes within both aviation security and aviation 
safety and is therefore underlain a risk regulation regime. Risk regulation is a 
method of risk governance, a way for (primarily) governments to handle a 
risky business instead of banning it altogether. 
The main aim of this thesis is to explore the consequences of the risk 
regulating regime that has governed Norwegian aviation security since 9/11. 
One of the basic premises in this study has been that the organisation of 
aviation security in practice needed to be seen in relation to the regulation that 
frames it. In order to do so, I have applied an integrated approach concerning 
both the collection of empirical material and in the choice of the theory and 
literature to understand it through. By exploring the regulatory changes that 
occurred and their organisational applications, I will be able to offer insights 
into the consequences of the choice of regulatory type and hence point to how 
regulatory choice15 may create constraints in the organisational setting of the 
airports.  
One of my main concerns, when speaking of consequences of regulatory 
choice, is how it influences action. Simply put, we can say that the more 
prescriptive a regulation is, the less space the regulatee will have for 
                                                     
15 In this thesis I use the term choice (i.e. regulatory choice and national strategic 
choice) to describe how Norway and Iceland have approached and handled the 
regulatory change in the EU. The Norwegian authorities did not refer to this situation 
in terms of choice, and the Icelandic authorities referred to it as a result of negotiating 
with the EU. Therefore, the term choice is mine and I apply it in a wide sense to 
indicate that the EU regulation was not imposed upon Norway in the exact form as it 
became implemented. E.g., according to interviewees at the CAA, Norway had never 
applied for any exemption as Iceland had done. This indicates that there have been 
choices in the implementation. This will also be described further in Chapter 5.   
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manoeuvring in relation to the regulation. Space in this connection therefore 
describes the possibilities the regulatee has for participation in developing, 
adapting and adjusting the regulation. To illustrate this, I have included a 
figure called ‘Space for Action’, which intends to depict this interconnection 
between prescription and action.  
In this thesis, I have chosen to apply High Reliability Organisation theory 
(HRO theory) as a tool to understand the empirical material. HRO theory 
provides a way to understand organisations that handle risky technologies. 
Understanding organisations through the lens of HRO theory is intriguing 
because it provides a framework that can tell us something about the 
components that should be present in order to be highly reliable. In Chapter 1, 
I introduced Eede’s definition of reliability: “Reliability is the system 
outcome that can be described as safe, effective and efficient, in terms of 
average and variance” (Eede, 2009, p. 5). In organisations with so much 
uncertainty that it can be difficult to evaluate the actual success of the system 
(as described in Chapter 1), HRO theory  provides a way to evaluate whether 
the organisational processes in the organisation correspond to the processes 
that lead to high reliability. Therefore, theory that indicates how 
organisational reliability is enhanced and diminished will be highly applicable 
in settings that are otherwise difficult to evaluate.  
This chapter is separated into two main parts. The first focuses on 
regulatory types and the regulation of risk. The objective of this part is to 
describe regulatory development throughout the last few decades, to describe 
the main regulatory types typical for risky industries and to discuss some of 
the critique (strengths and weaknesses) of the regulatory types. Because 
different types of regulation provide different possibilities for action, this 
chapter prepares the background for the connection between regulation and 
organisational possibilities, represented through the HRO theory.  
The second main part of the chapter focuses on High Reliability 
Organisation theory: how it has evolved and has been applied in 
organisational research. I contrast it to its most commonly applied 
‘archenemy’, the Normal Accidents Theory (NAT). In the literature, these two 
theories are often contrasted. Whereas HRO theory is considered a more 
‘positive’ theory claiming that high levels of reliability are possible, NAT is 
portraying a more ‘pessimistic’ outlook in which accidents are normal and 
should be expected. By comparing the two theoretical approaches, however, 
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the main points in HRO theory emerge. In this part of the chapter, the concept 
of collective mindfulness is introduced in relation to HRO theory. According 
to HRO theorists, mindfulness is considered to be the hard-to-grasp asset of 
people’s attention, which is important to maintain in order to operate with 
high reliability. The concept of mindfulness will be applied later in the thesis 
as a property highly entrusted to the regulatory type that constrains it.  
Prior to the two main sections in this chapter, I first focus on some of the 
fundamental concepts in this thesis. The risk regulating regime of aviation 
security is closely aligned with the protection of values, not only in an 
economic sense but also in societal terms. I find it necessary to connect the 
understanding of security, risk and what constitutes a security risk closely to 
values, and I begin with this clarification and delineation.  
3.2 Security, risk and security risks 
The concepts of security and risk are central in this thesis. In what follows 
I outline how these concepts can be defined and understood and also how they 
relate to one another. The main aim of this part is to demonstrate the 
complexity of risk thinking and its definitions in that, depending on how one 
conceives risk and defines what constitutes security risks, a negotiation of 
values commences. This negotiation of values entails what to secure, how to 
secure it, defining what and who constitutes a risk and what the protection is 
worth (both in an economical and non-economical sense). I begin by defining 
security (seeing it in relation to safety) since it has been a term often applied 
quite freely and contextually independent. This clarification is necessary since 
safety and security are clearly separated in aviation. I then continue with the 
concepts of risk and security risk: how to understand and define them, 
especially in relation to values. I end this conceptual part of the chapter with a 
brief summary. 
3.2.1 Security and safety 
In its most basic form, security can be defined as a condition free from 
danger and being protected and kept safe (Der Derian, 1995). This is very 
similar to the basic definition one finds for the concept of safety. The concepts 
are, thus, often applied interchangeably. However, in certain contexts the 
concepts are used distinctly. Through a review of the existing definitions of 
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these concepts, Piètre-Cambacédès and Chaudet (2010) find that some 
characteristic distinctions can be identified to separate them. The one most 
relevant for this thesis is the Malicious vs. Accidental distinction, in which 
security addresses malicious risks and safety addresses purely accidental risks. 
Here, accidental is understood as “related to undesired events happening 
unexpectedly and unintentionally” (Piètre-Cambacédès & Chaudet, 2010, p. 
59). Hence, we can say that the key term intentionality makes the difference, 
because when an action or attack is performed in order to intentionally cause 
harm, it is a security issue, but it is an accident and, thus, a safety issue when 
it is unintentionally causing harm.  
Now we have delineated security (and safety) through the term 
intentionality. Risk is not a concept easily defined. This is reflected through 
the numerous definitions of risk that exist. What is risk, and how can we 
understand it and, finally, what is the relationship between risk and security? I 
will attempt to answer this below. 
3.2.2 Risk 
Risk is a phenomenon that has followed peoples’ lives since, as Renn puts 
it: “human beings started to reflect [on] the possibility of their own death” 
(Renn, 1998, p. 5). However, what we call the ‘modern’ notion of risk reached 
the West some seven to eight hundred years ago (Bernstein, 1996). “[...] the 
serious study of risk began during the Renaissance, when people broke loose 
from the constraints of the past [...]. This was a time when much of the world 
was to be discovered and its resources exploited. It was a time of religious 
turmoil, nascent capitalism, and a vigorous approach to science and the 
future” (Bernstein, 1996, p. 3). However, Jaeger et al. (2001) pose the thought 
that, while the concept has been implicated in practices of insurance and 
investments for centuries, “the systematic application of risk to evaluate the 
technologies and products of high modernism is a child of the late 20th 
century” (Jaeger, et al., 2001, p. 9). Risk, as we know it, developed as a 
response to the acknowledgment of continuous larger technologies that are 
both more complex and more dangerous (ibid).  
The eagerness to define what risk was grew along with the interest in 
evaluating risks. Although there are numerous definitions of risk, they have in 
common that they presuppose a distinction between predetermination and 
possibility. Because risk implies that an outcome can happen and that it 
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occurs without predetermined certainty, it necessarily also implies uncertainty 
(Jaeger, et al., 2001). I have chosen to use Rosa’s definition of risk as a point 
of departure here, where risk is:  “a situation or event in which something of 
human value (including humans themselves) has been put at stake and where 
the outcome is uncertain” (Rosa, 1998, p. 28). When we see this definition in 
relation to other definitions of risk – for example Graham and Wiener (1995) 
who defines risk as “the probability of an adverse outcome” (Graham & 
Wiener, 1995, p. 30) – we see that Rosa includes the value aspect in his 
definition. In relation to the themes in this thesis, values (both economical and 
societal) are intrinsically a part of the protection of civil aviation and, hence, 
there is a necessity to include values in the risk definition, also. Thus, I find 
definitions as Graham and Wiener’s to be somewhat one-dimensional. 
Although I consider Rosa’s definition to be more than sufficient for the 
purpose of this thesis, I also find Aven and Renn’s (2009) evaluation of a 
selection of risk definitions to be of interest, since they extend Rosa’s original 
definition even further. They suggest the following definition where: “Risk 
refers to uncertainty about and severity of the events and consequences (or 
outcomes) of an activity with respect to something that humans value” (Aven 
& Renn, 2009, p. 13). Although Aven and Renn’s definition is quite similar to 
Rosa’s, they claim that Rosa’s definition of risk expresses an ontology 
independent of our knowledge and perceptions. They assert that “in our 
concept, risk does not exist independent of the assessor, as the uncertainties 
need to be assessed by somebody. Consider [...] lung cancer [...]. Would 
cancer exist if the conditions of cancer – the uncontrolled growth of cells – 
have not been detected [...]? Yes, cancer exists, but this is not a risk according 
to our definition” (Aven & Renn, 2009, p. 16). Hence, according to this 
definition, risk becomes a risk only after being defined as such.  
We have now established that risk is closely connected to values and is 
dependent on an assessor. This leads us over to the objectivity and 
subjectivity of risk connected to security. 
3.2.3 Risk, security and security risks 
As an analytical concept, risk has developed significantly during the past 
decades. It developed as an attempt to predict some of the consequences of 
events happening in society that were induced by ourselves and the 
environment. During the development of risk as an analytical entity, a strong 
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positivist tradition grew, treating risk as an objective ‘truth’ out there, acting 
‘on its own’. Simultaneously, the social sciences began to enter the field of 
risk research and began questioning some of the inherent assumptions upon 
which the technical analysis builds. The main contribution of the social 
sciences was to introduce the value aspect of risk. They asserted that risk was 
not, and could not be, value free, because what people perceive as undesirable 
depends on their own values and preferences (Renn, 1998). A highly relativist 
approach then evolved in response to the technical, positivist understanding of 
risk. In this approach, risk can almost be reduced to mere perceptions in the 
minds of individuals (Engen, Aven, & Pettersen, 2010). In the attempt to unite 
the different  approaches to risk, directions such as ‘scientific proceduralism’ 
(Shrader-Frechette, 1991) and ‘Reconstructed Realism’ (Rosa, 1998) were 
forwarded. These contributions tried to find a middle way between the 
cultural relativists (often represented by Mary Douglas and Aron Wildavsky) 
who “believe that risks are social constructs” (Shrader-Frechette, 1991, p. 8) 
and Naïve Positivists (represented by Chauncey Starr and Christopher 
Whipple (Starr & Whipple, 1980)), who “[...] maintain that risk evaluation is 
objective in the sense that different risks may be evaluated according to the 
same rule” (Shrader-Frechette, 1991, p. 8). 
In their article on security risks, Engen et al. (2010) look at theories of risk 
that may be applied to security risks. Here they draw on the review by Debora 
Lupton (1999), in which she describes “three major diverging sociological 
perspectives on how risk is conceptualised as a phenomenon” (Engen, et al., 
2010). She presents the ‘cultural/symbolic’ (cultural relativist) approach, the 
‘risk society’ approach, and the ‘governmentality’ approach. The 
cultural/symbolic approach take a strong constructionist approach in 
emphasising the role social and cultural processes take in identifying what 
risk is (Lupton, 1999 in Engen, et al., 2010). The ‘Risk Society’ theory 
represented by Ulrich Beck asserts that modern society is characterised by 
incalculable and uninsurable risks (C.A.S.E. Collective, 2006). “According to 
Beck, the 9/11 terrorist events escaped rational predictions and have displayed 
the limits of modern insurance technology [...] In the risk society thesis, 
hazards and insecurities are viewed as inevitable structural threats” (C.A.S.E. 
Collective, 2006, p. 468). The third approach, ‘governmentality’, draws on the 
work of Foucault, in which risk is seen as a way to order reality. Here risk is 
seen as “a way of representing events in a certain form so they might be made 
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governable in particular ways, with particular technologies and for particular 
goals” (Dean, 1999 in C.A.S.E. Collective, 2006, p. 177). In Lupton’s review 
of these three sociological perspectives, she explains that “The risk society 
theorists tend to take a fairly realist approach to risk in their emphasis on how 
risks have proliferated in late modern Western societies. From their 
perspective, risks are objective and real, although how we respond to them is 
always mediated through social and cultural processes. The cultural/symbolic 
perspective takes a somewhat more strongly social constructionist approach in 
emphasizing to a greater extent the role played by social and cultural 
processes in identifying what is risk. The governmentality perspective adopts 
the strongest social constructionist approach of the three perspectives. 
Nothing is seen to be a risk in itself; rather, events are constructed as risks 
through discourse. While all sorts of potential dangers or hazards exist in the 
world, only a small number of them are singled out and dealt with as ‘risks’” 
(Lupton, 1999 in Engen, et al., 2010, p. 1112). 
On the basis of these approaches to risk, Engen et al. (2010) proposes a 
fourth approach to risk that they label ‘Critical Realist’. They suggest that the 
approaches of Schrader-Frechette (1991) and Rosa (1998) may represent this 
critical realist approach, “due to the approaches advocating realist social 
theories when conceptualizing risk as a social phenomenon while sustaining 
an argument of hermeneutics in their epistemologies, meaning that no risk 
evaluation is value free” (Engen, et al., 2010, p. 1113). They claim that 
although security risks are hard to pin down, since security risk knowledge 
approaches the total uncertain, they are to some extent real, and they have to 
be managed as such. “Unless, there would be no meaning of the term risk at 
all” (Engen, et al., 2010, p. 1114). Connecting this with what was outlined 
above; Engen et al. include the work of Aven and Renn, which situates their 
definition on risk in a terrorist context. They claim that risks do not exist 
independently without an assessor. Uncertainties must always be assessed by 
someone. Engen et al. sum it up by asking, “Does a terrorist exist if the 
conditions of terrorism – such as social forces and intentional actors – have 
not been detected? Yes, the terrorist exists, but it is not a risk. Risk requires a 
knowledge construct of uncertainty. This construction can be based on 
observations and/or causal knowledge of the relationship between specific 
convictions and actions” (Engen, et al., 2010, p. 1115). 
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It may be time to ask how all this relates to security in aviation and the 
main threat to it, which is terrorism and intentional attacks. Pettersen et al. 
(2009) look at the response society has made through the ‘new’ security 
threats that the world has been faced with through wilful attacks by using the 
term ‘security risks’. “Security risks concern not only the identification of 
potential threats to people and objects [...] Security risks also encompass the 
value systems, social forces, and social structures that contribute to our 
understanding [of] and reactions to both hope and fears” (Pettersen, et al., 
2009, p. 1). They also bring in the fact that security risks are issues at all 
levels of society and, therefore, are highly politicised issues in which “states, 
business, industry professionals and private stakeholders are engaged in 
setting the risk agenda and in different ways affecting whether and how 
security risks are recognised, categorised and acted upon” (Pettersen, et al., 
2009, p. 1).  
3.2.4 Security risks and securitisation theory 
If we take a closer look at the ‘new’ security risks, as explained above by 
Pettersen et al. (2009), in which these ‘encompass the value systems, social 
forces, and social structures’, these risks do not seem to deviate much from 
other types of risks. However, in the continuance, they write that these 
elements ‘contribute to our understanding [of] and reactions to both hope and 
fears’, which I understand to play on the unpredictability of terrorist and/or 
intentional attacks. It follows Burgess’ point, as outlined in the introduction, 
that the aim of terrorism is not about disrupting societal services. The aim is 
to achieve a loss of confidence in these services and to produce fear of future 
threats. As Burgess points out, “The insecurity of our time is not the security 
event, the catastrophe itself, though this can be a corroborating factor, but the 
thought of the catastrophe, the fantasy of harm, careening toward us from the 
future” (Burgess, 2011, p. 7 [emphasis original]). The main intention is, thus, 
to create insecurity. One part of this insecurity is reduced through analysis and 
planning, which forms the basis for insurance that reduces the insecurity 
through compensation. The other part of insecurity is irreducible, because it 
revolves around what counts in life (Burgess, 2011). This is what Burges calls 
‘radical insecurity’ – the unforeseeable. It is this eventuality that provides the 
only basis for evaluating how we should live in the face of future threats 
(ibid). Burgess concludes, “This sense of insecurity is therefore the site of a 
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decision about what we value in human terms, and therefore it is a decision 
about our own identity, about who we are and what we want, what is 
dispensable and what is indispensable” (Burgess, 2011, p. 5 [emphasis 
original]).  
This poses a new issue if we connect this complexity of security risks and 
its considerable proportion of uncertainty with Aven and Renn’s definition of 
risk, which necessitates an assessor. As Pettersen et al. (2009) point out, 
defining security risks can be a highly politicised issue. In this 
‘problematisation’ of the definitional power of risk, it becomes easy to 
connect this to the ‘governmentality’ perspective of risk described by C.A.S.E 
and Lupton above. Although the aim here is not to go into this vast body of 
literature, it is interesting to look at one of the main contributions in this 
literature, ‘Securitisation’ theory. The main theme of this theoretical approach 
is to underscore that the ‘speech act’ of labelling something a security 
problem opens it up to the possibility of handling it differently than other 
societal ‘problems’. Wæver, as a representative from the Copenhagen 
School16, explains that it is the utterance itself, the ‘speech-act’ itself, that 
moves an issue from a ‘normal sphere’ to a ‘security sphere’. In other words, 
“The idea of securitization describes processes in which the socially and 
political successful ‘speech act’ of labelling an issue a ‘security issue’ 
removes it from the realm of normal day-to-day politics, casting it as an 
‘existential threat’ calling for and justifying extreme measures” (Williams, 
1998 in C.A.S.E. Collective, 2006, p. 453). This connects well with what 
Salter calls the ‘dispositif of security’ (Salter, 2008). “[...] the dispositif of 
security defines the objects of security. It defines what might be governed in 
the name of security, or what might be defined as security” (Salter, 2008, p. 
249). The difference between the security dispositif and a regular legal 
prohibition or disciplinary mechanism is that the security dispositif make 
certain fields amendable to specific types of governance. Salter concludes that 
“the dispositif of security is able to justify much more control by corporate, 
government, and private actors” (Salter, 2008, p. 262 [emphasis original]).  
                                                     
16 The Copenhagen School is regarded as one of the main contributors to Critical 
Approaches to Security in Europe (C.A.S.E.) alongside the Aberystwyth and Paris 
Schools. The term ‘schools’ was applied to explain different contributions when 
mapping the field of security studies (Wæver, 2004). 
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3.2.5 Summary: security, risk and security risks 
By differentiating security and safety issues according to the property of 
intentionality, security risk emerges as its own ‘category’ of risk. The 
understanding of risk in the literature has moved from the objectivst view of 
risk as objective and external to the human mind to the extreme constructivist 
view in which risk does not exist, it emerges through discourse. The approach 
taken by Engen et al. (2010), the ‘critical realist’ approach, establishes that 
although security risks approach the almost totally uncertain, they are to some 
extent real, and it is, therefore, necessary to treat them as such (Engen, et al., 
2010; Pettersen, et al., 2009). They connect this to Aven and Renn’s (2009) 
definition of risk, which requires an assessor to determine the difference 
between risks and threats. It is this property of ‘assessorship’ that is 
problematic, because, in the words of Pettersen et al., it is “a highly politicised 
issue where states, business, industry professionals and private stakeholders 
are engaged in setting the risk agenda and in different ways affecting whether 
and how security risks are recognised, categorised and acted upon” (Pettersen, 
et al., 2009, p. 1). This is further elaborated by securitisation theory, which 
points at this problematique of how calling something a security issue moves 
it out of ‘normal politics’ and into the form of the ‘politics of exceptionalism’. 
This is further elaborated by Salter and his Foucauldian term, the ‘security 
dispositif’, which describes the sphere in which definitional power is held to 
state what and how security problems should be governed.  
The concepts presented here are highly complex. They demonstrate how 
difficult it is to handle issues regarding security risks, and also how difficult it 
is to assess this handling. One of the most essential points, in my view, is the 
importance of power in the assessments of converting an issue into a security 
issue. This also places the risk regulation of security in another light because 
in such a complex environment with so high levels of uncertainty, there is the 
possibility that the defined risks that has motivated and informed the security 
risk governance is well fitted and appropriate, but it may also be that it may 
not be fitting the actual risks and threats ‘out there’. It provides a nuancing 
into the conception of the systems we create to protect us and that these are 
continually evolving and not static or assessed once and for all.   
I have now created an outline of the complex issues of risk and security 
risks. As we now continue with regulation, the examination made above 
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provides a foundation for examining regulation, especially the complexity in 
the regulation of risky industries.  
3.3 Regulation 
Aviation is and has been a heavily regulated field. In industries that may 
produce fatal consequences, regulation has worked as an attempt to control 
the risks to which the industry is prone. Instead of banning the risky industry, 
the attempt has been to reduce the risks to an acceptable level. After 9/11/01, 
a major expansion occurred regarding the amount of regulation in aviation 
security. It expanded, became more detail oriented and turned into a highly 
prescriptive regulatory regime. While the previous regulatory system was 
oriented around many of the same documents that later worked as the 
foundation for formulating the post-9/11 security regulation, the rigidity, 
specificity and detail-level increased. In this thesis, I have chosen to contrast 
two regulatory types that can be considered as pertaining to two sides of a 
scale: the prescriptive and the performance-based regulatory types. The scale 
should be considered as a theoretical one, in which the types of regulation are 
‘ideal types’. Real regulation will be found somewhere between the two types. 
What differentiates these two regulatory types is primarily the possible ‘space 
for action’ for the regulatee (Engen et al., 2013). In short, we can say that the 
more the cursor moves in the direction of prescription, the more the space for 
action shrinks (see fig. 2 below). Consequently, the more it moves in direction 
of goal orientation, the more the space for action expands. 
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There are clear benefits and disadvantages for different kinds of regulation, 
as well as great differences in possibilities and constraints. This part of the 
chapter aims, therefore, to clarify how regulation can be conceived and 
defined as well as to contrast the two regulatory types by describing their 
development and application. This will provide tools for understanding the 
background for the regulatory environment of aviation security described in 
Chapter 5.  
3.3.1 What is regulation? 
In simple form we can say that to regulate is to create rules and to 
propagate them (Brunsson & Jacobsson, 2000). Often regulation is conceived 
as restricting behaviour in order to prevent certain undesirable activities 
(Baldwin, Scott, & Hood, 1998), although a broader view of regulation is that 
it not only prevents but also facilitates or enables (ibid). According to Hood 
(2001), there should at least be three core functions present in a control 
system, which a regulatory system can be understood as, “There must be some 
capacity for standard-setting, to allow a distinction to be made between more 
or less preferred states of the system. There must also be a capacity for 
information-gathering or monitoring to produce knowledge about current or 
changing states of the system. On top of that must be some capacity for 
behaviour-modification to change the state of the system” (Hood, et al., 2001, 
Performance-
based regulation 
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Figure 2: Regulatory types’ influence on Space for Action 
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p. 23). Thus, instead of searching for the ‘correct’ definition of regulation, we 
can say what a regulatory system should contain.  
Now we have established a basic description of what a regulation is. Is 
there any difference between the regulation of safety/security17 and other 
types of regulation? According to Hopkins and Hale (2002) it is, in many 
regulatory areas, possible to make requirements of direct outcomes, whether 
fishing quotas, taxation of people and businesses or price fixing agreements.  
In safety, this is not possible, since the objective is to prevent harm – harm to 
workers, passengers, local residents, etc. (Hopkins & Hale, 2002). In risky 
industries potential harm always goes hand in hand with the industry, or as 
Wildavsky claims, “there can be no safety without risk” (Wildavsky, 1988, p. 
1). It is, however, deemed acceptable, as there is a societal gain in the 
industry. Since we cannot separate the risk from the industry, it will not be 
possible to impose a regulation that demands that no harm should be done. 
“All that can reasonably be required of those who control our workplaces, 
who transport us or who make goods and services we consume is that they 
minimize the risks to which they subject us” (Hopkins & Hale, 2002, p. 3). In 
order to minimise that risk, regulatory systems are created in order to direct 
how this should be done. The two main directions of regulatory types are 
usually contrasted by opposing prescriptive regulation with performance-
based (goal oriented) regulation.  I will follow that tradition and begin by 
outlining the two regulatory types. 
3.3.2 Prescriptive regulation 
Prescriptive regulation revolves around specifying and prescribing rules 
and standards, typically in a detailed fashion. Abiding by the rules and 
standards are presumed to provide the desired outcome in regards to 
regulatory goals. Prescriptive regulation as a regulatory type was developed in 
response to the industrial revolution. It required the risk creators to adhere to 
very specific, technical requirements, which could be anything from defining 
ladder heights to describing specific procedures. After technology developed 
further, the volume of the prescriptive regulations increased exponentially. 
                                                     
17 In this connection, the regulation of security and safety is juxtaposed since 
their goal is the avoidance of unwanted incidents with large consequences. 
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This led to a system that has been described as “unwieldy, unenforceable and 
unworkable” (Hopkins & Hale, 2002, p. 4).   
During the 1970s, traditional regulation of safety went through a so-called 
‘regulatory crisis’. “There was a strong deregulatory rhetoric, centring on 
alleged over-regulation, legalism, inflexibility and an alleged absence of 
attention being paid to the costs of regulation” (Hutter, 2005, p. 1). The 
Robens Report of 1972 recommended that “rather than specifying standards 
and procedures to enhance safety, legislation should specify the policy goal 
itself – safety, and require employers to ensure the safety of their workers, so 
far as reasonably practicable” (Robbens (1970) in Hopkins & Hale, 2002, p. 
4). Reports like the Robens and Cullen Report (1990; 1972) became major 
drivers in regulatory development in the UK, corresponding development in 
the US (as exemplified by Reagan’s rhetoric of ‘regulatory relief’ (Hutter, 
2005)) and the EU quickly followed. During this development, shortcomings 
with prescriptive safety regulation began to appear: First, in prescriptive 
regulation, the service provider is only obliged to follow prescribed actions 
and is, therefore, released of legal responsibilities beyond that. Second, 
prescriptive regulation tends to be retrospective, a product of past experiences, 
and can therefore be inappropriate and/or create unnecessary dangers in 
technically innovative industries. Third, the regulation provides best 
engineering practices from the time period they are written and becomes 
deficient in changing industries (Penny, Eaton, Bishop, & Bloomfield, 2001).  
Wilpert points to another type of problematique related to prescriptive 
regulation. He claims that a fundamental problem of compliance orientation is 
that, in order to be effective, it would require a theoretical insight and 
understanding of how the prescribed norm affects (obedient) behaviour. This 
cannot be systematically controlled. Consequences of this may be: 
 
 Inundation of regulations, proliferation of regulatory requirements; 
 Increase of conflict relations and distrust between regulator and 
regulated; 
 Information asymmetries between regulated and regulator since 
regulated is closer to emerging problems; 
 Increased de-motivation and tendency to unreflective compliance 
with rules; 
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 Reduced learning for all parties involved; 
 Inflexibility due to lengthy rule making processes; 
 Increase of operational responsibility for the regulator with potential 
liabilities. 
           (Wilpert, 2008, p. 373) 
 
This leads to a syndrome that has been called ‘adversarial legalism’ 
(Kagan (1999) in Wilpert, 2008)  which mainly points at practices in which 
policy-making litigation is dominated by lawyers and not bureaucrats in an 
‘anti-adversarial’ manner; expressed differently, non-negotiable practices with 
excessive faith in compliance. Wilpert’s concern is mainly about the long 
tradition of engineering science practices that is mainly oriented around the 
control of technical components and of the processes that follow natural laws. 
His point is that “Natural science paradigms, however, appear inadequate for 
the intention to control human factors, organization and management” 
(Wilpert, 2008, p. 373).  
3.3.3 Performance-based (goal oriented) regulation 
As previously described, a movement away from prescriptive regulations 
took place as the shortcomings of this type of regulation became more 
evident. Hand in hand with government reform that has occurred during 
recent decades, there have been reforms of the traditional ways of achieving 
regulatory goals (May, 2007). This has given way to experimentation with 
other approaches to regulation, such as (among others) voluntary approaches, 
in which industry and government cooperates in making codes of practice; 
self-auditing approaches, in which industries assess themselves; and 
performance-based approaches that regulate for goals rather than prescribing 
specified procedures and technologies (May, 2007). In relation to the 
regulation of safety industries or high-hazard industries, prescription or 
performance-based regulation has been prominent (sometimes in 
combination).  
The regulatory outcome is specified in a performance-based regulation. It 
emphasises the desired result rather than the exact procedures to achieve it, 
leaving it more to the regulated to determine how to achieve the goal (May, 
2007). “The central change under the performance-based approach is the 
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attention to outcomes as part of regulatory rules and standards” (May, 2007, 
p. 10). Kordek and Salvi (2009) provide the following definition of goal-
based regulation: “[it is the] development and implementation of lawful texts 
which prescribe objectives and which leave the choice of the means to reach 
them (Kordek & Salvi, 2009, p. 6). 
Table 1: Comparison of regulatory regimes 
                    Regulatory Regime 
  Prescriptive   Performance-based 
  regulation   regulation 
Regulatory foci Prescribed action Results or outcomes 
Compliance Adherence to    Achievement of  
determination prescribed actions   desired results 
Nature of rules Particularistic and Goal-oriented outcome 
and standards detailed specifications specifications 
Basis for  Adherence to  Regulatory goals are 
achieving  prescriptions assumed   embedded in the 
regulated goals to meet goals  results orientation 
Examples Dominant regulatory       Aspects of air and 
  approach in the USA   water quality, building 
  for environmental and and fire safety, energy, 
  social regulation and pipeline safety 
 
 
There are identified several advantages of implementing a more 
performance-based regulatory approach. One of the main benefits is that it 
demands a greater engagement from the regulated entity, since the 
responsibility to achieve the stated goal is put on the regulated. The regulated 
needs to demonstrate to the regulator that the goal has been satisfactorily met 
(Jenkins, 2012). “A goal based route requires engagement with the objective, 
and an active demonstration that the goal has been met” (Jenkins, 2012, p. 2). 
This is also why this type of regulation is sometimes called self-regulation, 
since it is up to the regulated entities to create their own set of rules and 
standards and to police and monitor their own performance regarding those 
standards (Kirwan, Hale, & Hopkins, 2002a). Another advantage is that 
performance-based regulation may circumvent complacency. Complacency 
may arise within a prescriptive system, since the predefined rules, standards 
 Modified after May (2007, p. 10) 
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and check-lists seem to conduce to an implicitly good safety standard. Thus, 
trust is placed on bureaucratic control to determine the adequacy of safety 
(May, 2007). The performance-based approach is also more flexible, because 
it offers the possibility of using alternative means to reach the objectives 
(May, 2003). This will be important for the spending of resources, since 
performance-based regulation seeks to avoid the regulatory pitfalls of 
unnecessary and/or inappropriate requirements (May, 2007).  
3.3.3.1 Risk-based regulation 
In an attempt to simplify a quite complex web of regulatory approaches, I 
have chosen to see risk-based regulation as pertaining to the category of 
performance-based regulation. This is mainly because, like other 
performance-based regulations, this approach evolved from the ‘regulatory 
crisis’ (as outlined above) in the 1980s and 1990s. As asserted by Peterson 
and Fensling, “Risk-based regulation is part of the movement away from 
prescriptive, command-and-control regulation, and toward outcome, or 
performance-based regulation” (Peterson & Fensling, 2011, p. 6). Risk-based 
regulation can be defined as “the application of a systematic framework that 
prioritises regulatory activities and deployment of regulators’ resources on 
evidence-based assessment of risk” (Baldwin and Black (2007) in Peterson & 
Fensling, 2011, p. 2). Risk-based regulation includes several approaches that, 
at a minimum, entail the use of technical, risk-based tools (Hutter, 2005). 
Risk-based regulation leans on a cost-benefit perspective that acknowledges 
that resources are always limited and that resources that are applied at one 
place will not be available for use elsewhere (Bounds, 2010). An efficient use 
of regulatory resources is needed to maximise the benefits of regulation and, 
hence, its benefits for society. This implies applying the regulatory resources 
where they can achieve maximum benefit to society (Bounds, 2010). Risk 
assessments should be used to identify where the resources are best applied. 
“A risk-based approach to regulation explicitly acknowledges that the 
government cannot remove all risks and that regulatory action, when taken, 
should be proportionate, targeted and based on an assessment of the nature 
and magnitude of the risk and of the likelihood that the regulation will be 
successful in achieving its aims” (Bounds, 2010, p. 16). The regulatory 
response should, therefore, be informed by an assessment of the probability of 
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the harm, and where this cannot be calculated, a rational and transparent 
consideration of other factors should be considered (Bounds, 2010).  
The advantages of a risk-based regulatory approach are the same as for 
other performance-based regulations. But one of the major arguments for 
applying the risk-based type of performance-based regulations is how it 
advocates the use (or avoids the faulty use) of resources within safety 
industries. Bounds points to the fact that sometimes governments respond to 
hazardous events with reactive regulation. This often happens in the aftermath 
of events that receive much media and political attention. The governments 
then draft regulations that give an impression to the public that the causes of 
the problem have been addressed, but this may be a faulty impression when 
the regulations are neither effective nor able to address the risk at hand 
(Bounds, 2010). This kind of regulatory failure has costs, the most obvious 
being that resources are spent in an inefficient area. But a consequence of this, 
according to Bounds, can be that “in a perverse way, poorly designed 
regulation that fails to address risk at the right level in society may actually 
increase the vulnerability of society creating situations of moral hazard and 
inhibiting innovation through the development of new and better methods to 
reduce risk” (Bounds, 2010, p. 17). 
3.3.3.2 Regulation revisited 
Regulation is no simple task, and the regulatory types presented here can 
be considered as ideal types. The critique of the prescriptive type of regulation 
runs through the account here, since it was the first kind of regulation that 
evolved with the industrial revolution. Since then, this form of regulation has 
met hard criticism, and alternative types of regulation evolved from that. It is 
possible to see the performance-based regulation as a reaction to prescriptive 
regulations that have been perceived as overly rigid and inflexible (May, 
2003). Although there are several advantages given for choosing a more 
performance-based regulation, this is by no means unproblematic. The 
potential benefits of this type of regulation revolves around not only increased 
effectiveness and flexibility but also better potential for innovation and 
reduced compliance costs for the regulated. The disadvantages, however, may 
be inconsistency in the application of rules and increased costs to the 
governmental regulators. The latter stems from the fact that while 
performance-based regulation may be less costly to develop, they may be 
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more expensive to enforce because of the greater vagueness of performance 
standards, together with the regulator’s possible lack of expertise (May, 
2003). Risk-based regulation is usually criticised by the cost/benefit approach, 
since indirect costs and benefits are seldom considered (Hutter, 2005). In 
addition, it will always be difficult to choose between competing analyses, as 
well as deciding how much weight one should give to public fears (which are 
more subjective and, hence, difficult to include in a rational cost/benefit 
analysis). Nevertheless, in many cases, it is not a question of either/or when it 
comes to regulation. Instead, regulation in practice can often be a combination 
of prescriptive and performance-based regulations. 
3.3.4 Prescription, proceduralisation and the ‘human component’ 
Prescriptive regulation is closely connected to what has been labelled 
‘proceduralisation’. Bourrier and Bieder describes proceduralisation as 
meaning two things “firstly an aim at defining precise and quantified safety 
objectives, secondly an aim at defining a process describing and prescribing at 
the same time how to achieve such objectives” (Bieder & Bourrier, 2013a, p. 
3). While prescriptive regulation is connected to the regulatory reality, 
proceduralisation frames a way of performing, in job tasks and practical 
performance. Within the frames of this study, we can say that the prescriptive 
regulation describe the framework where organisations have to operate within, 
while it is the local regulation and work instructions at the airports that is the 
object of proceduralisation.  
Within a prescriptive type of regulation, there will be a great deal of 
detailed specification of procedures. This is also the essence of 
proceduralisation. Procedures have become key features of modern 
organisations, but within the management of safety this has been predominant 
(Bieder & Bourrier, 2013a). Prescriptive rules have held an important role in 
the creation of systems that have searched for safer performance based on 
assessments of past experiences (Moore, 2005). This is also true for 
proceduralisation, which has been crucial in the construction of, among 
others, aviation safety practices (Bieder & Bourrier, 2013b; Pélegrin, 2013). 
The origin of proceduralisation is responses of previous experiences. As 
Bieder and Bourrier describe “It was [...] the only response that made sense in 
a world where beliefs on safety were (and still are in many places) based on a 
model which assumes that safety results from reliable equipment, good 
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procedures and processes, well-behaved operators and well designed 
organizations” (Bieder & Bourrier, 2013a, p. 3). What is it about prescribing 
procedures that attracts safety industries so much? There are several 
advantages of applying procedures and they largely follow the advantages 
found in prescriptive regulation; consistency and control. By describing, often 
in detail, how procedures should be performed, little room is given for 
variable performance. It reduces uncertainty in normal and abnormal 
situations and hence risk (Pélegrin, 2013). It is simultaneously easier to 
control compliance and to audit performance through this way of organising 
job tasks. However, the application of procedures alone does not ensure safety 
(Fucks & Dien, 2013). Fucks and Dien refer to Bourrier (1999) who list six 
main reasons as to why it is difficult to solely rely on procedures “[...] 
structural incompleteness of the rule, process and persons variability, 
undefined use conditions (implicit model of users taken into account by the 
designer of procedures), application conditions not always defined (specific 
situations can make procedure poorly adapted), organizational variability and 
reference to ideal situations [...]” (Fucks & Dien, 2013, p. 27). In addition, the 
excessive use of procedures and detailed descriptions of work tasks often 
pacifies people since the focus is on compliance with rules and procedures 
and not the end goal (safety) itself. Procedures are ordinarily applied in two 
ways (not exclusive) where procedures are either used as an aid or tool, or 
they are used as rules that one is bound to follow (Fucks & Dien, 2013). In 
organisations that coercively apply procedures, they tend to turn workers and 
managers into ‘little soldiers’ not acting until orders are given (ibid). The 
application of rules as ‘constraint’ particularly influences work behaviour and 
result in a simple criteria: “if you act within the boundaries (the prescriptions) 
you are right and if you act outside them, you are wrong” (Fucks & Dien, 
2013, p. 33).  
What we see, then, is that prescription and proceduralisation may lead to 
uniform and consistent behaviour in organisations. What seems to be more or 
less absent in this logic is the ‘human component’ of the system. Does this 
mean that humans are a liability in high-risk systems? Variable performance 
has in high-risk systems often been connected to ‘deviant human behaviour’. 
Prescriptive regulation and heavy proceduralisation has therefore been used to 
‘protect’ the system from variance caused by people. Rigid systems are 
constructed around a conviction that the prescribing of all procedures in detail 
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will ensure safety. Hollnagel (2008) calls this the ‘error-counting paradigm’, 
where “this paradigm often prescribed automation as a means to safeguard the 
system from the people in it [...;] work on safety comprised protecting the 
system from unreliable, erratic, and limited human components (or more 
clearly, protecting the people at the blunt end – in their role as managers, 
regulators and consumers of systems – from unreliable ‘other’ people at the 
sharp end – who operate and maintain those systems)” (Hollnagel, Nemeth, & 
Dekker, 2008, p. 4). Hollnagel continues by saying that research shows that 
humans are actually found to be providers of safety through their abilities to 
adapt when it comes to unforeseen events, gaps in the system and change 
(Hollnagel, et al., 2008). This way, we see two perspectives on the role of 
humans in high-risk systems; the first is represented by the prescriptive 
systems which are based on mistrust and the second, more positive view, is 
that humans actually contribute to safety. How this latter perspective may 
contribute to safety will be further elaborated below in relation to HRO theory 
and collective mindfulness.  
3.4 High Reliability Organisation theory (HRO theory) 
New kinds of risks have accompanied the development of new science and 
technologies. Through major risk events like Three Mile Island (1979) and 
Chernobyl (1986), the new scientific and technological developments were 
fundamentally questioned and led to great public concern (Hutter, 2010). 
There will always be a balance in such cost-benefit equations between the 
possible profitable outcomes the technology brings and the risk and harm they 
may cause society. “Science and technology simultaneously explore new 
innovative avenues which hold potential to advance our lives in positive ways 
but which may also present us with new risks or uncertainty” (Hutter, 2010, p. 
5). In designing organisations operating in high risk environments, the 
possibility to create reliable systems therefore becomes crucial. Reliability can 
be defined in several ways, depending on the discipline, context and 
worldview (Eede, 2009). Earlier in this chapter, Eede’s definition of reliability 
has been applied. To compliment this definition we can add Weick and 
Sutcliffe’s explanation of reliability which is “what one can count upon not to 
fail in doing what is expected” (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, p. 91), while 
another definition defines reliability as the “unusual capacity to produce 
collective outcomes of a certain minimum quality repeatedly (Hannan & 
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Friedman, (1984) in Weick, et al., 1999, p. 86). In this thesis, I choose to lean 
on Eede’s definition that “Reliability is the system outcome that can be 
described as safe, effective and efficient, in terms of average and variance” 
(Eede, 2009, p. 5). Average refers to an expectation that a system works ‘most 
of the time’ and variance refers to expected, unreliable occurrences18.  
In the aftermath of some of the great organisational disasters, such as the 
ones mentioned above, there were theoretical developments in the approaches 
to safety and reliability in high technological systems. This was the result of 
the acknowledgement that organisations played a critical role in the 
understanding and the management of risks in modern societies (Hutter, 
2010). This led to a focus on studying organisations that could demonstrate 
reliability under trying conditions, which has been labelled HRO theory.  
3.4.1 High Reliability Organisations and Normal Accidents Theory 
High Reliability Organisation theory (HRO theory) is often contrasted to 
Charles Perrow’s Normal Accidents Theory (NAT) since the theories usefully 
stand in stark contrast to each other and have also dominated the discussion of 
organisational reliability since the 1980s (Eede, 2009). HRO stands as the 
positive theory that claims that accidents in complex technological systems 
can be prevented, while NAT presents a more pessimistic view where such 
accidents are inevitable. HRO theory developed through different stages. In 
what follows, I will outline the main directions within HRO theory and 
finalise it with a contrasting of the HRO and NAT approaches to 
organisational reliability. Since Normal Accidents Theory is not my main 
concern but is used more here as a contrast to the HRO theory, the main focus 
will be given to HRO theory, and I will just outline the main points of NAT 
below.  
3.4.1.1 HRO background 
HRO theory was originally developed by a group of scholars who were 
interested in organisations operating in high risk environments where the 
outcomes of accidents could be catastrophic. These scholars were in essential 
                                                     
18 For further elaboration of average reliability and variance in reliability, see Eede 
(2009) pps. 3-5. 
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agreement that “serious accidents with hazardous technologies can be 
prevented through intelligent organizational design and management” (Sagan, 
1993, p. 14). According to Eede (2009), the development of the HRO theory 
can be seen as a three step process. The first one was created by Joseph 
Morone and Edward Woodhouse (1986), who studied the management of 
toxic chemicals, nuclear power and genetic engineering and found that the 
safety records were surprisingly good. Although they acknowledge that there 
is always ample room for improvement in safety measures, they also state that 
“given the challenge posed by modern technologies, the record to date is 
surprisingly good: despite dire warnings, no catastrophes have occurred in the 
United States” (Morone & Woodhouse, 1986, p. 5)19. This good record of 
safety could be, according to the authors, “[...] a systematic product of human 
actions – the result of a deliberate process by which risks are monitored, 
evaluated, and reduced” (Morone & Woodhouse, 1986, p. 8). Their focus 
worked mainly around the identification of the processes and strategies in the 
organisations that produced the good safety record.   
The second major approach is the ‘anticipation’ and ‘resilience’ strategies 
in Aaron Wildavsky’s well-known 1988 book, “Searching for Safety” 
(Wildavsky, 1988). Anticipation describes a strategy of predicting and 
preventing harm before it has occurred. Resilience is the effort of ‘bouncing 
back’ after an accident has occurred. Wildavsky’s main focus was to examine 
the cost and benefits for these two strategies, claiming that all managing of 
risk became optimal through a mix of anticipation and resilience (Sagan, 
1993). 
The third approach originated at the University of California, Berkeley, 
which has also lent its name to the group that was later called The Berkeley 
Group. The roots of this approach began with the work of the two approaches 
described above, with Marone and Woodhouse on one side and Wildavsky on 
the other (Eede, 2009). Based on their work, the founders of The Berkeley 
group, Karlene Roberts, Todd LaPorte, and Gene Rochlin, fully developed the 
HRO theory (ibid). They performed empirical research of especially three 
hazardous organisations: the air traffic controllers, the Pacific Gas and 
                                                     
19 Morone and Woodhouse consider Three Mile Island to be the worst reactor 
mishap in the American nuclear industry but more as a financial disaster than a 
nuclear disaster (Morone & Woodhouse, 1986, p. 8). 
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Electric Company that includes the facilities of the Diablo Canyon nuclear 
power plant, and flight deck operations on two US Navy aircraft carriers. The 
Berkeley Group argued that these organisations were able to perform in nearly 
error free operations (Sagan, 1993). Through their research, they maintained 
that “we have begun to discover the degree and character of effort necessary 
to overcome the inherent limitations to securing consistent, failure free 
operations in complex social organizations” (LaPorte (1991) in Sagan, 1993, 
p. 15). These organisations were, therefore, seen as providers of important 
lessons in the management of other hazardous organisations. “Most of the 
characteristics identified here should operate in most organisations that 
require advanced technologies and in which the cost of error is so great that it 
needs to be avoided altogether” (Roberts (1989) in Sagan, 1993, p. 16).  
These three approaches have focused upon different kinds of 
organisations, and they also diverge on different aspects of explanations and 
prescription, but they share the underlying assumptions about how these 
organisations function plus a set of four traits considered to contribute to the 
high degrees of safety. These traits are: 
 
 Leadership objectives: where political elites and organisation 
leaders place a high priority on safety and reliability. 
 The need for redundancy: where significant levels of redundancy 
exist, permitting backup or overlapping units to compensate for 
failures. 
 Decentralisation: where error rates are reduced through 
decentralisation of authority, strong organisational culture, and 
continuous operations and training, and 
 Organisational learning: This takes place through a trial-and-error 
process, supplemented by anticipation and simulation. 
(Sagan, 1993)  
 
These four factors constitute “a route to extremely reliable operations even 
with highly hazardous technologies” (Sagan, 1993, p. 17). This is due to the 
fact that these conditions have been witnessed in a number of the 
organisations investigated. The theory is, therefore, that if these conditions 
exist in an organisation, it will be possible to prevent serious accidents and 
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catastrophes. “While the high reliability theorists do not state what precise 
amounts and mixtures of these factors are necessary for operational success 
with hazardous technologies, their overall optimism is clear. Properly 
designed and well-managed organisations can safely operate even the most 
hazardous technologies (Sagan, 1993, p. 28). 
3.4.1.2 The Berkeley School and the Michigan School 
Building upon the work of Morone, Woodhouse and Wildavsky, The 
Berkeley Group developed the HRO theory. What differentiated them from 
their predecessors was the organisational perspective to organisational 
reliability (Eede, 2009). The Michigan School was also preoccupied with 
HRO theory, but their theoretical dimension was largely extended on Karl 
Weick’s Sensemaking notion (Eede, 2009). “Sensemaking is the process of 
creating a mental model of a situation, particularly when this situation is 
ambiguous” (Eede, 2009, p. 61). It is “a motivated, continuous effort to 
understand connections (which can be among people, places and events) in 
order to anticipate their trajectories and act effectively” (Klein, Moon & 
Hoffman (2006) in Eede, 2009, p. 61). Some of the main contributions of the 
Michigan school have been their introduction of “mindfulness” (which will be 
elaborated further below) and “resilience”. The main idea of the mindfulness 
approach is that it has moved the focus away from the more traditional 
decision-making theory and accident prevention and more over to 
interpretation and inquiry that are grounded in capabilities for action (Eede, 
2009). The main point of the Michigan contribution is, therefore, that HROs 
are reliable, because they are able to have a state of mindfulness (ibid).  
3.4.1.3 HRO and NAT ‘head to head’ 
In a 1982 book edited by Sills, Wolf, and Shelanski, Todd LaPorte posted 
his contribution on High Reliability Organisation theory in relation to the 
accident at Three Mile Island, which was a partial melt down of a nuclear 
power plant in Dauphin County, Pennsylvania, in 1979. LaPorte discusses the 
inherent and potential dangers in large and complex organisations dealing 
with hazardous technologies. He argues for an integration of social sciences in 
the development and design of what he labels “almost error-free” 
organisational systems (LaPorte, 1982). In the very same book, Charles 
Perrow introduced his Normal Accidents Theory, stating that accidents in 
THEORY 
 
59 
 
large and complex technological systems are inevitable. Although complex 
organisations may work hard to avoid serious accidents and maintain safety 
and reliability, accidents are a ‘normal’ result and inevitable over time (Sagan, 
1993). While the HRO theorists maintain that organisations are quite rational 
actors, the NAT theorists question what happens when performance is 
somewhat relaxed. James March, also a NAT theorist, asserts that when one 
relaxes the assumptions on organisational behaviour, a much more 
complicated and conflictual vision emerges:  “[Organisations] exhibit internal 
conflict over preferences. Once such conflict is noted, it is natural to shift 
from a metaphor of problem solving to a more political vision” (March (1981) 
in Sagan, 1993, p. 28). This approach stands in contrast to the much more 
rational view of the organisations that HRO theory describes. Perrow argues 
that models of the organisations’ behaviour are described as much more 
rational and effective than they are in the real world. He thinks that 
organisations are greatly influenced by sheer chance, accident and luck 
(Sagan, 1993, p. 31).  
Perrow identifies two structural features of many organisations that operate 
in high hazard environments: ‘interactive complexity’ and ‘tight coupling’. 
Because of this, organisations are prone to accidents, regardless of their 
leaders’ and operators’ intentions to counteract them. According to Perrow, 
“complex interactions are those of unfamiliar sequences, or unplanned and 
unexpected sequences, and either not visible or not immediately 
comprehensible” (Perrow, 1999, p. 78). He argues that no matter how hard 
people work to anticipate and fix all potential problems, unlikely and bizarre 
problems will occur. It is often the bizarre and banal failure that causes the 
normal accident. Unanticipated incidents in organisations with high 
interactive complexity like these are inevitable, according to Perrow. 
Although interactive complexity is the cause of bizarre failures, it is the 
second structural condition that Perrow calls tight coupling that is necessary 
to escalate an incident into a full normal accident. Firstly, tightly coupled 
systems typically have time-dependent processes in which production needs 
to move fast. Secondly, there is little possibility to vary production methods. 
Thirdly, they have little room for slack, which means that production must be 
precise, and fourth and lastly, safety devices, buffers, et cetera, are limited to 
the ones already designed into the system (Perrow, 1999). Sagan sums up 
Perrow’s argument by saying that “If a system has many complex 
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interactions, unanticipated and common-mode failures are inevitable; and if 
the system is also tightly coupled, it will be very difficult to prevent such 
failures from escalating into a major accident” (Sagan, 1993, p. 36).  
3.4.1.4 The Two Approaches Revisited 
The two theories are quite contrasting and clearly competitive as well. 
“His [Perrow’s] pessimistic conclusion – that “serious accidents are 
inevitable, no matter how hard we try to avoid them” – sharply contrasts 
against the optimism displayed by the HRO theorists” (Sagan, 1993, p. 31). 
HRO, on the one side, holds a positive view of high hazard organisations and 
their ability to approach near error-free and near-perfect reliability and safety, 
while NAT, on the other side, leads to a much more pessimistic view, in 
which serious accidents are inevitable. However, the HRO theorists do not 
dispute the logic of Perrow’s argument that in theory, interactive complexity 
and tight coupling lead to accident-prone organisations; rather, they assert that 
the degree to which human agency can counter and compensate the structural 
pressure is much higher and has the possibility to avoid normal accidents in a 
much larger extent than Perrow holds. In direct contrast to Perrow, HRO 
theorists argue that “The[se] organisations have developed strategies for 
avoiding the negative effects of these characteristics” (Roberts, 1990). For the 
HRO theorists, if these conditions are met, a highly optimistic prediction of 
near-perfect safety is warranted: “Parts of these systems do fail,” Roberts 
conclude in a critique of Perrow’s book, but “it is really not clear that all high-
risk technologies will fail” (Roberts (1989) in Sagan, 1993, p. 47). Sagan 
concludes by saying that: “Perrow may look at a glass of safety and find it 1 
percent empty; HRO theorists may see the same glass of safety as 99 percent 
full” (Sagan, 1993, p. 48). 
3.4.1.5 What is a High Reliability Organisation (HRO)? 
All organisations can be seen as social phenomena that produce or provide 
something. Thus, high-hazard organisations resemble other organisations. The 
Berkeley Group began to apply the term High Reliability Organisation to 
differentiate between organisations, because they felt that some label was 
needed to identify those organisations that were clearly distinguishable from 
others. These organisations had not just avoided failure because of luck, but 
they “actively managed to control and reduce the risks of technical operations 
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whose inherent hazards make them prone to join the list of classical failures. 
In other words, these organisations have not just failed to fail; they have 
actively managed to avoid failures in an environment rich with the potential 
for error” (Rochlin, 1993, p. 15). The Berkeley Group oriented their empirical 
research around three main organisations, as mentioned above: the FAA’s Air 
Traffic Control System, Pacific Gas and Electric Company’s nuclear power 
plant at Diablo Canyon, and the U.S. Navy’s nuclear powered aircraft carriers. 
“These complex organisations could offer ample opportunities for mishaps, 
loss of life, or at the extreme, widespread carnage. They operate safely, 
however, a fact not predicted by existing organisational theory” (Roberts, 
1993a, p. 3). The Berkeley Group does not claim to have found a ‘recipe’ for 
designing failure-free organisations through their research, but “it does at least 
address some criteria which, if not present in an organisation’s form or design, 
make it unlikely that it will in fact perform at a high level over long periods of 
time” (Rochlin, 1993, p. 13). There are several ways to define an HRO, and 
the Berkeley Group provide several characteristics, indicators, and criteria 
they have found in ‘their’ organisations. For the purpose here I think it is 
sufficient to use the commonly used definition by Rochlin which state that: 
“A highly reliable organisation is often defined as one that has already been 
judged on empirical or observational grounds to provide a desirable activity, 
product, or service at a desired or demanded level of performance while 
maintaining a very low rate of error or accident” (Rochlin, 1993, p. 16). 
Rochlin also writes that what distinguishes an HRO is not “their absolute 
error or accident rate, but their effective management of innately risky 
technologies through organisational control of both hazard and probability, 
thereby making possible the social exploitation of an activity or service whose 
social and/or human cost would otherwise be unacceptable at effective levels 
of performance” (Rochlin, 1993, p. 17).  
3.4.2 HRO and Mindfulness 
Some criticism has also been directed at the dichotomy between HROs and 
non-HROs, which has led to a call for a more integrated approach to the study 
of organisations (Scott (1994) in Weick, et al., 1999). In a response to this 
call, Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld (1999) argue that the value of the HRO 
approach is that they provide a “window on a distinctive set of processes that 
foster effectiveness under trying conditions” (Weick, et al., 1999, p. 82). This 
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means that, as opposed to other organisations, there is little or no room in 
HROs for trying and failing in the search for error-free procedures. “Diverse 
as HROs may seem, we lump them together because they all operate in an 
unforgiving social and political environment, an environment rich with the 
potential for error, where the scale of consequences precludes learning 
through experimentation, and where to avoid failures in the face of shifting 
sources of vulnerability, complex processes are used to manage complex 
technology” (Weick, et al., 1999). Nuclear power plants and air traffic control 
systems are examples of such organisations where the consequences of errors 
can be catastrophic and would imply great costs, both human and 
economically, to varying extents. The authors assert that “HROs warrant 
closer attention because they embody processes of mindfulness that suppress 
tendencies toward inertia” (Weick, et al., 1999, p. 82). They argue that the 
previous discussions around organisational accidents have been framed, to a 
large extent, in macro-level and technology-driven perspectives (Perrow and 
NAT) and that the discussion is enriched by adding the cognitive 
infrastructure that enables organisations to perform adaptive learning and 
reliability. “The enrichment arises from the facts that by explicating a set of 
cognitive processes that continuously reaccomplish reliability, we supply a 
mechanism by which reliable structures are enacted. This mechanism is often 
underdeveloped in non-HROs where people tend to focus on success rather 
than failure and efficiency rather than reliability” (Weick, et al., 1999, p. 82).  
 
3.4.2.1 Mindfulness in Psychology 
Weick and Sutcliffe build their understanding of the concept of 
mindfulness mainly on the work of the psychologist Langer, who describes 
mindfulness as a process of drawing ‘novel distinctions’. By doing this we 
(humans) keep ourselves situated in the present. Langer’s main point is that 
by relying on already drawn distinctions and categories, we become more 
unaware of the context around us and also of our own actions (Langer & 
Moldoveanu, 2000). This can then lead to what she labels ‘mindless 
behaviour’, in which rules and routines are more likely to govern our actions 
regardless of the circumstances. As Langer explains, “Mindlessness can show 
up as the direct cause of human error in complex situations, of prejudice and 
stereotyping, and of the sensation of alternating between anxiety and boredom 
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that characterises many lives” (Langer & Moldoveanu, 2000, p. 6). Tasks that 
are mechanically carried out by people working as telephone operators, 
checkout clerks, and airline personnel, for example, may often lead to 
personnel sleepwalking through the work day. Langer bases her claims of the 
effect of increased mindfulness on studies done among workers and managers 
in the business world (Langer et al., (1988 ) in Langer & Moldoveanu, 2000), 
education (ibid), and elderly populations through issues of aging and control 
(Langer, Hatem, Joss, & Howell, 1989). These studies showed that mindful 
treatments had great effect, especially considering creativity, learning, and 
attention (Langer & Moldoveanu, 2000).  
3.4.2.2 Mindfulness in Organisations 
Reliability was defined earlier as “the system outcome that can be 
described as safe, effective and efficient, in terms of average and variance” 
(Eede, 2009, p. 5). Weick defines reliability as the “unusual capacity to 
produce collective outcomes of a certain minimum quality repeatedly” 
(Weick, et al., 1999, p. 86), and that it simultaneously depends on the “lack of 
unwanted, unanticipated, and unexplainable variance in performance” 
(Hollnagel (1993) in Weick, et al., 1999, p. 86). However, Weick argues that 
it has been believed that highly standardised routines are what make a system 
reliable. However, the problem, according to Weick, is that “unvarying 
procedures can’t handle what they didn’t anticipate” (Weick, et al., 1999, p. 
86). Systems must be able to handle unforeseen issues to remain reliable. 
What seems to happen in HROs, according to Weick, is that “there is 
variation in activity, but there is stability in the cognitive processes that make 
sense of this activity” (Weick, et al., 1999, p. 87). According to Weick et al., 
Schulman’s study of Diablo Canyon (1993) exemplifies this, wherein he 
observes that it is not the organisational variance that makes the company 
reliable; rather, it is the ability to continuously manage fluctuations that seems 
to enhance reliability. “Instead, reliable outcomes now become the result of 
stable processes of cognition directed at varying processes of production that 
uncover and correct unintended consequences” (Weick, et al., 1999, p. 87). 
On the opposite side, it is the varying cognitive processes that produce 
unreliability, when the cognitive processes “no longer stay focused on 
failures, simplifications, recoveries, situations, and structuring...” (Weick, et 
al., 1999, p. 88).  
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“To grasp the distinctiveness of HROs, one needs to look more closely at 
the ways in which diverse but stable cognitive processes interrelate in the 
service of the discovery and correction of errors” (Weick, et al., 1999, p. 88). 
Weick et al. acknowledge that there has been ample recognition of how 
cognitive processes are associated with highly reliable organisational 
performance. This is exemplified through the work of Westrum (1993, 1997), 
Klimoski and Mohammed (1994), Thordsen and Klein (1989), and Hutchins 
(1990). What has not been recognised, however, is the clear specification of 
ways “in which these diverse processes interrelate to produce effective error 
detection” (Weick, et al., 1999, p. 88). Weick et al. outline five concerns that 
are “tied together by their joint capability to induce a rich awareness of 
discriminatory detail and a capacity for action” (Weick, et al., 1999, p. 88). 
This capability is what Weick and his colleagues have labelled ‘collective 
mindfulness’. Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld build upon Langer’s work on 
mindfulness at the individual level in order to use it at the organisational 
level. They apply the categories that need to be present in order to be mindful 
at individual level and develop them into the five cognitive processes needed 
for collective mindfulness. Weick et al. point out that the state of collective 
mindfulness in HROs is not only an issue of “the way in which scarce 
attention is displayed” (March (1994) in Weick, et al., 1999, p. 90) nor about 
how much attention it is possible to store up; it is also about the quality of this 
attention and how people use this attention, what they choose to do with what 
they notice. Derived from this, if the possibility to act upon what people 
notice is limited, it is not long before their ’useless’ observations of those 
hazards are also ignored or denied and errors cumulate unnoticed” (Weick, et 
al., 1999, p. 90). Following this, the possibility of achieving a state of 
mindfulness will depend on the possibilities people have for action. Limited 
action and few possibilities for activating cognitive processes result in a state 
of mindlessness or situations where people act on ‘autopilot’ (Weick, et al., 
1999). “Mindfulness is less about decision making, a traditional focus of 
organisational theory and accident prevention, and more about inquiry and 
interpretation grounded in capabilities for action” (Weick, et al., 1999, p. 91).  
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3.4.3 The Five Processes of Mindfulness in HROs 
For Weick and Sutcliffe it is the concept of mindfulness that can separate 
‘good’ from ‘bad’ HROs. As already described, mindfulness entails several 
concerns that together form the possibility of being highly reliable.  
Through investigations done in effective HROs, Weick et al. have 
distinguished five processes by which a state of mindfulness seems to be 
created:  
 
1. Preoccupation with failure 
2. Reluctance to simplify 
3. Sensitivity to operations 
4. Commitment to resilience 
5. Underspecification of structures 
 
A preoccupation with failure (1) implies that in an organisation where the 
possibility of trial and errors is limited, there is a will to learn by the errors 
that are available. This will encourage routines where people report errors 
because of the learning potential they provide. “Effective HROs both 
encourage the reporting of errors and make the most of any failure that is 
reported” (Weick, et al., 1999, p. 92). An example loaned from Westrum 
(1992 in Weick, et al., 1999, p. 93) describes how the German-American 
rocket scientist Werner Von Braun responded to a report from an engineer 
that he might have caused a short-circuit during pre-launch testing by sending 
him a bottle of champagne. Another example, loaned from Landau and 
Chisholm (1995 in Weick, et al., 1999, p. 93), describes how a seaman on a 
nuclear carrier reported that he has lost a tool on the deck. This results in that 
all aircrafts are redirected to land bases instead, and the seaman is later 
rewarded for his reporting at a formal deck ceremony. Similarly, Edmondson 
found that it was the highest performing nurses who had the highest error-
detecting rates for adverse drug events. This finding was contrary to her 
hypothesis. “The general point is that, one means to learn, even where the 
possibilities of trial and error is [sic] limited, is by broadening the set of errors 
that are available from which to learn and by instituting practices that 
encourage people to report all of those errors that are detected” ((1996) in 
Weick, et al., 1999, p. 93). 
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The reluctance to simplify interpretations (2) is a way to avoid 
complacency and situations where people are socialised into ignoring the 
same things. “Simplifications […] allow anomalies to accumulate, intuitions 
to be disregarded, and undesired consequences to grow more serious” (Weick, 
et al., 1999, p. 94). “Traditional organisations tend to overlook the question of 
what they ignore [...] whereas effective HROs respect this question and know 
more about what they don’t know” (Weick, et al., 1999, p. 95). In addition, 
redundancy is often implemented in HROs to preserve awareness. 
Redundancy also takes the form of scepticism. “The scepticism may 
counteract the potential complacency that redundant systems may foster. 
Redundancy involves cross checks, doubts that precautions are sufficient, and 
wariness about claimed levels of competence” (Weick, et al., 1999, p. 96). 
“Concomitant with trust is the belief that all humans are fallible, and that 
sceptics improve reliability” (ibid). 
Sensitivity to operations (3) lies close to the concept of ‘situational 
awareness’ that prevents errors from accumulating. Weick et al. lean on the 
work of Roth (1997 in Weick, et al., 1999, p. 98), who has studied simulated 
nuclear power plant emergencies and examined operator decision making. 
These simulations illustrated how effective HROs retained sensitivity. 
“Sensitivity to operations is achieved through a combination of shared mental 
representations, collective story building, multiple bubbles of varying size, 
situation assessing with continual updates, and knowledge of physical 
interconnections and parameters of plant systems [...]” (ibid). “The value of 
her work lies in the articulation of the ways in which higher-level cognitive 
activities, social construction of coherent explanations, and knowledge of the 
physical plant, all produce mindfulness in the moment” (ibid).  
A commitment to resilience (4) makes an organisation not only able to 
‘bounce back from errors’ (Weick, et al., 1999, p. 100) but also able to cope 
with unexpected events when they happen. They prepare for unavoidable 
surprises. “HROs acknowledge the reality of fallible humans, murky 
technology (Vaughan, 1996), and narrow specialties. To cope with this reality, 
they pay attention both to error-prevention and to error-containment” (Weick, 
et al., 1999, p. 100). Effective HROs usually develop what Wildavsky defines 
as anticipation and resilience. “Anticipation refers to the “prediction and 
prevention of potential dangers before damage is done”, whereas resilience 
refers to the “capacity to cope with unanticipated dangers after they have 
THEORY 
 
67 
 
become manifest, learning to bounce back”” (Wildavsky 1991 in Weick, et 
al., 1999, p. 100). 
 Lastly, the underspecification of structures (5) points to the case where 
orderly systems sometimes amplify errors. Therein lies a paradox, because the 
orderly systems that are made to avoid errors sometimes seem to cause them 
(Weick, et al., 1999). A way to avoid this may be through loosening the 
hierarchical decision structure and letting the decisions follow the problem. 
“To loosen the filter of hierarchy […] makes people […] pay more attention 
to inputs in the moment, they are more sensitive to their time of arrival, and 
processes are more influenced by temporal connections” (Weick, et al., 1999, 
p. 104). “What is distinctive about effective HROs is that they loosen the 
designation of who is the “important” decision maker in order to allow 
decision making to migrate along with problems” (Weick, et al., 1999, p. 
103).  
3.4.4 Summing Up 
According to Weick et al., the main aim of the High Reliability 
Organisation approach is to repudiate the notion, of Perrow and Sagan 
especially, that normal accidents are bound to happen. Normal accidents are 
countered by organisational mindfulness: “When we propose these five ways 
in which mindfulness counters normal accidents, we differ from other analysts 
such as Perrow and Sagan because we do not treat technology as a given that 
dominates organisational life through its own imperatives. Instead we treat 
technology as an equivoque, as a sequence of events that can be understood 
more fully as a sequence of events that can also be interrupted, redirected, 
isolated, loosened, slowed, patched, halted, accelerated, etc” (Weick, et al., 
1999, p. 105). In other words, in Weick et al.’s work, mindfulness is 
considered a counteracting measure against normal accidents: “Mindfulness 
both increases the comprehension of complexity and loosens tight coupling” 
(ibid). By depicting conditions that are to be sought instead of depicting what 
to avoid, the High Reliability Organisation theory provides insights into 
organisational principles that lead to reliable outcomes and they conclude that: 
“Reliability-enhancing organisations identify sets of outcomes they 
continually work never to experience” (Weick, et al., 1999, p. 108). 
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3.4.5 Main critique of the HRO Theory  
Several lines of criticism and limitations have arisen toward HRO theory, 
both in itself and as an opposing theory to NAT. The next section follows an 
outline of two of the main lines of critique of HRO theory.  
3.4.5.1 The HRO organisations used as affirmation of the theory 
The original organisations used by the HRO theorists are a small number 
of hazardous organisations that have shown good safety records over time. 
According to Leveson et al. (2009), choosing one variable (as they have done 
when choosing those with good safety records) does not guarantee that this is 
transferable to other organisations and that similar results can be expected. 
For example, one finds in the HRO literature, as described by LaPorte and 
Consolini (1991), that these organisations operate in contexts of “nearly full 
knowledge of the technical aspects of operations in the face of recognized 
great hazard” (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991, p. 29). This statement seems to 
designate the HROs in question in a category of organisations that face little 
uncertainty. This may, then, imply that in order to apply HRO principles to an 
organisation, there is a need for a nearly complete knowledge of the technical 
aspects of operations. This has been properly criticised by Leveson et al. 
(2009), who asserts that this will exclude many organisations where total 
certainty is impossible: “Most systems must operate under uncertainty 
(technical, organizational, economic, and market), and the level of uncertainty 
is an important dimension of risk” (Leveson, et al., 2009, p. 7). Although they 
risk conceiving LaPorte and Consolini too literally, they underscore the 
essential point of many organisations’ reality of coping with uncertainty. 
Their main point, however, is that much of the HRO theory is based on stable 
and predictable systems with low levels of uncertainties. This is not 
necessarily comparable to most other systems in which technological 
innovation and advances are necessary to achieve goals and missions. This is 
similar to the point made by Lekka (2011), who questions the possibilities of 
meaningfully transferring HRO processes to organisations that do not have 
safety as their primary goal. She claims that organisations facing constant 
market pressures may find it more difficult to implement such processes, such 
as the non-profit organisations described in the HRO literature have 
experienced (Lekka, 2011 see also; Leveson, et al., 2009). This follows the 
main criticism that HROs operate in ‘exotic’ contexts and, therefore, cannot 
THEORY 
 
69 
 
provide useful information to ‘normal’ organisations (Waller & Roberts, 
2003). Waller and Roberts counterclaim this and underline that they do not 
mean that it is a simple process of just lifting the ideas and procedures directly 
from the studied HROs and applying them to other contexts. On the contrary 
the focus should, instead, be on the difficult job of “distilling the essence of 
core reliability processes from HROs and creating new knowledge – both 
theoretical and empirical – regarding these processes and their suitability for 
other organizations” (Waller & Roberts, 2003, p. 814). They point to recent 
research in which lessons from the HRO theory have been applied and say 
that what these articles show is how HRO knowledge gives a better 
understanding of core reliability processes. “Our main point is this: 
organizational environments have changed dramatically, rapidly, and 
unalterably, and those organizations once regarded as exotic are now 
becoming exemplars. HROs may now hold critical answers for ‘normal’ 
organizational adaptability, growth, and survival” (Waller & Roberts, 2003, p. 
814).  
3.4.5.2 HRO theory’s lack of theoretical framework 
Closely connected to the critique above is the critique that HRO theory is 
missing a theoretical framework that would make it applicable for use in other 
organisations. Critics ask for a theoretical framework that would explain why 
some organisations are able to operate and sustain a level of high performance 
while others fail (Boin and Schulman (2008) in Lekka, 2011). Instead, HRO 
research tends to be descriptive without evidence of the cause-effect 
relationship between safety performance and HRO processes (ibid).  
Pettersen argues that there are few epistemological and ontological 
commitments in the HRO concept, and this makes the conceptual baggage of 
HRO primarily heuristic (Pettersen, 2008a). He asserts that “advancing this 
form of dualist theory must involve making clearer the ontological and 
methodological assumptions on which the theory is shaped and moulded” 
(Pettersen, 2008b, p. 26).  
The critique against HRO on a general level is complicated, since the 
contributions from The Berkeley Group and The Michigan School work at 
different levels. In simplified form, we can say that contributions from The 
Berkeley Group favours structural dimensions of the HROs, while The 
Michigan School focuses more on the concept of culture and contextual 
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factors (Eede, 2009). After the publishing of the mindfulness/resilience 
approach, The Michigan School became the leading direction of HRO 
research. This approach had high face-validity and was also picked up by 
practitioners, especially after the publication of “Managing the Unexpected” 
(Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001), which revitalised the HRO theory and also 
provided a structural framework. This led to The Michigan School ‘taking 
over’ as prime providers of HRO influence. Eede concludes that “It is our 
belief that the Berkeley group, as founding fathers of the HRO, got bypassed 
by that other group of HRO scholars at the Michigan State University because 
the ingredients offered by the former were not novel enough, whereas with 
their concept of mindfulness and resilience, the latter offered a much more 
appealing body of theory” (Eede, 2009, p. 45).  
3.4.6 Summarising HRO and Mindfulness 
Above, I have contrasted HRO theory with Normal Accidents Theory in 
order to highlight the main points of this theoretical approach. Although these 
two theories contribute differently, history and literature have shown that, 
although examples of organisational unreliability have been demonstrated in 
the past, so has organisational reliability. Furthermore, these organisations 
have demonstrated reliability over long periods of time (Eede, 2009). 
According to HRO theorists, and especially Weick and colleagues, the 
deciding factor in explaining this performance is the processes of 
mindfulness. In brief, collective mindfulness provides a possibility to create 
an environment in which the human capabilities are given space and 
opportunity to operate reliably. Weick et al.’s argument emphasises that this 
accommodation is what enables organisation to become highly reliable. The 
HRO theory of mindful operations provides facilitating and inhibiting 
conditions in order to operate mindfully and, hence, reliably.  
3.4.6.1 Airport security: a High Reliability Organisation? 
Since the first studies of high reliability organisations in the 1980s, 
literature on high reliability has continued to grow and has also been applied 
in increasingly more contexts. It has even turned into a label of excellence that 
some organisations want to employ, especially organisations concerned with 
safety and public image (Bourrier, 2011). This is not so for airport security. 
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None of the agents included in this study have applied the term high 
reliability organisation to their work. The question thus still stands: Are 
airport security HROs? According to Frederickson and LaPorte (2002), airport 
security is an HRO: “Commercial air passenger security is part of a unique 
class of institutional characteristics and decision-theoretic challenges that are 
collectively described as high-reliability organizations (HROs)” 
(Frederickson & LaPorte, 2002, p. 34). What is characteristic of HROs is that 
they are error-intolerant. In the airport security context, error is defined as “a 
dangerous person getting on or dangerous object being put on an airliner” 
(Frederickson & LaPorte, 2002, p. 35). The airport is an entity that consists of 
many organisations in which the main aim en bloc is to run and operate air 
travel that is safe and (usually) economically sustainable. Security, in this 
connection, is one of the tasks performed in relation to the main aim. 
Although the security companies in charge of screening procedures are the 
companies contracted for performing security work, all working groups and 
companies at the airport touch upon security work and/or procedures. Security 
can therefore be understood as an interface between the different companies. 
This interface is underlain with strict rules, procedures and regulations for 
how people (passengers and employees) are to manoeuvre within it and is 
what I understand as the high reliability organisation of airport security. 
3.5 Summarising comments 
In this chapter I have problematised the main concepts applied in this 
thesis: security, risk and security risks. I then focused on two main parts of the 
literature: regulation literature and High Reliability Organisation theory. As 
will be further explicated in the empirical chapters, prescription and 
prescriptive regulation has been closely knitted with aviation safety from the 
beginning, and because aviation security regulation has largely copied 
regulatory practices from aviation safety, this has also become the case for 
aviation security.  
The regulation literature presented here aims to provide a background for 
understanding not only the regulatory change that took place in aviation 
security post 9/11 but also the implications of applying a highly prescriptive 
regulation. I used the figure ‘Space for Action’ to illustrate the connection 
between regulatory types and possibilities for action for the regulatee. Action 
is a key word in relation to HRO theory and action, or rather the possibilities 
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for action, has therefore become the connection point between regulation and 
organisation. This will be further elaborated on and discussed in Chapter 7.  
Prior to the empirical chapters, I account for methodology and the 
methodological approaches I have applied in this study. The methodology 
chapter aims to provide the reader with a guide for how I have approached the 
field to make it methodologically manageable to investigate and be able to 
answer the main research problem. 
METHODOLOGY 
 
73 
 
4 METHODOLOGY 
In Chapter 1, I formulated the main research problem and the subsequent 
empirical questions that would collectively create a foundation for discussing 
the research problem. I introduced my approach to the research, which I called 
an ‘integrated approach’ to describe my use of several methods on several 
levels of the aviation system together with literature and theory from different 
disciplines in order to create a comprehensive account of the regulatory 
transition and the consequences this has had. As a social anthropologist, I 
have been trained in ethnographic fieldwork. However, within a short time 
after the outset of the project, I realised that, although my experience doing 
ethnographic fieldwork would be central to accomplishing this project, the 
field was so large and complex that a case study that included fieldwork 
would seem more appropriate in this large, and not so readily delineated, 
setting20. The focus of the study was extensive (the Norwegian civil aviation 
system) and it was necessary to decide on which parts of the system I should 
include, and in this, choosing appropriate methods for gathering data in this 
parts.  
This chapter aims to describe the process of delineating a case that would 
aid me in gathering the data necessary to address the research problem and the 
methods I applied to carry this out. It is an exploration of how I delineated the 
case, the choices I made regarding the research strategy, and how I planned 
and realised the research. In the final part of the chapter, I include a short 
examination of ethical considerations, reliability and validity, and 
methodological strengths, weaknesses and bias. 
4.1 Choosing a qualitative approach and what this implies  
In this first part, I look more closely at my choice to conduct a qualitative 
case study. I then continue with a discussion of interpretation, preconceptions 
and biases in qualitative research. The purpose is to demonstrate my own 
view of the relationship between the researcher and his data and how 
openness around chosen methods, preconceptions and biases, in my view, 
                                                     
20 By fieldwork, I mainly refer to doing participant observation and interviewing, 
which are further discussed below. 
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strengthens the credibility of the study. I also provide a short description of 
my own preconceptions before entering the field. 
4.1.1 Choosing a case approach 
The main aim of this project has been to look at security regulations in 
practice, which entails looking at this phenomenon in its real-life context. The 
field is complex, one might even say ever-expanding, depending on the 
chosen level of abstraction. In doing research in such a complex and multi-
facetted setting, the case study approach is often applied because,  according 
to Yin, it  “allows investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful 
characteristics of real-life events – such as individual life cycles, 
organizational and managerial processes, neighbourhood change, international 
relations, and the maturation of industries” (Yin, 2003, p. 2). But this does not 
guide us in how one can do research in a complex field. Creswell defines a 
case study as “[…] an exploration of a “bounded system” or a case (or 
multiple cases) over time through detailed, in-depth data collection involving 
multiple sources of information rich in context” (Creswell, 1998, p. 61). The 
concept “bounded system” implies that it is bounded in time and place, and 
multiple sources of information implies observations, interviews, documents 
and reports. This seems to follow Yin’s description of the case study as an 
empirical investigation of a phenomenon in its natural surroundings applying 
multiple sources of data. Ringdal discusses this description of case studies and 
concludes that “This is practically identical with common definitions of field 
investigations” (Ringdal, 2001, p. 114 [my translation]). When following a 
qualitative research approach, a case study is but one out of several possible 
research strategies. Other approaches could be phenomenology or a more 
‘pure’ ethnography. In a phenomenological approach, the researcher intends 
to grasp the essence of experiences about a phenomenon. However, the data 
collection is typically quite constrained, since the form of data is usually 
gathered through long and profound interviews with relatively few 
participants (usually up to 10 participants) (Creswell, 1998). In a more pure 
ethnographic approach, the researcher is focusing upon describing and 
interpreting a social group or culture through a lengthy time in the field using 
primarily observations and interviews to collect data (ibid). Although the 
descriptions provided here of phenomenology and ethnography are highly 
simplified, they provide a background for contrasting a case-study approach 
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that comprises multiple methods, including ethnographic fieldwork, as one 
type of data collection method.  
In this large and complex field I was entering into, I therefore chose a case 
study approach. I delineate it as a case study in that I used several types of 
data and data gathering methods in order to create an understanding of a 
situation that involved several particular fields and levels within the 
Norwegian civil aviation system. I will reflect more on my methodological 
choices in the conclusion of this chapter.  
4.1.2 Interpretation, preconception and bias in qualitative research 
With my background in social anthropology, it felt natural for me to 
choose a qualitative research design. However, the main reason for choosing a 
design needs to be the nature of the research question. As Robson explains: 
“The general principle is that the research strategy or strategies, and the 
methods or techniques employed, must be appropriate for the questions you 
want to answer” (Robson, 2002, p. 80). If one is searching to understand 
something and this something includes humans and human interaction, it 
would be natural to choose an interpretive, qualitative approach. According to 
Johnson, “Practitioners of almost all interpretive paradigms are searching in 
one way or another for some understanding (verstehen) rather than for some 
explanation of social phenomena” (Johnson, 1998, p. 140). The inner 
connection between qualitative research, understanding and interpretation can 
be found in the work of Husserl and Heidegger, since qualitative research has 
roots in these philosophers’ thinking. For Husserl it was important that the 
researcher needed to describe phenomena without the constraint of 
metaphysical and theoretical speculations but instead described the 
phenomena as they appear to us (Sawicki, 2011). Heidegger, as a student of 
Husserl, followed these thoughts by developing the concepts upon which 
qualitative research rests. Hergenhahn (1997) refers to Heidegger’s work, 
stating that the concept of ‘Dasein’ has been fundamental to qualitative 
research. Dasein is used to explain that a person and the world he lives in are 
inseparable. And following from this, it is in the interpretation of man’s 
reality that the research can take place. Understanding, however, always 
comes before interpretation (Ormiston and Schrift (1990) in Gudmundsdottir, 
1996). “Interpretation is the articulation and disclosure of understanding, the 
process by which we identify ‘something as something’” (Gudmundsdottir, 
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1996, p. 301). According to Heidegger, interpretation is founded on three 
prestructures: ‘Vorhabe’ (fore-having), ‘Vorsicht’ (foresight) and ‘Vorgriff’ 
(fore-conception) (Heidegger (1962) in Gudmundsdottir, 1996). By applying 
these concepts, Heidegger shows how the researcher can never approach his 
data as a blank canvas, as if the researcher did not bring anything with him to 
the field. ‘Vorhabe’ reflects something we have in advance, and, more 
specifically, knowledge of our informants’ language as well as our own 
research experience that we bring with us to our research. ‘Vorsicht’ reflects 
the more value-laden, preferred point of view regarding our inquiry and can 
be described as our own understanding of the different traditions in qualitative 
inquiry. ‘Vorgriff’ refers to our socialisation, the ways in which we have been 
taught to look at our research fields. As researchers, we include these three 
processes in how we interpret our data. “The fore-structures create the 
boundaries, or horizons, where understanding and interpretation [...] take 
place” (Gudmundsdottir, 1996, p. 302). If we then merge the three fore-
structures and call them researcher preconceptions or biases, how should we 
as researchers cope with this? First, we have to accept that we are part of the 
data we gather. As Dewalt and Dewalt write, “Postmodernist writers 
particularly emphasise that the observer and his or her circumstances and 
biases cannot be separated from the accounts that they write” (Dewalt, 
Dewalt, & Wayland, 1998, p. 287). This is due to the inherent properties of 
the qualitative research strategy where the researcher can be described as 
being the instrument. As Brodsky explains: “[...] analysis, interpretation, and 
meaning-making come from the researcher, using all of her or his personal 
and professional skills, training, knowledge, and experience as an instrument 
to produce a coherent authentic picture of the research as the researcher saw 
and experienced it” (Brodsky, 2008, p. 766). We have to accept that we bring 
these fore-structures and preconceptions with us into our research, but what 
we can do, according to Dewalt et al., is to “make these biases as explicit as 
possible so that others may use them in judging our work” (Dewalt, et al., 
1998, p. 288).  
Johnson takes this further and argues that this is the importance of research 
design. He asks, “In a complex world of competing arguments, who is to be 
believed or trusted? Are data themselves, independently of how they were 
conceived and collected, proper evidence for making a case?” (Johnson, 1998, 
p. 131). He answers his own questions by leaning on Agar, who asserts that “a 
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credible argument should be systematic and based on a process that informs 
us about how researchers came to know what they know” (Johnson, 1998, p. 
131). This is what should be reflected in the research design. According to 
Johnson, design involves “[…] the methodological and analytical details that 
contribute to the credibility, validity, believability, or plausibility of any 
study” (Johnson, 1998, p. 133). I relate closely to this, and it has been a 
deliberate choice for me to let this guide me in the writing of this chapter and 
in the description of my design. I try to account not only for my choices but 
also how I came to make them so the reader can follow my journey (as far as 
possible) in how I collected my data. I am sure that some may think I may 
have included excessive details in my descriptions, but this was an intentional 
choice for me. I chose rather to be too explicit than too implicit. I concur with 
Johnson who asserts that “The value of empirical evidence can only be 
properly evaluated by understanding the details of how the research was 
conducted” (Johnson, 1998, p. 132).  
4.1.3 My own preconceptions 
The journey of fieldwork is always interesting, especially when one 
realises how far one has moved from the beginning till the end of the time in 
the field. Although I did not know much about civil aviation and the 
regulatory system for security in advance, I had some thoughts on how things 
were connected in this field. I realise now that many of these thoughts were 
largely based upon media portrayals of aviation security. For instance, I had a 
quite clear picture of the difficult situation the pilots were in due to the new 
security regulations through descriptions in newspapers and television. As I 
also discuss in Chapter 6, I later realised that the pilots were a strong group 
who had strong labour unions, which often tends to give some groups a 
stronger voice than others. My point here is not to diminish the pilots’ claims 
but rather to emphasise that I came to realise that there were others (as 
security and handling companies) that I had heard very little about in advance 
who also experienced challenges with the security system. Another issue, also 
closely related to media representations, was the role aviation security had in 
the public space. At the time when I started my project, there was much media 
attention around the liquid ban (see Chapter 2), which caused much debate 
about the intrusiveness of airport security. When looking at media coverage 
around the time period prior to my field work, the general themes revolve 
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around the hassle and inconvenience that airport security placed upon the 
passengers. Avinor, as airport owners, were often asked to explain why all 
this inconvenience was forced upon the passengers, this way almost implicitly 
portraying them as responsible for the new implemented measures. Much of 
this coverage caused a culture of ridicule in the public space, where it was 
normal to joke about the security control, security measures and security 
guards. This, of course, coloured my thoughts of the field in advance of my 
fieldworks. As I was also an ordinary airline passenger in advance of my 
fieldwork and data collection, I, too, had an impression of the security control 
and measures as somewhat exaggerated and excessive. They did not always 
make sense to me, and I wondered how some of the things we as passengers 
went through would enhance the overall security. I perceived the system to be 
overly rigid, and I believed that the responsibility for this rigidity belonged to 
Avinor and the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA). It did not take long after the 
first few initial interviews and reading some of the main documents for civil 
aviation security that I realised that my knowledge in this area had been 
superficial.  
When I have talked with people about my research during the almost six 
years I have worked with this project (not informants), it is remarkable how 
quickly people begin to tell me stories. As soon as I have told someone that I 
am studying aviation security, people tend to serve me stories on their own 
initiative about some experience they have had themselves or someone they 
know has had in the security control at some airport. Usually, the point is to 
explain some absurdity or outrageous conduct by some security guard or how 
they were able to get some prohibited item through the security control. I am 
also often asked to explain why security measures are so cumbersome. During 
the course of this study, I have received many of these stories and questions, 
since most of us have some sort of opinion about the security control. But I 
realise now how differently I listen to these stories now than I did prior to my 
fieldwork. Earlier, stories like these only confirmed some of my own 
prejudices toward the security system, but now, stories like these start other 
processes in me. I begin to think of regulations and problems of 
implementation. I think about responsibilities for how the system appears as a 
much more complex issue than only placing it on any single actor in the 
Norwegian system. And I usually find myself, in situations like these, 
nodding to the person telling the story, thinking that this perhaps used to be 
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me for a few years ago. This is the extraordinary ‘educating’ side of doing 
fieldwork. During the course of a fieldwork, you twist and turn your own 
preconceptions, learning and relearning things you have taken for granted or 
not even reflected upon, always demonstrating to you how complex and 
intertwined things really are. And it is your task as a researcher to take this 
newfound complexity and make it into something simple and comprehensible 
again. It is a marvellous endeavour that never lets you return to your starting 
point again. 
In the next part of this chapter, I will describe the preliminary phases of the 
research project with the development of the pilot study. 
4.2 Designing the case ‘security regulation in Norwegian civil 
aviation’ 
In the initial meeting with the reference group21 in March, 2008, one of my 
main aims was to discover the possibilities for data collection within the civil 
aviation system. I was also interested in getting input from the main actors 
within the aviation system on what they perceived to be good strategies for me 
to follow. On the basis of this meeting, I realised I had to understand how the 
system was built up, get to know ‘the ropes’ of Norwegian civil aviation. This 
led to the decision to start with interviewing the main actors in the civil 
aviation system before doing fieldwork at a selection of Norwegian airports. 
In combination with these interviews, I began ‘studying up’ on the field I had 
                                                     
21 My PhD project has been part of a larger project called ‘The Social 
Determination of Risk – Critical Infrastructure and Mass Transportation Protection in 
the Norwegian Civil Aviation Sector’. The project was funded by the Norwegian 
Research Council and had the 1st of January, 2008, as the official starting point. This 
was the same date as the start of my own PhD project. Before I obtained a place as a 
PhD candidate on the project, the leader group had established contacts within the 
Norwegian civil aviation system and formed a reference group. The group consisted 
of representatives from the coordinating organisations: the Peace Research Institute in 
Oslo (PRIO) and the University of Stavanger (UiS), and also representatives from the 
Norwegian aviation system: Avinor and the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA). This 
cooperation between the research organisations, the main Norwegian airport operator 
and the supervisory authority was crucial for the attainment of outcomes relevant both 
for academia and the industry itself. I was first introduced to the reference group in 
March, 2008, where I presented an overview of my preliminary project. 
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chosen so I was able to understand more of what the interviewees talked about 
in the interviews. I read official documents and reports concerning civil 
aviation, first and foremost for Norwegian civil aviation, but I also went 
through documentation on how Norway was connected to the EU and what 
obligations Norway had as an EFTA-country. This saved a lot of time in the 
interviews, since we then had a common understanding of the background of 
civil aviation security and its regulation.  
In this part of the chapter, I describe the circumstances around the 
interview: how they were conducted and how the interviewees were selected. 
I also include a description of the circumstances around my interviews within 
the Icelandic civil aviation system. I continue with the development of the 
pilot study at Sola airport and the function this had in ‘paving the way’ for the 
two following fieldworks at OSL Airport Gardermoen and Fjellvik.  
4.2.1 The interviews 
Prior to the first reference group meeting in March, 2008 (see above), I 
established contact with another researcher, Trond Nikolaisen, who was also 
involved in the project through his master’s project. We worked with many 
similar themes in our projects, and we decided to cooperate on interviews of 
the essential actors within the aviation sector. We made this decision mainly 
because some of our fields of interests coincided and coordinating our 
questions and conducting the interviews together meant we would not take up 
too much of the interviewees’ time. The persons we were interested in 
interviewing were highly occupied people working at the highest levels in the 
aviation sector. This way, we felt that we would cause as little inconvenience 
as possible, so instead of organising separate interviews, we decided to 
evaluate whether this cooperation was productive after completing the first 
interviews. We both had a full security clearance, which meant that the 
interviewees could speak freely22.  The aim of these interviews was mostly 
quite uncomplicated, as our interest was to learn about the aviation sector and 
the regulatory developments after 9/11. This may also be a direct cause of 
why this cooperative interviewing worked, since the main themes of the 
interviews were mostly kept on a general level. This might have been 
different if the themes of the interviews were more personal or controversial.  
                                                     
22 For further discussion of access issues, see below 
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4.2.2 The interviewees 
In a large system such as the civil aviation system, which includes many 
organisations and people with different authorities and roles, a large part of 
the job is to find out who you should interview to achieve the kind of 
information you are seeking. In our case, we started out with a few 
recommendations from a representative in the reference group and spun off 
from there. We started with two interviews when we attended the Norwegian 
Aviation Conference in February, 2008. This annual event gathers both 
governmental and private actors from within the Norwegian aviation sector. 
This way, attending the conference proved to be a productive way to be 
introduced to the areas of interest for the aviation sector itself. We also used 
some of the spare time outside of the conference program to conduct the first 
interviews. The first interviewee worked in the security department at 
Stavanger Airport, Sola. She had been recommended due to her thorough 
knowledge of security and the European Union, but as she had not been part 
of the transition phase after 9/11, 2001, she recommended that we contact a 
few others to ask about this particular part. In addition, we interviewed a 
representative from the Civil Aviation Authority who worked mainly with 
airport inspections. With these two interviews as a starting point, we were 
referred to other people within the system who again recommended others (or 
sometimes the same people we had already interviewed). Before our last 
interview in April 2008, we perceived to have generated a quite detailed 
picture of the regulatory development for civil aviation security post 9/11 on 
the authority level. This was further supported when we conducted the last 
interview with one of the representatives from Avinor. At the end of our 
interview, he suggested another person he thought we should interview. We 
could inform him that we had already talked with that person. Then he 
continued by recommending that we should definitely talk with someone from 
the Ministry of Transport and Communications, which we told him that we 
had already done and also with whom the interview was done. He then 
commented that we ‘had a really good cast of characters’ and that ‘our 
research would at least not be hindered because of the people we had 
involved’. By recruiting interviewees through recommendations as well as 
including some more, as we did with representatives from the unions and the 
National Investigation Board, we felt that we were gaining a thorough picture 
of security in aviation after 9/11 in the Norwegian setting. The interviews 
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gave me an understanding of what had happened at the authority level in the 
aftermath of the large regulatory changes that took place after 9/11. This way, 
the interviews worked as a way for me to learn how the system worked, what 
roles the different actors had, and how they were connected to each other and 
outwards toward the rest of the world.  
4.2.3 Preliminary phases of the fieldworks 
After finishing the interviews, the preliminary work of planning the 
fieldwork started. I had decided that I wanted to do fieldwork at three 
different airports that varied in size and geographical location. The main 
reason for this choice was that through input from people in Avinor and the 
Civil Aviation Authority, I understood that there was a significant difference 
between the larger and the smaller airports from the perspective not only of 
their operations but also how they worked with the security regulations 
implementation. Additionally, operating an airport in the North of Norway 
with a hush climate and in remote locations was quite different than operating 
in the more central southern districts. Thus, I presented my plan for Avinor 
and together we decided on three airports I would get access to. I would start 
with the airport pertaining to the city I lived in and conduct a pilot study there. 
Doing a pilot study can have several benefits. It can assist the researcher in 
developing relevant guidelines for the study, clarify concepts and generally 
refine the data collection plans (Yin, 2003). In choosing the pilot study, 
several reasons may be decisive: geographic location, informants that are 
especially accessible or congenial, access or convenience (ibid). Since the 
pilot study became the location for the refining of my final research design, it 
also became the place where I dedicated the most data collection time. This 
was because the time had to be divided between the elaboration of a feasible 
fieldwork at the airport (described further below), the actual data collection in 
the field, and also time for testing (and failing) in creating the boundaries and 
delimiting the final case. At the end of the pilot study, I had elaborated a draft 
for the two other field locations I had selected. Additionally, during the time 
at Sola I had learned that Iceland, which was in a quite similar position as 
Norway toward the EU, had chosen an implementation strategy different from 
Norway’s. I therefore decided to include a set of interviews from the Icelandic 
civil aviation system that could work as a comparison to the Norwegian 
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implementation. I will here describe how these interviews were arranged and 
carried out.  
4.2.4 Collecting data in the Icelandic civil aviation system 
So far I have discussed the circumstances connected to the development of 
the fieldworks and interviews in the Norwegian case setting. Here, I will 
describe the setting for the data gathered in Iceland. As already mentioned, it 
was while doing the fieldwork at Sola that I learned that Iceland had 
implemented the EU regulation only on the international aviation system and 
not on the national system, as Norway had done. It was during my fieldwork 
time at Sola, the first contact was made between the Sola Security Department 
and the Chief of Aviation Security at the Icelandic Civil Aviation 
Administration. In December 2009, more than a year after the initial contact 
was made, the dates for my interviews with different representatives from the 
civil aviation system in Iceland were set. The ambition for the interviews in 
Iceland was for me to learn how the Icelandic system had worked with and 
implemented security regulations post 9/11. I conducted one interview with 
two representatives from the Icelandic Civil Aviation Administration (where 
the Chief of Aviation Security was one of the representatives), one interview 
with the Airport Director and the Chief of Security of the international 
Icelandic airport, and an interview with the Airport Director and the Chief of 
Security at the national airport. The setting for the interviews was very similar 
to the interviews conducted at the Norwegian authority level and was, 
therefore, following a more semi-structured interview format. The interviews 
conducted in Iceland can be juxtaposed to the interviews conducted with the 
Norwegian Ministry of Transport and Communications, the Civil Aviation 
Authority, and Avinor Central Offices, since the themes for the interviews 
were approximately the same: to acquire insights and to understand the 
transitional phase post 9/11 regarding security regulation. An additional 
agenda for me in the Icelandic interviews was to understand why they had 
chosen a different implementation strategy than Norway. This is also why I 
have chosen to focus primarily on the interview with the Icelandic Civil 
Aviation Administration in this thesis. The other interviews, however, were 
important for my understanding of the practical realisation of Icelandic 
aviation.  
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So far I have described the initial phases of my research project and 
planning, including the Icelandic interviews. I will now describe more 
thoroughly what I have called the pilot study, which describes the background 
for my choices of focus at the airport fieldworks.  
4.2.5 The actual Pilot Study 
As Sola Airport was already involved in the project (through its 
representatives in the reference group), it was a natural place for me to start 
planning my project and the fieldwork or fieldworks that would follow. My 
main contact person there was the Chief of Security (CoS), and he worked as 
both an organiser (enabler) and a sparring partner in the developing phase. In 
addition, as he had worked for almost 30 years at the airport, he had extensive 
knowledge of both aviation in general and the security- and safety-fields with 
which he had worked the most over the last years.   
The fieldwork at Sola was supposed to have several functions. This was 
where I ‘learnt airports’, so to speak: how they worked, who was responsible 
for what, and where the airport was connected to the other surrounding 
organisations, such as Avinor central offices and the Civil Aviation Authority 
(CAA). This formed the foundation for the next fieldworks I was going to do 
at OSL and Fjellvik. It was a huge learning process for me, which is also why 
the fieldwork was much more extensive at Sola than any of the other airports. 
At Sola I thoroughly discussed with airport management where it would be 
most beneficial for me to be, meaning which companies at the airport I should 
do fieldwork in, and then I got to test it out in practice. All employees at the 
airport had to conduct themselves in a few or several ways according to the 
security regulation so that no one was unaffected by security. If we consider 
the airport as split in half, with one part completely open to the public and the 
other side restricted and only open for those who have undergone a security 
check, it may be strange to think that the unrestricted side had to relate very 
much to security. Although it was clear that it was the personnel who worked 
at the restricted areas or who moved between them who had to relate the most 
to security, the companies on the unrestricted side had no exceptions. All 
people working at the airport had to go through safety and security training23, 
and all of the products or merchandise moved into the building had to be 
                                                     
23 Which entailed computer-based training programs 
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equally controlled. In short, everyone whose workplace was at the airport had 
to have a relationship to security. This was significant in the delineation of the 
field in deciding which criteria should be decisive. Should it be sufficient that 
the informants merely touched upon security in one way or another, or should 
there be something more? As the companies in the unrestricted area had few 
contact points with security compared to the others, I decided to leave them 
out and instead focus on the companies operating on the inside or ‘in 
between’. 
In this process of learning airport, I started with initial meetings and 
conversations with Avinor’s Security Department at Sola. Through the spring 
and summer of 2008, following the reference group meeting in March, I spent 
much time in Avinor’s office area. The Security Department, and its Chief of 
Security in particular, gave me insights into the operation of an airport in 
practice and the work and challenges regarding security issues and 
regulations. I was also allowed to participate in meetings both prior to and 
during my fieldwork, which provided me with insights into how they talked 
about and worked with security both as the airport operator and also across 
the company borders. As already mentioned, we also discussed in these 
meetings which companies at the airport would be the most relevant for my 
topic and which groups would be most related to the themes I wanted to 
explore. In addition, this sometimes entailed delineating groups within the 
same company where this was suitable. This will be further described in the 
following section. 
4.3 The final delineation and methods applied 
4.3.1 Selecting the airports and companies 
I decided early in the planning of my project that I wanted to do fieldwork 
at more than one airport. This decision was made for mainly two reasons. 
First, I was informed early on by Avinor representatives (both in the reference 
group and the first interviews) that the small, regional airports had different 
challenges than the larger ones. Secondly, and based on the first, I assumed 
that implementing the same regulation, regardless of size, would have some 
consequences for the particular airport which perhaps could be attached to its 
size. I therefore had to make some choices regarding which airports should be 
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included and what criteria should be used for this selection. Avinor’s airports 
were separated into three categories: small, medium and large. There were 26 
small, 16 medium and 4 large. OSL was considered to be in an own division 
apart from the categorisation (see Figure 1 for an overview of this 
categorisation). In deciding which airports I was going to do fieldwork at, I 
decided to choose OSL since this was the only airport large enough and hence 
constructed for the handling of the security regulation. I chose Sola as a 
representative for the large airports and Fjellvik as a representative for the 
small, regional airports. This way, I left out the medium sized airports from 
the study. The reason why I ended up choosing them out was twofold; first, I 
had limited time and resources for doing the fieldworks and I was hesitant to 
leave out any of the other airports. However, secondly, and perhaps most 
importantly, the medium sized airports are a mix of both small and large 
airports. Some of the medium airports are quite similar to the small and some 
are more similar to the large airports. In the discussions I had with Avinor 
about selecting the airports for the fieldworks, we discussed the possibility of 
leaving the medium sized airports out of the study. Avinor did not express 
that having a representative from the medium size in itself was the most 
important. What did seem important to them, however, was to contrast a small 
and a large airport and to include OSL, if possible. I chose to follow Avinor’s 
recommendation, included OSL and left out a medium sized airport. 
During the pilot study at Sola, I decided to follow four companies at the 
airport: Avinor as the airport operator, two handling companies (SGS (SAS 
Ground Services) and Norport), and Securitas24. These companies were most 
involved with the security regulations at the airport. Since I would also find 
almost all of the companies at the three airports I had chosen, I assumed that if 
size and geographic location did matter in the implementation of security 
regulations, I would get an impression of this by following the same 
companies at three different airports. This proved to work well, with some 
exceptions I will describe later.  
First I will describe the main data collection methods applied in the field. 
                                                     
24 For a more profound description of these companies, see chapter 2, 
‘Background and Context’. 
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4.3.2 Collecting data 
4.3.2.1 Interviewing 
At the beginning of this chapter, I described how I applied interviews as a 
data collection method to gain knowledge about the Norwegian civil aviation 
system and the regulatory change processes after 9/11, 2001. The interviews 
on authority level (both in Norway and Iceland) were mainly semi-structured. 
Bernard writes that “Semi-structured interviewing works very well in projects 
where you are dealing with high-level bureaucrats and elite members of a 
community – people who are accustomed to efficient use of their time” 
(Bernard, 2006, p. 158). I applied this interview type on occasions when I 
knew I would have few, or maybe only one, possibility to do the interview. 
The interviews I conducted at the airports, however, were often more 
unstructured. By this I mean interviewing where I had a clear plan of the 
themes I wanted to talk about but where I let the conversation develop more 
informally. 
At the airport, I used interviews as a way to gain knowledge about the 
management’s point of view in the companies where I did fieldwork. I 
typically started with an interview prior to the fieldwork and concluded with 
an interview following the fieldwork. This way I was able to ask the leaders in 
the company directly about issues that appeared in the course of the 
fieldwork. The initial interview also worked as a way to structure the 
fieldwork I was about to do. Normally we discussed questions like where 
(within the organisation) I could conduct the fieldwork, who my contact 
person(s) would be, how I could introduce myself to the employees, and the 
time period for my stay.  
I applied interviews this way in the situations where I was interested in 
gaining a general overview of certain issues, situations and settings. The semi-
structured interviews taught me much about the larger processes regarding 
regulation, while the more unstructured interviews at the airports helped me 
gain an overview of organisational issues at the airports and helped me fine-
tune the approach to the fieldworks. In addition, the end-interviews with the 
managers worked as a way for me to review the insights I had gained in the 
fieldwork, which made me ask different questions than the ones I perhaps had 
asked prior to the fieldwork, thus giving me different perspectives.  
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The interviews were, therefore, a way for me to get the more general 
overview. It was through the fieldworks, however, that I got more specific 
data that gave me insights into the challenges of operating with and according 
to security regulations in practice. Below, I explain more of what I mean 
when I use the term ‘fieldwork’, and I describe, through some examples, how 
I actually carried out the data collection in the ‘fields’.   
4.3.2.2 Fieldwork, participant observation and participating 
observer/observing participant 
Fieldwork can be described as a strategic method to conduct research that 
puts you right in the middle of the action and lets you collect data (Bernard, 
2006). Historically, the anthropological fieldwork involved going away to 
another culture, learning the language of the culture one visited, and staying 
there long enough so that people began acting normally when the researcher 
showed up. The main method applied in the field was that of participant 
observation. It was about “stalking culture in the wild” (Bernard, 2006), 
which it still is. Today, the fieldworker may do research in his own culture, in 
an institutional/organisational setting or in an urban context; in other words, 
in just about any setting he wishes – but the principles originating from the 
traditional fieldwork are still the same, including the applied methods. There 
are several advantages to applying participant observation as a data collecting 
method. The method of participant observation deviates from the role of being 
a mere participant and observer (which all humans are in their everyday 
activities), since “[...] the method of participant observation includes the 
specific use in behavioural analysis and recording of the information gained 
from participating and observing” (Dewalt, et al., 1998, p. 259 [emphasis 
original]). The method requires a specific approach to recording the 
observations in field notes, and this information that the researcher gains 
through participation is, according to Dewalt et al., “... as critical to social 
scientific analysis as more formal research techniques like interviewing, 
structured observation, and the use of questionnaires and formal elicitation 
techniques” (Dewalt, et al., 1998, p. 259). Applying the method of participant 
observation gives the researcher insights and understandings in the social 
world with subjective meaning and experiences of the people in the field-
context. In addition, participant observation provides material in a more or 
less unique way since: “... the type and depth of insight and interpretive 
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material which [participant observation] yields are difficult or impossible to 
gather using other research methods” (Seymour-Smith, 1986, p. 216).  
In fieldwork, there are two particular roles the researcher can have: 
participant observer and complete observer (Bernard, 2006). Ethnographic 
research is mostly based on the second role. This role can be delineated 
further, since one possibility is to be an insider in the ethnographic context 
that does observations and record some aspects of life around him; that is, an 
observing participant. Another possibility is to be a participating observer 
who participates in some aspects of life and tries to record whatever he can 
(Bernard, 2006). Which role the researcher has will be determined of the 
nature of the field in which he does research. Some fields are more prone to 
participation, while in other fields where there may be a large degree of 
specialisation among the informants (as in many work places) it may be more 
difficult since it can involve extensive training, among other things25.  
4.3.2.3 The issue of time 
There are some important things one should bear in mind when conducting 
fieldwork. Time is a key word here. The anthropological fieldwork is 
considered to be time consuming, traditionally often taking a year or more. 
There are several reasons for this, because visiting other cultures that are, 
perhaps, very different from one’s own, may demand a long time just to settle 
in, learning the new language and achieving a position where one is able to 
ask good questions and get good answers (Bernard, 2006). In addition, being 
present in the field context during the different seasons often provided 
different kinds of data. Doing research in one’s own culture has advantages 
and disadvantages. The most obvious advantage is that one is doing the 
fieldwork in one’s own language, and it saves much time not have to learn a 
new language. Secondly, if one is quite well known already in the field 
situation, it may take less time to become accustomed to the field setting. In 
addition, in doing research in a more modern context, the seasons will often 
be of less importance. The main point taken from the traditional fieldwork is 
that the researcher should stay long enough so that he not only scratches the 
surface of a phenomenon, but is able to grasp the social reality of the field as 
                                                     
25 For examples of researchers that have undergone training to become observing 
participants see Bernard (2006) p. 348. 
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far as possible. Conducting participant observation reduces the possibility that 
people act differently when they know they are being studied; in other words, 
it reduces the possibility of reactivity (Bernard, 2006): “As you become less 
and less of a curiosity, people take less and less interest in your comings and 
goings. They go about their business and let you do bizarre things such as 
conduct interviews, administer questionnaires, and even walk around with a 
stop-watch, clipboard, and camera” (Bernard, 2006, p. 354). The main point 
to take from this is that it is necessary to stay long enough in the field so that 
people are accustomed to the researcher being there, and the stories one is told 
are not only sensational stories that may not be representative for what is 
‘really’ going on. 
So how long should one stay in the field then? Hannerz (2003) asserts that 
the traditional field site was closely linked to nature (as described above) and, 
thus, to the seasons of the year. In addition, the researcher had to reach 
acceptance among the local people to the degree that he or she could be part 
of just about all activities in that society. These things take time. Hannerz’ 
argument is, thus, that other topics may not call for the same amount of time. 
For instance, in a multi-sited fieldwork, these issues may be of less 
importance, and it is possible to bring what one has learned to the next field 
and not necessarily begin from scratch (ibid). This entails that there may not 
be a need to spend the same amount of time when one has several field sites, 
since it is possible to draw on knowledge already obtained from previous field 
sites. Or as Bernard points out, “[...] you may have already picked up the 
nuances of etiquette from previous experience” (Bernard, 2006, p. 350).  
4.3.2.4 Describing the fieldwork(s) 
I previously described how I delineated the field, how I chose which 
companies to conduct the fieldwork within, and how I used interviews at the 
beginning and the end of each section of the fieldwork. In this part I want to 
describe the actual conduct of the fieldwork; the how of the fieldwork.  
 
Meetings 
Meetings were an essential part of all the fieldworks I conducted. This was 
especially due to two reasons. The first reason was that two of the airports 
where I did my fieldwork were large (although to a different extent), which 
meant that there were many employees and the companies were at different 
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locations within the airport buildings. This made it difficult for me to 
introduce myself in a ‘door-to-door’ approach, since this would have been 
very time consuming. Instead, I was able to attend a meeting at Sola called 
‘Security Forum’ that consisted of leader representatives from all the 
companies at the airport. Similarly, I attended a meeting at OSL called 
‘Security Network Meeting’ attended by representatives from the companies I 
was doing my fieldwork with. This way, the initial meetings became an 
important channel for presenting my project and me in a manner that (I 
hoped) made the companies also want to be a part of my project. It was also a 
practical way to be introduced to the persons I was more or less dependent on 
to carry out the fieldwork.  
The second reason that meetings were essential is that they gave me 
valuable insights into the challenges and problems they met at leader level in 
relation to security regulations. The value of meetings is also underscored by 
Schwartzman who asserts that “[...] researchers have begun to realize that 
routines and forms like meetings and stories [...] provide researchers with 
important information about the social structure and culture of organizations 
and society” (Schwartzman, 1993, p. 38). Meetings, for me, became a channel 
to see which issues were emphasised (or not) and how they were emphasised 
by the leaders at the airports. 
In all three airports, I was invited to meetings related to security issues. At 
Sola and Fjellvik, these meetings usually included all companies operating at 
the airports, while at OSL meetings seldom included every company and were 
held more locally within each company. This way, there were fewer meetings 
at OSL since I was invited to the meetings that were held by the airport 
operator, OSL, and not to the local meetings. Besides these meetings, I was 
invited to meetings held outside of the airport, such as the quarterly security 
meeting between the directors of the largest airports and also an inspection 
meeting at Fjellvik between Avinor’s central office and the airport 
management. I was also invited to one meeting in relation to the joint Civil 
Aviation Authority (CAA) and EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) 
inspection at one of the airports, but this invitation was later withdrawn, since 
some participants preferred to have the meeting without the interference of an 
outsider. As a result, I was never able to participate in any interaction between 
the CAA and/or the ESA and the airport management, which could have 
given me insights into how they communicated with each other and what 
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issues were typically discussed. Since this was not possible, on two occasions 
I met with airport representatives both prior to and after such inspections. 
 
Participant observation 
As already outlined, in the interviews with the management of the 
companies, we also discussed the plan for my fieldwork. Since the companies 
I conducted fieldwork at were large companies with many tasks, we typically 
tried to elaborate which groups or part of the company I should participate in 
and also in what way. The following two examples, from the initial fieldwork 
with Securitas and one of the handling companies at Sola, show how this was 
carried out. 
   
Securitas  
At the initial interview, the Leaders presented the different work tasks they 
had within their company. These included passenger security control, 
employee security control, patrol (within the airport), the barracks, the control 
where all articles and goods were screened, and other small odd jobs, not 
readily defined26. We decided that I would begin with 2-3 weeks in the 
passenger security control, and then continue to other areas. We discussed 
how I could introduce myself to the employees, and since the security guards 
had no work e-mail and they never had staff-meetings with everybody 
present27, I suggested putting a poster up on the wall in the staff break room. I 
hoped this would give at least a minimum awareness of my presence there for 
most of them, so that I did not just appear in the security control one day. One 
of the main reasons for my reluctance to do so was that I was afraid that I 
would be conceived as a controller. Controllers were either people from 
Securitas, Avinor or the Civil Aviation Authority who sometimes came to 
observe the security control. Controllers usually just appeared (one or two) 
and observed them working, perhaps taking notes. This could last for 10 
minutes or much longer. I was given the impression that since the guards were 
                                                     
26 For an elaboration of the work tasks, see chapter 2, ‘Background and Context’ 
27 This is so because it is difficult to gather every employee (since someone 
always is manning the posts), and it is difficult to have meetings outside of operating 
hours. Therefore, meetings were usually done only with leaders and middle-managers. 
It was their duty to then convey important information to the rest of the employees.   
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not given an explanation for these controls, and they rarely knew what exactly 
was controlled, this caused some unease. My intention was to avoid this role 
by introducing myself in advance through my poster. I later found out that 
about half of the people I spoke to had seen my poster, and the rest had no 
idea who I was when I began ‘hanging out’ in the security control. To some, 
my sudden appearance resulted in what I perceived to be the unease described 
earlier, and this had consequences for my role afterwards. Especially on one 
occasion, I was standing on the inside of the security control just watching the 
processes of getting the passengers through the control. I became aware of 
one of the Shift Leaders (whom I had not met before) watching me repeatedly. 
I tried to smile and nod to her (as we were at a distance from each other) 
without her reciprocating my small greetings. After a while she asked out loud 
in the direction of the Coordinators’ office while nodding in my direction 
“Does anybody know what she’s doing here?” It seemed like she thought that 
I was a controller of some kind and that my presence there made her 
uncomfortable. The Coordinator came out of the office and explained my 
being there, but I do not think that helped much, since she just went about her 
business again without speaking to me. During my time in the security 
control, I tried to talk to the same Shift Leader on a few occasions, but she 
was not very willing to speak to me. If this was caused by our poor 
introduction or not, is difficult to say, but I consider it reasonable to believe 
that this did not help. This is an example of what I was trying to avoid by 
being introduced in advance, but it is difficult to avoid one’s role in the field 
being misunderstood in some way, which underlines that the role one has as a 
researcher is not only decided by yourself but will also be interpreted and 
ascribed by the people in the field. I will return to this issue under ‘roles’.  
I used two weeks first in the security control before I began to accompany 
the security guards to the other work tasks they had. I participated in all their 
different duties and decided I would concentrate on the passenger security 
control, the employee security control and the security barracks, since these 
had the most intersecting points to practices in accordance with the security 
regulations. At the time of my fieldwork, Securitas at Sola had about 150 
employees (including both full- and part-time employees). During the first 
two weeks in the security control, I got to know some people better than 
others, and I began to follow their shifts (although not exclusively). I followed 
shifts that started early in the morning and also the last shift for the night. I 
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spent a month with Securitas, where I divided my time in the last weeks 
between the security control for passengers, the employee security control and 
the barracks.  
 
Handling companies 
I started the fieldwork at the first handling company the same way as I did 
with Securitas: with an initial interview of the management where we also 
planned my fieldwork. After the interview, I was immediately taken to the 
offices and break room at airside and introduced to the middle-management 
and also the team I was mainly going to follow. This way, there was little 
question about who I was when I began the fieldwork. The handling company 
mainly consisted of two work groups: the ramp agents and gate personnel28. I 
started by staying a few days with each group and found that the ramp agents 
were the employees who had the most contact points with the security 
regulation; therefore, I chose to direct most of my time with them. After the 
initial days when I accompanied the gate personnel, I spent two weeks in the 
first company with the ramp agents whose starting shifts began at 04.00 in the 
morning and participated in almost all of their activities. Some activities I 
could participate inn, like stowing luggage, but many activities I could not do, 
such as driving the numeral vehicles. After finishing the fieldwork at the first 
handling company, I continued to the second handling company at Sola where 
I spent about two weeks. I spent about five weeks altogether with the handling 
companies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
28 See chapter 2, ‘Background and Context’, for an elaboration of the handling 
companies, and chapter 6 for an elaboration on factual work tasks the ramp-agents 
had 
METHODOLOGY 
 
95 
 
Table 2: Overview of data collection 
Period Location Activity 
05 - 06. Feb, 2008 Bodø Norwegian Aviation 
Conference 
Feb - April, 2008 Bodø, Oslo, Lillestrøm Interviews: Civil Aviation 
Authority, Norwegian 
Accident Investigation 
Board, Ministry of 
Transport and 
Communications, Avinor, 
Norwegian Pilots’ 
Association, Norwegian 
Association for Flight Crew, 
Airports Council 
International (11 
interviews) 
April - Sep, 2008 Stavanger Document search, 
literature search, meeting 
activities at Sola Airport 
Sep - Dec, 2008 Stavanger Fieldwork Sola Airport 
Dec, 2008 Stavanger Processing data from Sola, 
Preparing for fieldwork at 
OSL Gardermoen 
Jan - March, 2009 OSL Gardermoen, Oslo Fieldwork OSL Airport 
March - mid-April, 2009 Stavanger Processing data from OSL, 
Preparing for fieldwork at 
Fjellvik Airport 
Mid-April - May, 2009 Fjellvik Fieldwork at Fjellvik 
Airport 
2 weeks March, 2010 Reykjavik, Iceland Interviews: Civil Aviation 
Administration, ISAVIA 
Reykjavik Airport, ISAVIA 
Keflavik Airport 
 
 
Variations in the fieldworks 
Above, I describe how I typically initiated and conducted the fieldworks. 
After doing it this way quite successfully at Sola, I hoped to apply the same 
approach at my next field site, which was OSL. Upon my arrival I had already 
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planned the first interviews and meetings through mail correspondence with 
the Chief of Security at OSL, so the fieldwork began effectively. As my 
approach to the fieldworks with the security company and the handling 
companies had worked well, I initiated them the same way at OSL. This 
generally worked well, with some exceptions and unforeseen events 
(described below). The last fieldwork at Fjellvik was somewhat different, 
since the airport had a total of 26 employees. To maintain the boundaries 
between the groups and companies, as I had done on the other fieldworks, 
would have been somewhat artificial. Therefore, I usually ‘followed the 
action’ instead, meaning that I moved around more fluidly between the groups 
and talked with people when they had time or were available, independent of 
their company. This worked well for my fieldwork there, as it enabled me to 
tag along when opportunities to follow an activity occurred.  
 
Presentation style of empirical data 
In a case study, such as this, where several methods are applied, the type of 
data that is gathered will also vary. The interview data gathered at what I have 
called the authority level, both in Norway and Iceland, were much more 
structured than the more experience-near data gathered from the airports. This 
difference is anchored in the type of questions the data were supposed to 
answer. The interviews at the authority level, as already described above, 
intended to create a more general overview of regulatory processes, while the 
fieldworks were intended to describe in much more detail processes that took 
place at the airport implementation level. I have also separated the two 
empirical chapters according to this delineation, and the reader may, 
therefore, see a change of pace in presentation style from the first to the 
second empirical chapter (5 and 6). To do it this way was a deliberate choice, 
since doing participant observation in the field situation involves the 
researcher to a different extent than it does in the more formal setting of an 
interview. The data presented from the airports are, therefore, presented in a 
more ‘experience-near’ fashion where my participation is more recognisable. 
In regards to the use of quotes in the empirical Chapters 5 and 6, the 
interviews at authority level (both in Norway and Iceland), Avinor and the 
different Associations were tape recorded. These quotes are therefore only 
translated and edited by me. In the interviews and conversations at the 
airports, I took notes and wrote when I could since it often would be 
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impractical to apply a tape recorder. Thus, the quotes are not as directly 
recorded. However, most of the quotes I have applied in this thesis have been 
written down directly in the setting, or noted and elaborated within short time 
by me in order to be as true as possible to the statements from the informants.  
4.3.3 The unpredictability of doing fieldwork and other 
considerations 
In what follows, I will outline some of the more unforeseen parts of the 
fieldworks. In many ways one can see the fieldwork as having a life of its 
own, since one is often unable to control how things are played out in 
practice. While I perceived that my overall fieldwork went well, especially 
considering the number of companies and locations involved, there were 
things that did not go exactly as planned and also issues that are difficult to 
plan for. I will describe some of these events that ended up being influential 
for the final research and data collection. 
4.3.3.1 The airports’ background was important in the 
implementation phase.  
During the fieldworks, I realised that the different airports I visited had 
different backgrounds. This became more evident by going deeper into the 
history of regulatory development in Norway. Using OSL as a starting point, 
this airport took over as Norway’s main airport on the 8th of October, 199829. 
One can say that from that day, OSL was Norway’s main gate out of the 
country. There was a security screening system then, although it was not like 
today’s. Nevertheless, OSL worked as a hub where the national flights fed 
passengers into the system of international flights, screening the passengers 
with the security system operating at that time. Thus, when the 9/11 attacks 
occurred, OSL was already designed to separate the clean and unclean 
passengers (meaning those that had been security screened or not). The 
airside, for instance, was fenced in and unavailable to the public and the 
passengers were security screened; although not 100%. Implementing the new 
regulatory system after 9/11 at OSL was not, therefore, as ‘revolutionary’ as it 
was for other Norwegian airports, like Sola, but perhaps most of all for 
                                                     
29 For an elaboration on OSL, see chapter 6. 
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Fjellvik and the other small airports. Because of this it was almost to be 
expected that the challenges I found at the different airports often seemed to 
pertain to their sizes within the system. The regulation (EC) No. 2320/2002 
was designed for large airports like Heathrow in London or Charles de Gaulle 
in Paris, and implementing it on OSL, which was already working as the 
Norwegian hub and main international gateway, was not a very large 
upheaval. At the other airports (more or less all the other Norwegian airports), 
the systems and buildings were not constructed to support the new regulatory 
regime. With limited funds and personnel, the airports accommodated what 
they could and tried to mend the systems and resources they already had to be 
able to meet the requirements. It is easy to understand why this process was a 
much heavier one for them and why the different airports had different 
challenges and bottle necks they had to overcome to implement the new 
regulation.   
This had also consequences for the data collection process and I therefore 
realised that I had to rationalise and adapt. For instance, shortly after starting 
my fieldwork at OSL, I noticed that I was not finding the same issues there as 
I had done at Sola. I became a bit perplexed when I was not ‘finding 
anything’, meaning that the employees did not seem to experience the same 
issues that had been described at Sola. An example of this was that during my 
first week at OSL, which I spent with one of the handling companies, I 
participated in the same way as I had at Sola, but the ramp agents did not have 
as many opinions about security and the obligations caused by the security 
regulation. I realised that the only intersecting point the ramp agents at OSL 
had with security was the employee security control they had to go through 
when they started their shift, as all other employees working on the inside of 
the airport had to do. The reason for this was that at OSL, all airside areas 
were within the Critical part of Security Restricted Area (CSRA), which 
meant that there was no extra security control on the airside as there was at 
Sola and Fjellvik. I then understood that the airport layout was playing a large 
role, and in realising this, I decided to move on to use my time at other places 
at the airport. 
4.3.3.2 Things that do not end up as planned: pilots and crew 
 As described previously, the group that has received the most media 
attention in Norway regarding the aviation security regime is the pilots. As a 
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group, they have been given space in the media, and as a group in society they 
also have some authority. The pilots have strong unions that work for them, 
both within the aviation system and toward the authorities. By comparison 
one can easily see that the handling companies, as a group, have received little 
or no attention in the media about the inconveniences caused by the regulatory 
system. Nevertheless, since the pilots have been a very visible group in the 
public arena who often point at the inconvenience of the system, I found it 
interesting to include them in the fieldwork. In the preliminary interviews, I 
interviewed two representatives from pilots’ and crew associations and 
charted a basic outline of the challenges. Following from that, I presented my 
project and my own intentions at a meeting at Sola where the chief pilots30 of 
two of the largest airlines in Norway were present. They gave the impression 
that they were interested in the project and that I should contact them when I 
wanted to start my fieldwork with them. I had set aside three months for my 
fieldwork at Sola and, during that time, the Chief of Security and I tried to get 
in contact with them for feedback on how a fieldwork could be conducted 
among them. We did not get any tangible agreements, and as time passed and 
my time at Sola was ending, I decided to try again when I went to OSL, which 
had already been arranged for the 2nd of January, 2009.  
When I arrived at OSL, I established contact with one of the airlines and 
their managers located at the airport. I was able to conduct some preliminary 
interviews and some short informal talks with a few pilots. Some time passed 
without a clear agreement as to how an eventual fieldwork was going to be 
realised. I used my time at other places around the airport while waiting for a 
decision. At the end, I was offered to hang around in the lounge where the 
crew arrived after their flights and waited for their next flight. I tried to spend 
a few days there, but quickly found that it was more difficult than I had 
expected. This was quite a hectic place where people were arriving and going 
all the time. For the crew arriving, this was the place where they could have a 
short eating break and a possibility to relax and talk with their co-workers. 
My presence there was difficult to translate into all of this, especially because 
the crew personnel in the lounge were changing all the time, and the people I 
had talked with might not return for a few days or even weeks. Thus, it was 
                                                     
30 Every airport has a chief pilot as a representative from each company who acts 
as the leader at the actual airport. 
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difficult to establish relationships and the information I received became very 
fragmented. I had hoped I would be able to follow a few crews in their daily 
duties, seeing what struggles they had when they had them and have time to 
discuss it with them afterwards. The easiest way to do this would have been 
through following a crew on their flights. I proposed this to the coordinator, 
but, unfortunately, this was difficult as they had tightened up the routines for 
so-called ‘free travellers’. If I wanted to sit on the folding chair in the cockpit, 
I would have to pay full price tickets for all the flights. As this would 
consume more or less all of my fieldwork funding, this was not an option for 
me, and it became unrealistic for me to gather data this way. Since it did not 
work well to gather data in the busy lounge, I had to decide whether or not to 
abandon my plan, use what data I had gained, and direct my time to the other 
groups where access was easier. I decided to do that, especially having in 
mind that this project was not only about crew and pilots, but all groups 
relating to the security regulation. Thus, I decided to move on and to decide 
later on if I had sufficient data to include in the final thesis. In analysing the 
data I had gathered, the interviews I had been able to conduct with the pilots 
were sufficient for creating an understanding of some of their main interest 
areas and preoccupations. However, due to a lack of data it was not possibly 
to show their daily work was affected by the regulation. 
4.3.3.3 Access and fieldwork roles 
We can say that there are two types of access in a fieldwork situation, 
although these are not static. The first type is the formal access, which is 
essential for the realisation of the fieldwork. Bernard also points to the fact 
that “Issues about access vary to a considerable extent with the kind of task 
you are carrying out and the nature of the organization concerned” (Bernard, 
2006, p. 378). In my study, the formal access was the ‘make or break’ point 
for my research. Fortunately I was granted complete access and security 
clearance, which meant that people could speak freely within my presence. 
This was a great advantage for me, as I came to learn on several occasions. 
Especially in meetings, this came up several times where people were about to 
speak, and then would ask the chairperson whether they could speak freely, or 
ask what kind of clearance I had. The advantages also appeared in my 
fieldworks when sometimes people would hesitate when talking with me and 
say something like “maybe I shouldn’t speak about this publicly...” I could 
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then assure them that I was security cleared and that anything they said would 
be confidential. The confidentiality part was also the main criterion for me to 
receive the full security clearance. When negotiating about my access in the 
first reference-group meeting, I also had to sign a declaration of non-
disclosure. Most of the security regulation is exempt from public disclosure, 
and this meant that my writings, whether in my field notes or my dissertation, 
would also, at the outset, be exempt from public disclosure. Therefore, one of 
the main conditions for me being granted total access was that all writings had 
to go through Avinor before they were made public. This entails the 
possibility that something I perceived to be important could be stopped from 
being published. This has been in the back of my mind throughout the project 
and is why I have explained things more generally and not in detail when I 
have arrived at these crossroads, and I have also tried to specify this in the 
text. In my opinion, detailed explications of regulations would not provide 
deeper understanding of the themes in this thesis.  
The second kind of access is what one gets from the people one meets 
throughout the fieldwork. As I outlined above, my approach to explaining my 
presence was by putting up a poster in the Securitas break-room, for example. 
This approach was not perfect, but I later felt that it at least had given some of 
the security guards a ‘heads up’ to my coming there. In the beginning of the 
fieldworks among the security companies, I believe that I was connected to 
the controller role several times (besides the one already described). 
Schwartzman (1993) describes that this is not an untypical role to be ascribed 
in the field. She continues by explaining that “No matter what role one tries to 
adopt in the fieldwork situation, in the beginning informants will make sense 
of the researcher in the way that they make sense of all other strangers who 
appear and begin to ask many questions” (Schwartzman, 1993, p. 48). To me, 
this underscores that one cannot control how people should perceive you in 
the field, and in large fields, one cannot go around and introduce oneself to 
everyone. One can try to use different strategies to introduce oneself in 
advance of the arrival, but in the end, what really counts is the amount of time 
one spends in the field so that people (or at least a selection of them) become 
comfortable enough to talk about things that go beyond scratching the surface.  
My role in the field, besides the occasional controller role, was that of a 
typical researcher. I was not the first researcher at the airports, so people 
seemed to accept my presence quite easily. There had been people doing 
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surveys on several occasions on anything from customer satisfaction to health, 
safety and environment issues among the employees. Although no studies had 
been done on the same scale as mine, it seemed like people quickly 
categorised me as ‘just another researcher’. I have to admit that I felt more 
comfortable in that role rather than as a controller. The possibilities for 
participating in the various work tasks in the field were quite restricted, so 
there were limitations on how much I could participate. As previously 
described, with the airlines I could do some things (such as stowing luggage), 
but among the security companies, I could not participate in anything since 
that would have required long-term training. This is why I consider my 
researcher role to be closer to one of participating observer, whereby one can 
“... participate in some aspects of life and record what they can” (Bernard, 
2006, p. 347) than the observing participant that can best be described as 
“insiders who observe and record some aspects of life around them” (ibid).  
4.3.3.4 Ethical considerations 
Every research project has the responsibility to ensure that research ethical 
considerations are dealt with. In research ethics we can crudely delineate 
between three groups of norms; first, norms concerning research autonomy 
and practice; second, norms governing the relationship between the researcher 
and the people and groups directly involved by the research; and third, norms 
treating the relevance research should have for society  (Nasjonal 
forskningsetiske komité for samfunnsvitenskap og humaniora, 2005).  
In my project, two major ethical concerns have been important. The first 
was concerned with anonymising the informants so information cannot be 
traced back to individual employees at the airport. The interviewees at 
authority and leadership level, however, has not been anonymised but are 
represented in terms of position and role. There has not been any demand by 
the involved agents to be anonymised and they have been informed of the 
purpose and use of the material gathered. The airports have not been 
anonymised but I have chosen to rename Fjellvik. This was done because an 
airport with only 26 employees is more exposed than airports with many 
employees. Fjellvik is therefore considered as a representative for small, 
regional Northern airports. 
The second major concern has been the handling of data which, in this 
setting, is to a large extent undisclosed for security reasons. The thesis has 
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been read and approved by Avinor to ensure that the information provided in 
this thesis does not breach this. 
4.4 Approximating the concepts of reliability and validity 
The application of the concepts of validity and reliability in qualitative 
research is, and has been, thoroughly debated31. Since the concepts originated 
and were originally applied in quantitative research, it has been claimed that 
qualitative research needs to develop its own concepts for judging the quality 
of research (Healy and Perry (200) in Golafshani, 2003). There have been 
many attempts at doing this and Lincoln and Guba’s alternative is probably 
one of the most applied. They claim that where validity and reliability have 
been criteria for evaluating the quality of research in the quantitative 
paradigm, terms such as credibility, confirmability, dependability and 
transferability should be essential criteria for judging the quality of the 
research in the qualitative paradigm (Lincoln and Guba (1985) in Golafshani, 
2003). This view represents one end of the debate, whereas Morse (1999), 
conversely, presents a quite opposite point of view. In his journal editorial 
from 1999, he strongly refutes the notion that qualitative research should not 
consider the concepts of validity and reliability: “To state that reliability and 
validity are not pertinent to qualitative inquiry places qualitative research in 
the realm of being not reliable and not valid. Science is concerned with rigour, 
and by definition, good rigorous research must be reliable and valid. If 
qualitative research is unreliable and invalid, then it must not be science. If it 
is not science, then why should it be funded, published, implemented, or taken 
seriously?” (Morse, 1999, p. 717) Without going any deeper into the debate 
itself, what others have concluded is that the solution lies in how the 
researcher operationalises the concepts within their own research. As Robson 
points out, the largest problem in applying these concepts is that they have 
been operationalised so rigidly in fixed, quantitative research (Robson, 2002). 
Following the same line of thought, Golafshani concludes that “Therefore, 
reliability, validity and triangulation, if they are to be relevant research 
concepts, particularly from a qualitative point of view, have to be redefined as 
we have seen in order to reflect the multiple ways of establishing truth” 
(Golafshani, 2003, p. 597). 
                                                     
31 Among others, see Golafshani (2003), Creswell (1998) and Morse (1999).  
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Following the typical definition from quantitative research, then, a study is 
reliable if it can be replicated and provide the same result if done under the 
same circumstances and with the same instruments (Ringdal, 2001). Validity, 
on the other hand, deals with whether the researcher measures what he wanted 
to measure (ibid). This does not apply well with qualitative research since 
humans and human societies are not static. However, by following the 
recommendations from both Robson and Golafshani above, the key term is to 
operationalise the concepts. This also follows what Rødne asserts: “Validity 
and reliability are concepts that through exact definitions stand alone in 
textbooks. The task of operationalising these demands within the project is to 
a large extent left to the individual student and research fellow” (Rødne, 2009, 
p. 205 [my translation]). In what follows, I will intend to operationalise this in 
order to say something about how I relate to the concepts of reliability and 
validity.  
Yin explains that the goal of reliability is to minimise (as much as 
possible) biases and errors in a study (Yin, 2003). The thought behind this is 
that, if another researcher some day would try to do the same case-study as 
you have done, he would arrive at the same findings. While this may resemble 
the ‘replicating’ part of a quantitative study, it is not the same, as mentioned 
above, because doing the same case-study again is not the same as replicating 
it (ibid). By understanding reliability this way, the researcher needs to be 
thorough in the reporting of his own research and, simultaneously, be open 
and reflective about his own preconceptions. In this way, it connects to the 
themes of bias, preconceptions and fore-structures that I described at the 
beginning of this chapter.  
Bernard defines validity as referring to “the accuracy and trustworthiness 
of instruments, data, and findings in research” (Bernard, 2006, p. 53). Robson 
(2002) explains that it has something to do with being true, correct or 
accurate. How can we assure ourselves and our readers that we are 
approaching this accuracy and correctness? It is difficult and, perhaps, 
impossible, but what we can do is to say something about the threats to 
validity or what makes research more valid. Lincoln and Guba, for instance, 
divide threats to validity into three main categories: reactivity, respondent bias 
and researcher biases (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). I have already discussed the 
point of researcher bias above, and the first point of reactivity is what I 
described briefly above in ‘the issue of time’, where one of the main strengths 
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of doing participant observation for a longer period of time is that it reduces 
the possibility of reactivity (Bernard, 2006). The second point, respondent 
bias, is about the informants’ agenda,  when the respondents/informants may 
have an agenda of their own and either withhold information or give partial 
information or even try to give the researcher what he thinks he want because 
of that (Robson, 2002). This, too may, be mitigated by prolonged involvement 
in the field, as this usually creates a better bond between the researcher and 
the respondents/informants (ibid).  
With this understanding of reliability and validity, the methodology 
chapter I have presented here is my attempt to accommodate the necessary 
components in approximating what we can call a reliable and valid qualitative 
study. I try to elaborate on my choices, how I came to make them and where it 
led me. I also try to show how research studies tend to change during their 
course and how I then coped with these unanticipated situations. I hope this 
has provided the reader with an understanding of who I am as a researcher, 
my choices and how I carried out my project.  
4.5 Summarising comments 
At the beginning of this chapter, I quoted Robson, who wrote that, “The 
general principle is that the research strategy or strategies, and the methods or 
techniques employed, must be appropriate for the questions you want to 
answer” (Robson, 2002, p. 80). One of the main purposes of qualitative 
enquiries is to understand social phenomena based on rich descriptions about 
persons and situations (Thagaard, 1998). This is why a qualitative approach is 
appropriate when the goal is to understand a phenomenon in a given context. 
However, choosing an extensive field, as I have done, craves delineation in 
order to make the study feasible. Yet, while one has to be conservative in 
delineating the field, since studying ‘everything’ would demand a lifetime (or 
lifetimes), the study cannot be rigorously held down. By asking open-ended 
questions in exploring the field, this will help the researcher to change his 
questions during the process to reflect an increased understanding of the 
problem (Creswell, 1998). This reflexive way of doing research must be 
connected to the reflexivity of the researcher. Reflexivity, in short, can be said 
to refer to the researcher’s own analytical focus on his field. This can too be 
seen as an ongoing process and not only designated to a reflection in the 
aftermath of the study. Dewalt, Dewalt and Wayland describe this as a 
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beginning point rather than an end point. “We need to be aware of who we 
are, understand our biases as much as we can, and to understand and interpret 
our interactions with the people we study. Once we have done that, we can 
strive to determine whether there are regularities in human behaviour” 
(Dewalt, et al., 1998, p. 290).  
The aim of this chapter has been to account for how I planned and carried 
out my research in order to gather data that would enable me to answer the 
questions I had posed. I have also discussed the concepts of reliability and 
validity whereby the detailed explanations of my choices and approaches are 
my attempt to increase the reliability and trustworthiness of this study.  
This case study has placed much focus on empirical research. The 
interviews and document-studies provided me with the necessary knowledge 
to understand the background of what was ‘going on’ at the airports; in 
hindsight, I am content with how well this prepared me for the fieldworks. 
Doing ethnographic fieldwork, and in my case several fieldworks, can be a 
very comprehensive methodological approach. It usually takes much time, so 
the researcher must be prepared to stay in the field much more compared to 
other methods. This is also the strength of the method, because it is perhaps 
the only method that provides in-depth insights and material in such a 
complex environment which would, otherwise, be difficult to reach. 
Therefore, in my search to understand the consequences of the transition of 
security regulations after 9/11, I consider that the methods I chose have 
worked well in enabling me to answer the questions I have posed. The 
empirical material of this thesis is presented in the following two chapters.  
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5 REGULATING SECURITY POST 9/11 
5.1 Introduction 
With the terrorist attacks on the 11th of September, 2001, large changes 
commenced that radically influenced civil aviation worldwide. In Europe, the 
European Union, as a regulatory agent, acted rapidly, summoning people who 
worked with security in the European countries to Brussels32 to establish a 
common security regulation for civil, commercial aviation. Norway, as a 
European Free Trade Association country (EFTA), connected with the EU by 
the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement33, also became part of this 
process.  
The main aim of this chapter is to describe the regulatory transition that 
took place for aviation security after 9/11, described from a Norwegian 
perspective by the main agents on the authority and administration level in the 
Norwegian civil aviation system. The first two empirical questions posed in 
the Introduction of this thesis have been guiding this endeavour and will also 
be steering the end discussion of this chapter: 
 
1. How was the security system for civil aviation transformed after 9/11 
from a Norwegian perspective? 
2. How was the transformation perceived by different agents within the 
civil aviation security system? 
 
By asking these questions, it is possible to create an account of the moves 
that were made in the transitional phases, the national strategies applied by the 
Norwegian authorities and how all of this was perceived by the different 
agents within the Norwegian civil aviation system. I also contrast Norway 
with Iceland in regards to national strategies applied in the transitional phases 
in order to describe an alternative to the Norwegian implementation of the EU 
regulation.  
                                                     
32 The headquarter of the European Commission 
33 See Chapter 2, ‘Background and Context’, for an elaboration of the EU, EFTA 
and the EEA Agreement. 
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In this chapter, I describe the transition process after 9/11 through the 
accounts of the Norwegian authorities and main agents to elaborate the 
motivation and work that was done to become a part of the common European 
aviation security regime and to gain insights into the properties of the 
regulation in practice. The first part of the chapter is mainly based on the 
interview with the Vice President of the Norwegian Ministry of Transport and 
Communications (MTC), which held a position as Vice Chairman in the 
Section for Air Traffic, and the interview with the CEO of Avinor. This is 
followed by the second part, which is the contrasting case of the Icelandic 
Civil Aviation System. This is based on the interview of the Head of Security 
at the Icelandic Civil Aviation Administration (Flugmálastjórn Íslands). The 
third and fourth part of the chapter are mainly oriented around properties of 
the regulation and are based on interviews with the Civil Aviation Authority 
(CAA), Avinor and official documents regarding national positioning toward 
EU regulation. The chapter is finalised with a concluding summary including 
the main findings presented in this chapter. 
5.2 The transitional phase in Norway 
5.2.1 Norway’s role in the transition 
As elaborated in Chapter 2, ‘Background and Context’, although Norway 
is not an EU member, the EEA agreement between the EU and EFTA makes 
Norway part of the European Internal Market comprising free movement of 
people, goods, services and capital. Norway is, thus, obliged to follow all 
regulations found relevant to the EEA agreement. The EEA agreement can be 
considered as a compromise or also as a possibility for countries outside of 
the Union to participate in the European market on the same level as the other 
EU countries. This membership in the European Internal Market has 
advantages but it simultaneously obliges. This is reflected in that EFTA 
members have to follow regulations found relevant to the EEA Agreement. To 
what extent an EU regulation is found relevant to the EEA varies, but in 
regards to civil aviation security, this normally comprises all regulations.  
Due to this, Norway became included and involved in the new regulatory 
system for aviation security post 9/11 due to the EEA agreement. 
Additionally, although the Regulation (EC) No 2320/2002 was new, it was, as 
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Chapter 2 described, founded on ICAO’s Annex 17 and ECAC’s Doc 30. 
These two documents had also been influential in developing the Norwegian 
Aviation Act. Hence, when the new Regulation 2320/2002 was implemented, 
which to a large extent was founded on the same two documents, much of its 
contents was already known and, to some extent, already implemented in the 
Norwegian civil aviation system. The large difference, however, was that the 
new regulation was legally binding, while the previous regulations had only 
been bound by public international law to report deviations from. Thus, the 
liberty that each sovereign country possessed prior to 9/11 to adapt the 
recommendations into the national context had now ended. 
Although Norway had some rights because of its EFTA membership, 
including that of an observer in the EU Commission, the degree of its 
involvement in regulatory development was not given. After 9/11, the 
Norwegian delegation34 found itself very much involved in the process of 
establishing Regulation 2320/2002. Norway was summoned to Brussels 
shortly after 9/11, as were all other European Union member countries. The 
Vice President of the MTC was personally given a place in the EU AVSEC35 
Committee that worked directly with the development of the 2320/2002. She 
explained that it was a clear strategy from the Norwegians’ side to be visible 
and participating in order to create goodwill from the EU and not be banned 
from the EU regulatory area. To be banned would imply that the Norwegian 
aviation security system would not be considered ‘good enough’ by the EU 
and could receive a ‘Third Country36’ status, whereby all passengers 
originating from Norway would be considered ‘unclean37’. When the Frame 
                                                     
34 The Norwegian delegation comprised representatives from the Ministry of 
Transport and Communications (MTC) and the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA). 
35 The AVSEC (Aviation Security) Committee is placed directly under the EU 
Commission 
36 The term ‘Third Country’ describes a country that is not a member of the 
European Union. It reflects a third country not a part of an agreement between two 
other countries. In relation to EU regulations, ‘Third Country’ refers to all other 
countries that are not EU members or EFTA members who are also obliged by the 
EEA Agreement (Eurofound, 2013). 
37 The terms ‘clean’ and ‘unclean’ were applied by the EU Commission after 9/11 
to delineate countries that followed EU security regulations from those that did not. 
‘Clean’ therefore refers to ‘secure’ airports and/or passengers, while ‘unclean’ refers 
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Regulation 2320/2002 was passed in the European Parliament and the 
European Council on the 19th of December, 2002, this became a concern for 
the Norwegians:  
 
For us, as an EEA country [not a EU member] the frame regulation 
was not legally binding, and when it was passed in the EU in 2002, 
there was a kind of small panic in our camp because we could risk 
to be treated difficultly, as a so-called ‘Third Country’, or ‘unclean’ 
as it is also called. To implement the regulation in the EEA 
Agreement took time, so what we did was to prepare the Norwegian 
regulation that was based in the Norwegian Aviation Act 
[Luftfartsloven] and we improved it. But still, it was a purely 
Norwegian regulation we had, while the other countries had the 
2320/2002.      
 (Vice President, MTC) 
 
Since processing laws and regulations in the EEA bureaucracy was a time-
consuming affair, the Norwegian strategy was to accommodate EU 
Regulation 2320/2002 by altering the Norwegian law to hold the same 
regulative level as the EU did. The main aim for the Norwegian authorities 
was, thus, to avoid being banned from the ‘good company’ in the EU caused 
by the struggle they had with the EEA processes. The main reason why the 
processes in the EU and the EEA were unsynchronised was that when a law 
was passed in the EU, it automatically took effect 20 days after it was 
announced in the Official Journal of the EU38. For the member countries, the 
law took effect automatically, since the EU countries had common legislation. 
For non-members, like Norway, this had to follow the obligations in the EEA 
agreement and thereafter become implemented in Norwegian law. This 
laborious exercise was described by the Vice President of the MTC:   
 
The process after something is passed in the EU is that it becomes 
subject to an assessment in EFTA, down in Brussels, to find out 
whether it is EEA relevant or not. If it is found to be relevant, we 
                                                                                                                              
to unsecure airports and/or passengers. If an EU or ESA inspection reveals security 
deficiencies at an airport, the airport is subjected to sanctions and is classified as 
‘unclean’ (Essig, Hülsmann, Kern, & Klein-Schmeink, 2013). 
38 The Official Journal is the public journal for the EU where legislation, reports 
and judgments, etc., are published. Only legal acts published in the journal are 
binding. 
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[the Ministry of Transport and Communications] receive an enquiry 
asking whether we consider it to be necessary with constitutional 
changes or technical adaptations in order to implement it in 
Norwegian law. We then send an answer back to them and then 
EFTA makes a draft to what an EEA resolution should look like. 
Then again we are allowed to give response to the draft before it 
goes back to EFTA, and now the real interaction between EFTA on 
the one side and the EU on the other begins. This is when it has to 
go through many organs in the EU. It can take half a year, it can 
take a year; it depends on whether it is current or not. And only 
when it has become an EEA resolution, can we incorporate it as a 
part of the Norwegian Aviation Act.  
(Vice President, MTC) 
 
Although this is just a highly simplified presentation of the implementation 
processes in the EEA agreement, it reveals why there was always a time lag 
for EEA regulations. Because of this, and to compensate for the impossibility 
of following the same pace as the EU on regulatory implementation, Norway 
accommodated it by changing the national regulation in accordance with the 
EU regulation and, simultaneously, tried to maintain a visible and involved 
profile in Brussels to gain goodwill and not become a ‘Third Country’, an 
apparently successful strategy:   
 
I think it meant something that we were present in Brussels, being in 
this committee where they knew us and could ask us questions 
about us. Not just me, but we who were present down there told 
them that we are working as hard as we can. But as an EEA country 
we have EEA procedures and we explained that it can take quite a 
long time before we get it through the formal processes; through the 
EEA Committee and so on. Everything takes time. So the reality 
was that the 30th of April, 2004 we got a statute [forskrift] that had 
implemented the regulation plus some other regulations that the EU 
Commission had passed in the mean time. I remember I had decided 
for myself that the 30th of April would be the deadline for 
implementation because we could not wait any longer. I felt we had 
‘strained the rubber band’ for so long, and as of the 30th of April, we 
had formally implemented the regulation. But the Commission 
always passes new regulations, so we always fall behind because of 
the EEA process. Since we ‘know’ them (the Commission), they 
give us goodwill; there is no way around that. We go to Brussels 10 
times a year, we are in different committees and we know everyone.  
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We wanted to be perceived as having the same standards as the 
other countries. 
      (Vice President, MTC) 
 
Based on what has been described so far, we can see that while not an EU 
member, Norway was summoned with all the other EU member countries 
when the decision was made to make a single regulation for Europe. 
According to the statement by the MTC’s Vice President, the Norwegian 
authorities’ strategy was to participate in as much of this work as possible and 
to create good relationships in Brussels so as to receive some leeway when it 
came to the time-consuming EEA processes. This was mended by Norway 
being able to get an interim arrangement, meaning that they were given a 
dispensation while waiting for the bureaucracy to run its course. As a sign of 
goodwill, Norway changed its national regulations to align it as closely as 
possible to the EU regulation. As the informant herself pointed out, their 
willingness was noticed, and they were able to avoid a ‘Third-Country’ status. 
By being a visible, although not voting, partner in Brussels, the strategy was 
to demonstrate a willingness to accommodate the EU regulation in a way that 
made it possible to avoid being banned from the EU regulatory area for 
aviation security. 
5.2.2 Interim arrangements and national strategy 
Although the Regulation 2320/2002 officially was implemented in Norway 
on the 30th of April, 2004, there was an interim arrangement between Norway 
and the EU that exempted the regional (small) airports from having full 
security screening procedures. The agreement stated that a total 
implementation was to be completed by the 1st of January, 2005. However, to 
implement the same regulations on all of the 26 small Norwegian airports, 
when many of them were situated at climatically tough and remote locations, 
was not an easy task. To demonstrate the difficulty the Norwegian airports 
had in implementing this, the Norwegian authorities invited a delegation from 
the EU Commission to visit some of these airports in hopes of creating some 
understanding of their challenges: 
 
What was a challenge was that the Regulation 2320/2002 was 
primarily intended on airports like London and Paris, in short, the 
large ones. And then, back here in Norway, we were supposed to 
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implement it on all the Norwegian airports. We invited the 
Commission to come look at this here, among other things we 
brought them up North [to some of the small local airports]. They 
had never seen anything like it. They did not understand that it was 
possible, and while they were there at the airport, there came 
reindeer down at the airfield. And at some airports there were 
maybe just 5 or even 2 passengers. They really had an ‘aha-
experience’. This is why it was so important to invite them to see 
how we have it in Norway; how our route network is organised. In 
other countries they have the large hubs and then it is ok with all the 
requirements that are set regarding the security standard. But take an 
airport like Mehamn39. That they should accomplish the whole scale 
of the regulation, well, that is a challenge. Nevertheless, it was 
decided that Norway would implement EU standard, and that is 
what we have done. 
        (Vice President, MTC) 
 
The EU accommodated Norway’s wish for an exemption for the small 
airports by setting the date to the 1st of January, 2005 for a complete 
implementation of the 2320/2002 on the small airports. This would give 
Norway time to do the necessary reconstructions on the airports as well as 
train personnel to man the security controls at all airports.  
Considering the interim arrangements they were able to negotiate, the 
Norwegian strategy of visibility, contribution and involvement seemed to 
have worked well, along with the acceptance of amending national legislation 
while the EU regulation was pending in the EEA bureaucracy. However, 
Norway had no voting rights in the EU, and one could assume that Norway’s 
ability to influence the regulatory processes would be less than the other 
member countries. This was not the case, however. On the contrary, the MTC 
Vice President emphasised how well she thought the Norwegian delegation 
was generally treated in Brussels, and she explained the good relationship 
between Norway and the EU by Norway’s rapid response-time and positive 
approach toward the EU: 
 
We are treated very well in the AVSEC Committee. I hear from 
members in other committees that they are sent out in the hallway if 
a discussion becomes ‘heated’. We are never asked to leave; we are 
allowed to be there all the way until voting takes place. 
                                                     
39 Mehamn is a municipality in the northernmost part of Norway with 
approximately 700 inhabitants and 4 departures a day. 
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I actually do believe that this good relationship stems from Norway 
being very rapid and positive. In addition, Norway is part of 
working groups alongside all the other meetings. So you see we 
possess a lot of resources. We are part of these groups and in 
addition the Civil Aviation Authority has two persons working 
down there. It is in these working groups things happen, and this is 
why we have to do a very good job, because when things are 
decided, we can just forget about it.  
 (Vice President, MTC) 
 
Thus, she indicated that this goodwill was closely connected to the active 
role they played in Brussels, and she considered that if they changed this 
active approach, things would most likely become more difficult:  
 
So we cannot complain. They know [in Brussels] that everything 
has to go through the EEA channel and they understand that, but the 
day we are not present there and they are not reminded of the EEA 
Agreement, then we can have problems.  
 (Vice President, MTC) 
 
Thus, Norway had no voting rights but the MTC Vice President placed 
more importance on lobbying and other channels for influence than on the 
actual voting:   
 
I do not think the voting is important. No, I do not think it is 
important at all. We are so well treated and I think that the fact that 
we are there, present, and that they have been here in Norway, and 
that we continuously remind them of the EEA agreement is the most 
important.  
        (Vice President, MTC) 
 
During this interview it became clear that this willingness to comply and 
accommodate had been a clear strategic choice taken by the Norwegian 
authorities toward the EU. The Vice President further exemplified this 
strategic approach through the work group on which she had participated, the 
National Strategy Group, a group whose main task was to establish Norway’s 
strategic role in EEA work:  
 
I have recently been part of a working group [National Strategy 
Group] where we developed a strategy for the EEA work, and here 
we specifically clarified that we have to be active from the 
REGULATING SECURITY POST 9/11 
 
115 
 
beginning; starting when a proposal is at the beginning. This 
demands great activity on our side. The strategy we developed can 
be passed at any time now. You can say that there are high and strict 
expectations of us and of us being active, and equally important is 
the lobbying in the Parliament. This is something we have actively 
thought about and seen that there are possibilities and opportunities 
lying there [in the lobby work].  
        (Vice President, MTC) 
 
Hence, active lobbying in Brussels was a way to be able to influence ahead 
of the voting, since Norway had no right to vote in the Parliament. The Vice 
President elaborated how this could be carried out: 
 
Then you go down to Strasbourg where the Parliament is. For 
instance, you go down earlier in the week when the representatives 
are doing the preliminary work. The representatives go down there 
without their wives and children, which means they are free from 
duties in the evenings all the week until Friday when they go home 
to their families for the weekend. So if there is something you want 
to lobby for, you go down there early. [...] This is a very nice 
channel, and more: it is for everyone.  
 (Vice President, MTC) 
 
Considering the constant need to be visible through lobbying and 
participation, it is conceivable that a membership would have facilitated much 
and made it easier for Norway to have influence. The MTC Vice President did 
not, however, see this as making much difference when it came to aviation 
security. On the question of whether she believed it would have been easier if 
Norway was an EU member, she answered: 
 
I do not think I can answer that very clearly. We have been treated 
so well all the time so I... I do not think it would have... Well, my 
personal opinion, and this is not an academic opinion, I do not think 
that, regarding security that is, it would change much. On other 
areas than security, yes, by all means. 
 (Vice President, MTC) 
 
It was clear that Norway’s strategy of not only being a visible and 
contributing actor but also demonstrating willingness to compliance was 
effective in staying in what the Vice President described as the EU’s ‘good 
company’. Norway’s strategy became clear in this interview. The intention 
had been to follow EU regulations, and when this became delayed because of 
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the EEA processes, this was mended by changing Norwegian law. It was 
important to have a good relationship with the EU to avoid becoming an 
outsider in the European aviation security system. Simultaneously, to promote 
Norwegian interests, the strategy was to participate where possible to forward 
issues important for Norway. The fact that Norway was not an EU member 
was not held to be important for Norwegian influence. 
We now move from the arena of Norwegian national strategy and over to 
the national handling of the Kato Air incident, the most influential intentional 
attack against civil aviation Norway has experienced. As just described, 
Norway had achieved an interim agreement with the EU that exempted 
regional airports from implementing full security screenings. This incident, 
however, overthrew the original plan to implement full security by the 1st of 
January, 2005, and it was immediately ordered that it should be implemented 
within 48 hours. The case of the Kato Air incident is interesting, since it can 
be seen as a signifying act for how the Norwegian civil aviation system 
handled the only ‘real’ intentional attack on Norwegian soil. I will see this 
incident in relation to the similar case from New Zealand, the 2008 Blenheim 
Hijacking. There are two reasons for comparing the two incidents. The first is 
that the New Zealandian and the Norwegian governments ended up with 
different ways of handling extra security measures in the aftermath of their 
respective incidents. Secondly, although the New Zealandian government 
contacted the Norwegian authorities after the Blenheim incident to seek 
advice on how they had handled the situation, they still ended up choosing a 
different strategy for their national system on aviation security.  
5.2.3 The Kato Air incident and the Blenheim hijacking 
5.2.3.1 The Kato Air incident 
As described in Chapter 2, on the 29th of October, 2004, a small Dornier 
228 airplane operated by Kato Air was subject to an attack in which a 
passenger onboard this flight entered the cockpit and attacked both pilots with 
an axe. Although the episode ended with only minor injuries for the pilots, the 
incident caused immediate changes in Norway’s interim arrangement 
regarding aviation security, resulting in Norway rapidly implementing 100% 
security screening on all Norwegian airports, in addition to decrees to 
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strengthen all cockpit doors. This reaction was not imposed by the EU but 
was a national choice. The course of these events was further described by the 
MTC Vice President: 
 
In relation to what happened with the Kato Air flight attack, the 
Civil Aviation Authority imposed extraordinary security measures 
on Norwegian airports and airlines. As soon as the 2nd of October, 
2004, 100% security control on all airports (including the regional) 
was effectuated. Now, the EU regulation had at that time been 
implemented, but the regional airports had the exemption due to the 
interim agreement Norway had with the EU. After Kato Air, on the 
2nd of October, full screening was now in place; all passengers and 
all luggage, etc.  
 
We had said to the EU that by the 1st of January, 2005, all the 
regional airports would implement the Regulation 2320/2002. So 
the interim agreement would give the different airports time to 
adjust and adapt to the regulations. For instance, there was a bit of 
construction work needed to meet the standards. But on the 30th of 
September, the day after the Kato air incident, an urgent resolution 
was made demanding that all cockpit doors that could be locked 
should be locked from now on. And on the 2nd of October, 2004, all 
airports had implemented the 2320/2002. [...] The choice to 
implement 100% security immediately was a national decision. 
 (Vice President, MTC) 
 
This demonstrates how regulatory practice, even within Norway, can be 
described as event-based. In the EU, the regulation was already in place, but 
in Norway, because of the interim arrangement, it took an event to implement 
the same standards even before the deadline of the 1st of January, 2005. In the 
interview with the Avinor CEO, he accentuated how the reactions from the 
authorities demonstrated how politically, and to some extent media-driven, 
the regulatory practice was in the aftermath of the Kato Air incident:  
 
To take the Kato Air incident, it was already decided that we should 
implement the regulation on small airports as well, but Kato Air led 
to pressure both politically and from the media that a regime should 
be put in place as soon as possible so that something like this could 
never happen again. This only goes to show how politically driven 
this really is, because then the politicians stood in the frontline and 
talked about the importance of getting this done as quickly as 
possible. All of a sudden it was sort of forgotten how difficult and 
strict they previously had felt that the system was. 
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(CEO, Avinor) 
 
He also found it difficult to see the Kato Air incident in relation to 
international terrorist attacks. He perceived that the risks to which the 
Norwegian system was subjected were somewhat different than the risks 
facing international aviation. He did not seem sure that the regulatory system 
that had been constructed on the basis of international terrorist attacks was 
necessarily appropriate for the types of risks that the Norwegian civil aviation 
system was subjected to:  
 
It is difficult to relate to the international terrorist threat and the 
threat we have here in Norway, because there are different things at 
play. It is clear that we have, for instance, many asylum seekers here 
in Norway who may risk being sent out of the country if their 
application is denied. Many of them are located in small places, 
maybe in the north in small municipalities. We have had episodes, 
and without being too concrete, there have been revealed cases that 
stopped people before they got on the inside and had the possibility 
to hijack a plane. So there has been talk about situations where 
people have bought fuel and other stuff... These things are not 
public, and without digging any deeper into this, it is not only 
abroad that these kinds of plans and intents have been revealed. 
Thus, we can say that we have a real risk here, but then the next 
question is how big this risk is and what kind of consequences it can 
have. So we are not really talking about risks where the airplane is 
to be used as a weapon, in a 9/11 kind of attack, but more as a 
means for pressure to achieve asylum or similar things. We have 
had a few episodes historically where people have hijacked 
airplanes to achieve asylum, like in 199340 and 199641, so this is a 
real risk here in Norway. But then we can ask if the regulations we 
have implemented cover these kinds of risks. The next question is 
whether it is worth using more than 800 million NOK a year on it. 
(CEO, Avinor) 
 
                                                     
40 On the 15th of September, 1993, an Aeroflot plane on a flight from Baku to Kiev 
was hijacked by three men from Azerbaijan, forcing it to go to Gardermoen, where 
they sought political asylum (SNL, 2009) 
41 On the 3rd of September, 1996, a Balkan Air flight from Beirut to Varna was 
forced to continue to Gardermoen by a Palestinian who surrendered shortly after 
landing and sought political asylum (SNL, 2009) 
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What the CEO described were actual risks in Norway, although different 
than the threats to international aviation, which accordingly indicated a need 
for a security system. Simultaneously, he questioned whether the system was 
appropriate for the type of risks to which Norway was subjected. However, 
the alternative would have been to wait until the appropriate assessments and 
documentations were done, which was no alternative right after 9/11, since it 
would have taken too much time. 
 
However, if you had a very high security clearance you would see 
that very much has been revealed that has not been talked about in 
the media. What comes in the media may only be the tip of the 
iceberg. Then you would perhaps get a better understanding of the 
regulation. But then again you have the question of whether we are 
doing the right things, whether the things we do are risk assessed 
enough or well enough worked through. Well... What should we 
have done then? Should we have waited 2 or 3 or 5 years until it 
was risk assessed enough? That was maybe the alternative. 
  (CEO, Avinor) 
 
The preceding description of the Kato Air incident explains the effects it 
created for Norwegian civil aviation. We now continue to the case of the 
Blenheim hijacking as a contrast to the Norwegian handling of this incident. I 
was made aware of this incident during the interviews with the Civil Aviation 
Authority, when one of the interviewees explained that the New Zealandian 
(NZ) Government had contacted the Norwegian Government seeking advice 
about how it had handled the Kato Air incident. The reason for the enquiry 
was that there had been a hijacking in New Zealand in 2008 that resembled 
the Kato Air incident; the ‘Blenheim hijacking’. The interviewee from the 
CAA brought this up as an example of an alternative implementation strategy 
in the wake of such incidents, since the NZ Government reacted differently to 
their incident, even after consulting the Norwegian authorities. The NZ 
assessment is expounded next, based on official documents from the NZ 
Government.  
5.2.3.2 The Blenheim hijacking in New Zealand in 2008 
The Blenheim hijacking resembled the Kato Air incident to a large extent, 
since it was a hijacking of a small, regional flight. On the 8th of February, 
2008, Eagle Airways Flight 2279 between Blenheim and Christchurch, New 
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Zealand, was hijacked. The hijacker was a 33-year-old Somali female who 
attacked the two pilots with knives and demanded the plane be flown to 
Australia42.  
Although New Zealand is geographically distant from the European Union 
and Norway, the case is interesting as an alternative approach to the 
Norwegian handling of the Kato Air incident. First, the two cases have 
significant similarities regarding the course of events and also the type of 
attack.  Secondly, in the official documents, the NZ Government compares 
their national aviation security system to the OECD countries (both New 
Zealand and Norway are members), in which a majority of these member 
countries are also EU members. This means in practice that the alternative the 
NZ Government presented after the Blenheim hijacking was to implement a 
system that aligned the system found in OECD and, hence, the EU countries 
for their national aviation security system.   
Both the Kato Air incident and the Blenheim hijacking were not defined as 
terrorist acts. The New Zealandian Cabinet (Government) directed officials to 
review domestic aviation security after the Blenheim incident. The appointed 
officials determined in their review, “the threat from acutely disaffected 
people [is currently assessed] to be MEDIUM (feasible and could well 
occur). The threat posed to domestic aviation by terrorism is currently 
assessed to be VERY LOW (unlikely)” (Ministry of Transport, 2009a, p. 2 
[original emphasis]). At the time of the review, the NZ domestic aviation 
system only screened 57 percent of all passengers travelling within the 
system. The review committee developed alternative strategies in which 
additional security screening procedures would be “broadly consistent with 
international best practice and would bring New Zealand into line with other 
OECD countries” (Ministry of Transport, 2009a, p. 1). The new security 
procedures the Committee proposed were, hence, aligned with EU 
regulations. However, on the 18th of May, 2009, Transport Minister Steven 
Joyce announced that the Government would not extend security screening for 
domestic air travel. He announced that, “fortunately, events like the alleged 
hijacking in February 2008 are very rare in New Zealand. While there will 
always be some risk with unscreened passengers on domestic aircraft, the cost 
of implementing additional screening would have a disproportionate impact 
                                                     
42 For a more thorough description, see Chapter 2. 
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on domestic aviation and is therefore unjustified, particularly in these tough 
economic times” (Ministry of Transport, 2009b).  
The Blenheim case is interesting as a contrasting case to the Kato Air 
incident, as they ended up having quite different impacts. While the Kato Air 
incident was not decisive for the judgement of whether Norwegian regional 
airports should have full security screening or not, since this was already 
decided by the Norwegian authorities, it had an immediate effect. In Norway, 
full security screening was in place two days after the incident. In New 
Zealand, the Blenheim case initiated a review of the system and based on this 
review, the NZ Government, through the Ministry of Transport, decided that 
implementing measures on the domestic flights on the same level as 
international flights was disproportionate in relation to the threat level and, 
therefore, were concluded to be unjustified. As an alternative, additional flight 
deck security was implemented on domestic flights, which would make it 
difficult to repeat an attack like the Blenheim or the Kato Air incidents. Based 
on this, we see that two countries that experienced two very similar, 
intentional attacks against the domestic aviation system ended up with two 
quite different implementation strategies. We will return to variations in 
implementation strategies at the end of this chapter.    
We now move over to the Icelandic civil aviation system, which also 
provides an example of a different implementation strategy, also as an EFTA 
country obliged by the EEA Agreement. Iceland, like Norway, was not a 
member of the EU. Iceland had, however, an exemption from EU security 
regulations for its domestic aviation system. Next, I describe the Icelandic 
civil aviation system regarding its security strategy, mainly based on the 
interview with the Head of Security (HoS) at the Icelandic Civil Aviation 
Administration.   
5.3 The Icelandic Version of EU regulation 
Iceland is a small island country located in the North Atlantic Ocean 
bordering the Arctic Oceans. It is the smallest of the Nordic European 
countries with a population of about 300.000 people in 2010. Its location 
between the continents of North America and mainland Europe has made it a 
place for stopovers on the transoceanic flights. Reykjavík, the capital, has two 
airports: Keflavík and Reykjavík. Keflavík is its main airport and works as a 
hub for international traffic, while Reykjavík handles mostly the domestic 
REGULATING SECURITY POST 9/11 
 
122 
 
transportation as well as flights to Greenland and the Faroe Islands that are 
not subjected to the EU regulations.  
The interview data presented here is mostly based on the interview at the 
Icelandic Civil Aviation Administration (Flugmálastjórn Íslands). One of the 
two representatives at this interview was the Head of Security (HoS), who 
was very much involved in the transitional phases of security regulations in 
Iceland after 9/11. The Icelandic system was small and transparent, and she 
was recommended as someone who had a good overview of how the Icelandic 
system had been transformed after 9/11.  
5.3.1 The construction of the Icelandic security system 
While Iceland and Norway were different with regard to geographic 
location and size, they had some common features: as non-members of the 
EU, both were still strongly affected by the regulations, both were small 
countries with many small airports where the maintenance and upholding of 
the regulations was largely part of regional politics, and both were obliged by 
the EEA Agreement. However, where Norway had applied for an interim 
agreement in relation to the security Regulation 2320/2002, Iceland had 
applied for a complete exemption from the security regulation on domestic 
aviation. The background for the exemption was largely based on Iceland’s 
distance from the rest of Europe, together with the aircraft size that operated 
these domestic routes. This was elaborated by the Head of Security (HoS) 
from the CAA: 
 
Our main argument at the time was the distance from Europe. With 
the type of domestic fleet we have – I mean, the biggest ones are 
Fokker 50s and their ranges… I mean, if they would leave Iceland 
with the intention to do terrorist activity they would be intercepted 
long before they would reach the target. But mainly it was the 
distance from the European Union and the type of fleet we have. 
          (Head of Security, CAA) 
 
Since Iceland was located so far away from mainland Europe, hijacking 
was not considered to entail the same risk from Iceland to the rest of Europe 
as other countries closer to mainland Europe would. The Fokker 50, which 
mainly operated the domestic flights, was a propeller aircraft that carried up to 
62 passengers. Both the range of the aircraft and its capacity made the risk of 
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hijacking with the intent to cause impact on mainland Europe small. This 
formed the basis of their application for an exemption from the EU regulation 
on security on domestic flights. The largest gain for the Icelandic Civil 
Aviation System, in having this exemption, came from having more lenient 
security demands on their regional airports:  
 
Having these small airports like you also have [Norway] – I mean 
we have scheduled flights to some of them perhaps three times a 
week or one flight a day. We have maybe one person who looks 
after the airport, who lives close to the airport. He comes up when 
there is a flight and closes the airport after the flight leaves. So I 
mean, both the cost/benefit, the risk assessments made and as I said 
the fleet… that was the argument. And to apply full security 
measures at these airports… you don’t even have the facilities. You 
would have to build new terminals et cetera for one flight coming 
three or four times a week. As I said, the risk assessments were 
made and we did not see the need. The state police make a sort of 
risk assessment for these flights – and they have been valued as low 
risk. 
               (Head of Security, CAA) 
 
It was clearly considered as an asset to them that they were exempt from 
the cost and work of implementing security regulation on these small airports. 
This also left the risk assessments to be done on the national level, with the 
state police performing the risk assessments for each airport. For small 
countries, one of the main challenges of Regulation 2320/2002 was that it was 
designed for large airports in large systems. Implementing the same measures 
at small airports created situations where one or a few persons had to occupy 
several roles and jobs at once 
  
Even I have to wear many hats [in the Civil Aviation 
Administration]. This is so much easier for larger airports where 
people have dedicated assignments and tasks and don’t have to split 
themselves in multiple directions and tasks. And I mean the risks 
are higher in certain places in the world compared to here. Many of 
these regulations that come, we say ‘WOW, how are we going to 
implement them here?’  
 
For example we were discussing something the other day, say for 
instance the new cargo regulations, it is so complex, and it is so 
obviously made to fit into a setting where you have hundreds of 
known containers and a hundred regulated agents, and… ok…. We 
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have four [laughing]. We have no problem to keep track of those 
four regulated agents, and we could do it all in a much smaller scale, 
more easily, but today we have to go this way according to the 
instructions in the regulation and we prepare all the documentation. 
I mean, a lot of these things are based on the fact that you cannot 
have an oversight of what is going on, and for us you could easily 
have oversight of all airports, except maybe Keflavik since Keflavik 
is rather big in that perspective. But for all the others and at least 
with the traffic of today you don’t have any problems. You don’t 
have non-stop traffic during the day and they are closed during 
night-time.  
          (Head of Security, CAA) 
 
In Iceland, they had four agents who handled cargo and, hence, were easily 
monitored. The small scale of the Icelandic system would have made the 
cargo agents easy to monitor, as they had been doing before the new cargo 
regulation arrived, and it would also have been the most economic way to 
handle this. Since the cargo area was subject to EU regulations, they were 
obliged to follow instructions laid down through the regulation. It also 
demonstrated the division between Keflavik, as the main airport, and the rest 
of the Icelandic Civil Aviation System, which mainly comprised small 
airports that were easy to survey with little traffic and few employees. These 
airports were, like their Norwegian siblings, part of a regional politics plan, 
since people lived scattered all over the country. Thus, the airports were 
connecting the small places to the larger ones and providing other kinds of 
services, such as medical assistance to remote locations.   
So far we have seen that the largest difference between Iceland and the rest 
of the EU countries (Norway included) was its geographical location, in 
addition to the aircraft operating in the domestic aviation system. This formed 
the basis for their exemption. However, this did not explain why they had not 
implemented EU security measures for their own benefit. They had obviously 
made a different assessment than Norway had. It was clear that the CAA did 
not perceive the risks the EU security system was designed to handle to be 
equally relevant in the Icelandic setting: 
 
We hear about things that happen in other countries, but here in 
Iceland… nothing will ever happen to us you know. This is Iceland, 
we are 300.000 people. Who is going to come here and want to do 
some great damage? It will not affect anybody in the big picture 
[laughing]. And even if they attempt to ruin Keflavik airport, ok… 
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the small percentage of passengers that cross the Atlantic will be 
affected. I don’t know exactly what the percentage is, but we have 
less than 2 million a year. So even if they did a total destruction of 
Keflavik they would not even affect one percent of the passengers 
going across the Atlantic. So, I don’t know, the only thing I really 
can see they might want to do is to use the possibility of Iceland to 
go from one continent to the other. To come here and do some real 
physical damage to get the attention of the world; I don’t think it is 
very likely. Then you have the mentally disturbed. I mean, you 
never know what they can do. 
 
Of course we [Iceland] are different in many ways, but now I’m not 
talking on behalf of the CAA, but you can say that you find many 
areas where you have much more risks – more riskier areas – in the 
world than anything you will ever find in Iceland. But when it 
comes to international flights, we see that the hazard is the same so 
this is why we are in full compliance with the EU regulations. 
          (Head of Security, CAA) 
 
Hence, based on the domestic risk-assessment, Iceland was deemed to be a 
low-risk area when considering the type of risks the EU security measures 
were constructed to prevent.  Keflavik, on the other hand, as the main gate out 
to the world, was considered to be as risky as any other European airport, 
since risks travel within the system because of the principle of One-Stop 
Security43. Iceland was also considered an ‘outsider’ when it came to risk of 
domestic attacks, and the possible impact of such an attack was played down. 
This led us over to the Kato Air incident, since this had had a great impact on 
the Norwegian security system and how risks for intentional attacks were 
considered to be an actual threat to the civil aviation system. 
  
Yes, of course there were discussions. We discussed the Kato Air 
incident. This was not an act of terrorism, but the other threat, the 
mentally disturbed. Of course we have the same threat in Iceland.  
          (Head of Security, CAA) 
 
It may be reasonable to believe that if such an incident were to take place 
in Iceland, there would have been consequences for the domestic security 
system. However, this did not necessarily seem to be the case. On the 
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question of what would have happen if a similar attack were to happen in 
Iceland, the HoS reflected around this issue: 
 
(Sighs) Very good question, but honestly I do not have an answer to 
that one. It would depend on the seriousness and what happened… 
but… I think that these exemptions we have in our domestic air 
traffic – it is so valuable for us that it would really have to be a 
serious incident for people being willing to – or even look at 
changing the setup we have today.  
          (Head of Security, CAA) 
 
What she stated here was that the Kato Air incident had created 
discussions around the Icelandic system. However, the HoS was 
simultaneously very clear in that the exemption from the EU regulation was 
very valuable to them, because it gave them the possibility to govern the 
domestic system independently. This was held as so valuable that even if a 
similar incident were to happen, she assumed that they would most likely 
continue with the same system as they already had.  
Although Iceland had not implemented the EU regulation on domestic 
flights, this did not mean that they had nothing at all:  
 
We have measures for domestic flights. We check people working 
at the airport with ID background check and we check boarding 
passes and IDs, but with the new regulation from the EU this will be 
obsolete. We have reconciliation of baggage et cetera! So there is 
always something. But our main concern in domestic traffic is all 
the tourists coming here travelling around Iceland bringing with 
them gas cylinders for their cookers. And they put this in their 
baggage and that is something you really don’t want to see because 
we are really concerned about this. I don’t know how many gas 
cylinders we confiscate every year, especially during summer time. 
But that is safety and not security! 
          (Head of Security, CAA) 
 
Hence, there were measures taken, but the measures were not completely 
aligned with the EU standards. This demonstrated the possibilities the 
Icelandic exemption provided: it provided them with the possibility to do 
local assessments, and based on these, establishing what was considered to be 
sufficient measures in their particular context, this way not separating as 
sharply between the safety and security areas. 
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Another alternative this local adaptation also rendered possible was to 
implement a so-called ‘footprint’ of the security regulation. During the 
summer months, they also had some international flights from other airports 
besides Keflavík, and they applied a footprint instead of implementing full 
security screening on these airports: 
  
For example, in Akureyri there used to be some flights where you 
don’t have any transfer or transit, it is only a flight from point A to 
B, period. But we still applied the 2320/2002 regulation, but only as 
a footprint. This is only necessary in the peak season. There are no 
international flights in Akureyri in the wintertime. But from June till 
September there are about two flights a week. Those two times, 
there is no problem setting up the security measures you have and 
then you keep people trained. I mean it is lots of work for two 
flights during the peak season, but it is still the optimal solution.  
          (Head of Security, CAA) 
 
This meant that when they had an international flight to one of the airports 
that ordinarily just had domestic flights, the security footprint made it easy to 
mobilise full security routines during the operation of the flight before it was 
demobilised again and left as a footprint. This was implemented as an 
alternative to having security at all times.  
In addition, Reykjavik airport operated flights to the Faroe Islands and 
Greenland that were not subjected to EU regulation. They had flights 3-4 
times a week with small aircraft, such as the Fokker 50:  
 
The state police on Iceland did risk assessments at the time and 
assessed that the risk was minimal for these two flights. But I DO 
NOT ALLOW [this statement was accentuated by voice and 
gestures] international scheduled flights to any other countries than 
Greenland and the Faroe Islands from Reykjavik airport.  
          (Head of Security, CAA) 
 
In summary, we can say that the Icelandic system was separated into two 
parts. Keflavik followed the same standards and regulation as any other EU 
airport, while Reykjavik operated as the hub for domestic flights and flights to 
other non-EU locations, such as the Faroe Islands and Greenland. Because of 
their exemption for the domestic aviation system, they were able to ‘sort of 
eliminate the EU part’, as the HoS from the CAA stated, from the Reykjavik 
airport. While the interviewees were very firm in their following of the EU 
REGULATING SECURITY POST 9/11 
 
128 
 
regulation on all international traffic, it was simultaneously seen as a clear 
advantage to not have it implemented in totality on the domestic system.  
Thus far, the focus has been on how the security regulation was developed 
and implemented post 9/11, including variations in implementation strategy. 
We now shift the focus over to describing the regulation in more detail, how 
the main actors in the Norwegian civil aviation system perceived the 
regulation and its impacts, and what consequences the regulation was 
conceived to have. 
5.4 Properties of the security regulation 
The aim of this part of the chapter is to take a closer look at the regulation 
itself, its properties and implications. These descriptions, given by the main 
actors in the civil aviation system, will provide a more profound 
understanding of the inner coherence between the main actors, the 
construction of the regulation, and the consequences resulting from the 
implementation. The interview data presented here was gathered through 
interviews with the Legal Department and the Security Department at the 
Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), the CEO and the Chief of Security (CoS) at 
Avinor’s Central Office, and the Vice President of the Ministry of Transport 
and Communications (MTC).  
The three main actors involved in the security regulation and its 
enforcement were the MTC, CAA and Avinor44. In short, we can say that the 
MTC ‘owned’ the regulation, the CAA enforced it, while Avinor (and the 
airlines) were obligated by it. The MTC Vice President described the inner 
coherence between the main agents like this: 
 
The Ministry of Transport and Communications (MTC) is the 
regulation administrator, but it is the Civil Aviation Authority that 
enforces the regulation. They are the executive body. The MTC 
have the superior responsibility as the administrator of the Aviation 
Act while the CAA administers single cases according to the 
regulation. Next, the airports are obliged to perform their tasks 
according to the regulation, which is Avinor as the airport operator, 
the airlines that are placed at the airports, the companies handling 
goods, cargo, mail, catering, etc.; they all have duties according to 
the regulation. Then it is the CAA as an inspectorate who control 
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that the regulatory standards are followed. Next, we have the EFTA 
Surveillance Authority (ESA) in Brussels who come to inspect 
whether the regulation is followed or not. They go around seeing if 
the airlines follow the regulation, whether the employees follow the 
regulation doing proper screening, etc. Then they write a report, 
with a copy sent to the CAA and one to the airport. If there are 
revealed errors, there can be consequences, where the worst is the 
‘article 15’ measure which means that all passengers travelling from 
the airport in question are unclean. The article 15 is a Commission 
decree pursuant to the 2320/2002 regulation. 
 (Vice President, MTC) 
 
In Norway, the CAA performed all airports audits and audits of the 
companies belonging to the airports, while the ESA (EFTA Surveillance 
Authority), as EFTA’s control organ, in effect audited the CAA. An Article 
15 designation was a strict punishment for any airport that involved much 
work for the airport employees to get the standard back up to the level 
demanded by the CAA and that was also economically costly. In addition, an 
Article 15 caused inconvenience for passengers who had to go through new 
security screenings when arriving from the ‘unclean’ airport, causing stress to 
both passengers and security guards. Thus, the unclean airport transported its 
problems to the receiving airports, which again caused extra work and use of 
resources at the receiving airports. It was easy to conceive that Article 15 
airports were very unpopular among the other airports. For example, after one 
European airport (that shall remain unnamed) received an article 15, Sola 
Airport had to go through excessive work and stress receiving passengers 
originating from there. The Chief of Security reported that the arriving 
passengers had to wait several hours for new security screenings, which 
caused difficult situations and confrontations between security guards and 
passengers. Many security guards had to work overtime, and there were later 
reports that they had experienced the situation as straining, stressing and also 
abusive, to some extent, since they had been the front line toward the stressed 
passengers. The reason why they had to be security screened again was that 
the unclean passengers could not be mixed with the clean passengers at the 
airport, since this would make all the passengers unclean. This demonstrates 
not only why it was important for the airports to pass the CAA inspections 
without remarks that could lead to an Article 15 designation but also what 
kind of sanctions were available to the CAA and the ESA.  
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5.4.1 One-Stop Security 
The consequences and sanctions described above had large impacts for the 
One-Stop Security system. As described in Chapter 2, the principle of One-
Stop Security was that every passenger should only be subjected to a security 
screening once. This was described more contextually by the Chief of 
Security (CoS) at Avinor’s Central Office who connected the principle to the 
security regulation:  
 
The bearing principle in the security regulation is what we call 
‘One-Stop Security’. The passengers should not be subdued to more 
than one security control. This means that if you are going from 
Hasvik45 to Rome you travel for instance Hasvik – Tromsø – Oslo – 
London – and then Rome. Then the security control in Hasvik is the 
only control you go through and which classifies you as a ‘clean’ 
passenger. This principle was set down many years ago; long before 
9/11. You can say that prior to 9/11 you had a much less complex 
regulation. It was, let us say naive, less complex, more liberal, less 
demands, simpler control. But even then, you see that it was a 
regulation based on the threat level of that time, there were plans of 
escalation in case that the threat scenario changed. You could 
gradually implement stricter control if the threat level was raised. 
      (CoS, Avinor Central Office) 
 
However, since One-Stop Security was developed and implemented prior 
to 9/11, it can be said to have entailed different properties prior to and after 
9/11. As the CoS at Avinor also explained, it entailed ‘more naive, less 
complex, more liberal, less demands and simpler control’. After 9/11, they 
made the highest level of escalation the foundation for the 2320/2002 
regulation: 
 
What happened 9/11 was that all the levels of escalation became the 
general regulation. The whole system took a heavy lift in 2001 and 
became significantly stricter. And it was done in a very short 
amount of time. 
      (CoS, Avinor Central Office) 
  
In other words, the regulation rapidly escalated in the level of strictness. 
This leads us over to descriptions of the regulation; approximating the key 
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properties of the security regulation as it was described by the main actors of 
the civil aviation system. 
5.4.2 Secrecy, reactivity and rapidity 
In the interview with the (juridical) Senior Advisor at the Legal 
Department at the CAA, the Regulation 2320/2002 was described in terms of 
secrecy, reactivity and rapidity. The description mirrored first, that most of the 
regulation was secret and not open to the public, second, that the regulation 
was developed based on previous events and third, that the process of 
implementing the regulation happened very quickly after 9/11. The Senior 
Advisor from the CAA began by describing the reactive property of the 
regulation: 
 
Historically, security has always been steered by events. This is well 
depicted with Regulation 2320/2002 which was quickly put in place 
after 9/11 regarding passenger, baggage and cargo-screening 
routines. The same thing can be seen with the ‘liquid ban’ 
implemented in the regulation after the ‘Transatlantic Aircraft Plot’ 
in 200646. Immediately after revealing the attempt of the terrorist 
group, a liquid ban was carried out. First, this ban included all 
liquids, but was later adjusted into the limit of allowing passengers 
to bring 100ml containers in their hand luggage. This demonstrates 
the very reactive way regulation is applied in security, where the 
events govern the development of new regulations. 
             (Senior Advisor, Legal Department, CAA) 
 
Thus, we can see that regulatory development of security worked 
reactively, basing it on the thought of preventing similar attacks. The time it 
took from when an event occurred until a regulation was implemented was 
also described as quite unique for security regulations. The Senior Advisor 
from the CAA exemplified this through the Kato Air incident: 
 
Security is quite unique in the rapid way new regulation is 
developed and implemented. The time span between event and 
regulatory implementations is very short. It can be as short as a 
couple of days. In Norway, the Kato Air incident can illustrate how 
regulation works after an event at the national level. After the Kato 
Air incident, full security was implemented within two days. This 
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demonstrates the direct effect of an event where Norway 
immediately decided to implement regulation; even before the time 
limit of the EU expired. 
             (Senior Advisor, Legal Department, CAA) 
 
The last key property of the security regulation was secrecy. The level of 
secrecy present in the security regulation was unparalleled, compared to other 
EU regulations. This has been exemplified through the ‘list of prohibited 
articles’, a list drawn up by the EU specifying items that were prohibited for 
passengers to bring onboard in carry-on luggage. These listed items were 
considered to have potential for causing damage and/or injuries to aircraft 
and/or people. This list was secret after 9/11, which meant in practice that 
passengers could not know which articles were prohibited or not. This 
antagonistic practice was brought into the public light through the so-called 
‘Heinrich case’, in which Gottfried Heinrich, on his way to a hobby 
tournament in tennis, was denied boarding because he was bringing with him 
his tennis rackets (Austrian Times, 2009). What was special in this case was 
that the information that tennis rackets were prohibited items was secret, 
which in practice meant that Heinrich had no way of knowing this. He had 
already passed the security control, and was thereafter denied boarding at the 
gate. Heinrich brought the Austrian Authorities to the European Court of 
Justice where the judges ruled in favour of Heinrich, underscoring that the list 
of prohibited articles could not be enforced as long as it was secret and the 
passengers were unable to know what was, and was not, prohibited (Austrian 
Times, 2009). The Senior Advisor at the CAA explained that the Heinrich 
case had demonstrated to have major impacts on the discussion around 
secrecy of the regulation in the EU: 
 
This case had large consequences in the EU because it questioned 
whether a regulation could be valid or not if it was not published in 
the Official Journal. Afterwards, there were large negotiations in the 
EU court because the case treated a fundamentally important 
question to the Commission. What happened during this process 
was that the Commission acknowledged that they could not 
continue to keep the regulation secret the same way as they had 
done prior to the case. A new approach was installed where all 
regulations are split in two with one public and one restricted 
version, where the latter contains the detailed information. The first 
thing they made public was the list of prohibited articles, which is a 
direct response to the Heinrich-case. 
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             (Senior Advisor, Legal Department, CAA) 
 
The secrecy property had other consequences also. The Vice President of 
the Ministry of Transport and Communications brought it up in relation to the 
consequences secrecy had for involvement since it often entailed closed 
hearings or at times no hearings at all: 
 
Most of the regulations are secret, which means that we are not 
allowed to have hearings. Then we arrange what we call closed 
hearing groups on things that are secret. On these occasions we have 
a duty of confidentiality. This opposes my sense of justice; that you 
cannot send out cases on hearings. In principle, everything should 
be published on the internet, but the thing is that we are not allowed 
to do so. The kingdom of Norway has entered into an agreement 
with the EU and when something is EU restricted, it receives a 
restriction according to Norwegian law. In comparison, when 
upcoming regulations are public, which happens sometimes, they 
are put out on hearings; we have large hearings. We are completely 
dependent on input from these hearings. When something is passed 
in the EU, we seek advice from affected actors to the extent it is 
public. But sometimes it is super secret. Take for instance 
regulations on calibration of the detectors in the security control. 
Some of this is so secret that it never even crosses the borders. We 
are only allowed to read them in Brussels, for instance; signing 
them out and in again. But that is understandable. 
 (Vice President, MTC) 
 
What she described was a kind of dual view on the process of regulatory 
development. While it was understandable that regulations were secret, as the 
case was with for instance calibration of equipment, there were something 
principally wrong with closed hearings or not having hearings at all; 
something that also opposed the specific instructions in the Norwegian Public 
Administration Act47 for ensuring democratic and ethical handling of public 
administrative cases. She continued to describe that the input they received 
when hearings were open was an important source for them. The fact that this 
was removed because of the secrecy was considered a negative outcome.  
Above, the focus has been on the actual properties of the security 
regulation; describing its ‘architecture’. We now continue with investigating 
how the regulation got constructed: what was influential in developing the 
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security regulation. In the next part, we first take a look at how safety 
regulation influenced security regulation, and thereafter we look closer at how 
opportunities and degree of freedom differ between the two regulations, even 
though they were based on the same construction model. 
5.4.3 Security regulation follows traditional safety regulation 
Since there had not been any regulation like the 2320/2002 prior to 9/11, 
there had to be something that guided the EU in constructing the new security 
regulation. According to the CEO of Avinor, the EU had used the same 
approach as had been applied for decades within safety, or accident 
prevention. The CEO of Avinor described the background for safety 
regulation and its relationship to security regulation: 
 
Aviation, in general, uses relatively long time on the 
implementation of new regulations, especially international 
regulations. The background for the development of security 
regulation is taken from safety; the traditional accident prevention 
that has been worked with over many years. Thus, the constructing 
of the regulation is highly event based. It builds on investigating 
incidents and using time to implement new technology and new 
procedural regulations. 
(CEO of Avinor) 
 
Here, he brought in the aspect of time and that the necessity to use time in 
developing new regulations was traditionally anchored in certification; 
making sure that the regulation worked as intended:  
 
The reason for using relatively long time is that you want to certify. 
You want to document the safety profit both on new technologies 
and new procedures. Doing things this way has a long tradition, and 
although it sometimes may seem like a very ‘slow’ process, since 
you have to involve the international organisations like ICAO and 
Eurocontrol, on the whole I think it is a good and positive system 
because you document that things do in fact get better. 
(CEO of Avinor) 
 
The time aspect, then, was essential in regulatory development for safety; 
documenting that the procedures worked well before getting included in the 
regulations. In addition, the CEO accentuated that analysis was done by 
professionals, as risk professionals or regulatory developers. This was not 
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done in the development of the security regulations after 9/11. According to 
the CEO, in security regulation, the time aspect was not followed and 
secondly, the regulations were not developed by professionals but largely 
politically driven: 
 
What happened after 9/11 was that it was not the professionals, the 
risk analysts or the regulatory developers within aviation that were 
the driving forces behind instating a new, stricter regulation on 
security. It was mainly politically driven. In many ways you can say 
that the documentation and the analysis that informed the decision 
to implement a stricter regulation was inadequate. If we compare it 
to how new anti-collision systems, navigation systems and ways to 
communicate between air traffic control and pilots have been 
developed, you see that these things were implemented very 
systematically and thoroughly, while in security it was first 9/11, 
mainly, and then a couple of other incidents that pushed regulatory 
development to such an extent.   
(CEO of Avinor) 
  
This illustrates how the regulatory development on security followed the 
same principles as regulatory development within safety, while not following 
the processes for documentation and analysis that formed the basis for 
regulatory developments within safety. Thus, there has been a partial transfer 
of the principles for regulatory and technological development taken from 
safety.  
While the development of the EU security regulation had been using safety 
regulation as a model, the possibilities that lay within the two regulatory types 
were different. This will be further described next. 
5.4.4 Differences between safety and security regulation 
One of the major differences between safety and security was the 
possibility to do risk assessments. Avinor, as airport operator, was obliged to 
perform risk assessments both on safety and security. In short, these risk 
assessments could, for instance, reveal whether certain measures or 
procedures could have consequences for other procedures or areas, or risk 
assessments could be used to determine what would be sufficient measures to 
implement in order to assure that a certain level of safety was maintained. 
Within safety, this was how risk assessments were applied. Avinor was able 
to influence and develop alternatives to the regulation, based on these 
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assessments. This was often done in dialogue with the Civil Aviation 
Authority:  
 
On the safety side, I would say that the possibilities for influencing 
through risk assessments have increased. When we apply for 
changes or exemptions from the framework of international and 
national regulations, Avinor does risk analyses to document 
conservation or improvement of safety. In other words, we do risk 
assessments every time we want to do something different than 
what the regulation describes. We think that we have sometimes 
found, also through dialogue with the Civil Aviation Authority, 
better and more favourable safety solutions where we deviate from 
the regulations. This is especially so for the regional, small airports 
where we can find alternative technological and procedural 
solutions, sometimes also more economical, than the ones described 
in the regulation. So through safety management, where a 
combination of risk analyses and a close following up on all 
reported events and incidents is applied, all this has a role in 
improving safety. We think we are managing this in a good way 
now and we also have the CAA involved in this. 
(CEO of Avinor) 
 
The possibility to apply risk assessments as a foundation for adapting 
certain parts of the regulation to the actual context and, thus, obtained more 
tailored solutions, saved resources and instead placed them where analysis 
showed that it was needed. The CEO explained that they did not feel that they 
were at the same place with security as they were with safety:  
 
In security, we are obliged to have an overview of the risks and we 
are also compelled to assess vulnerabilities. But then you have the 
prescriptive regulation as a foundation, and although we do analyses 
on vulnerability in addition to the regulation that already lay there in 
detail... Well, as I say, it is hard to get approved deviations or 
adaptations from the regulation through that kind of risk 
assessments, so you do not have the same benefits that you have in 
the safety area. This is mainly because the security regulation is not 
risk based. 
(CEO of Avinor) 
  
The fact that the regulation was prescriptive made it difficult to implement 
risk-based solutions within security. Risk-based regulation can be seen as a 
type of goal-based regulation (as described in Chapter 3), in which the goal to 
be achieved is defined without prescribing how to achieve it. In a prescriptive 
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type of regulation, on the other hand, procedures and measures are predefined 
in detail. Here, some of the main differences between safety and security 
emerged. It was evident that the degree of involvement was higher within 
safety regulation. Safety followed a more risk-based approach, whereby 
regulations were based on, adjusted or adapted according to risk assessments. 
Within security, on the other hand, it was expected that Avinor had 
knowledge about vulnerabilities and risks, but the regulation would not be 
altered or adjusted based on assessments they made that would deviate from 
the Regulation 2320/2002. The only possibility for adaptations was to apply 
even stricter measures than the predefined EU measures. This was described 
by the CEO: 
 
It gets very challenging when you have a very detailed and 
prescriptive regulation on both technical and operational side that 
you, to a very small extent, can deviate from. Thus, it becomes kind 
of strange, since you, in these risk assessments, often reveal that you 
should have redirected your resources to somewhere else than where 
you actually use them. Consequently, the cost/benefit element 
becomes difficult because you are instead obliged to put even more 
on top of what initially is both costly and detailed. So this is 
challenging.  
(CEO of Avinor) 
 
Although there were rarely any adaptations or assessment-based solutions 
because of the level of detail, there had been a few occasions where Avinor 
had been allowed to adapt the security regulation somewhat: 
 
With this said, there are some places where we have chosen 
different solutions based on assessments. For instance, it can be 
things regarding fences and surveillance, where you have a quite 
desolate area with ocean on one side and a mountain on the other, 
which is sometimes the case on the small airports. And in situations 
like this, when discussing the amount of money we should use on 
fences and barriers, we have partly gotten through that it is possible 
to use money in a different way. 
(CEO of Avinor) 
  
It was clear that when operating according to a very prescriptive and 
detailed regulation, it was valuable to be able to have some influence in the 
execution of the design, as was more possible within the safety regulations.  
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Since there was very little possibility to adapt the regulation in the 
national- or airport-context because of the level of predefined details and 
prescriptions, a way around this could be to exert influence prior to the 
implementation of the regulation. Next, we take a look at the possibilities 
these main actors of the civil aviation system perceived they had.  
5.4.5 Possibilities for influence 
While regulation prior to 9/11 was mainly a national concern, this moved 
outside the borders after 9/11. The Senior Advisor from the Legal Department 
at the CAA described the consequences this had for influencing:  
 
If we connect this to the role of Norway, we can say that in 
principle, we can come with input within all areas of the EU system. 
This is due to the EEA agreement which makes the EU obligated to 
listen to what we have to say. In practice, if we are talking about 
security, this is difficult to carry out because the regulatory 
processes happen so rapidly. It is not like we receive a paper and 
then after maybe a year we can discuss it; thus having plenty of time 
to assess. No, everything happens really quickly. However, hearings 
are organised in connection to new regulations, but what happens is 
that because of the traits of the regulations, mainly that the 
processes are rapidly carried out [when they cross the Norwegian 
border] and that they are very often secret, the hearing will work 
more as a channel for information than a channel for elaboration. 
The regulation will usually already be passed before the hearing and 
in practice this means that the possibility for influence is very low.  
             (Senior Advisor, Legal Department, CAA) 
  
In effect this meant that although hearings were held, the properties of the 
security regulation precluded involvement in the development and preparation 
of regulations that were going to be implemented in Norway. The function of 
the hearings was therefore, in practice, mostly for informational purposes. 
This followed much of what the CEO of Avinor also described about his 
perception of Avinor’s involvement in the regulatory process:  
 
We have very limited possibilities for coming with input on 
regulations. Maybe through a quick hearing or a meeting, but it is 
relatively limited in that area. Within other kinds of regulations, 
there are quite long-term processes with rounds of hearings where it 
can take a couple of years from the first draft or proposition till it is 
passed. On security there has not been the kind of processes where 
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we have had much possibility to come with comments and in cases 
where we could do so, it has to a very limited extent gotten through. 
(CEO of Avinor) 
  
It became clear that the possibilities for influence were severely limited 
after regulations first were implemented in the Norwegian system. To have 
influence, then, it was necessary to be involved in the processes in the EU or 
through the international organisations that worked toward the EU. This was 
elaborated by the Chief of Security (CoS) at Avinor’s Central Office: 
 
We have informal meetings with both the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications and the Civil Aviation Authority which gives the 
governmental bodies input, like general information, our stand on 
different issues, opinions and assessments, to take with them when 
they go to their authority meetings. Then we bring the same input 
into the ACI [Airports Council International]48 meetings. ACI is a 
giant actor globally and have considerable competence and capacity 
on lobbying in Brussels.  
          (CoS, Avinor Central Office) 
 
Although there were meetings and forums where security was discussed 
nationally, the only way to have any real influence was to work towards the 
EU, either through cooperating with the Norwegian authorities or through 
interest organisations such as the ACI. When a regulation had crossed the 
Norwegian border, it was to a large extent fixed and settled. 
The Chief of Security at Avinor perceived, however, that Norway had a 
voice in the international setting and that it was possible to find some of the 
Norwegian standpoints in the development of new regulations: 
 
Actually, Norway does not have any less influence in the ACI 
considering that we are a small country. It all depends on how 
competent you are, how well you prepare and how you work. We 
can recognise Norwegian attitudes, standpoints and formulations 
both here and there.  
(CoS, Avinor Central Office) 
 
                                                     
48 Airports Council International (ACI) is an international interest organisation 
that represents 580 members who operate 1650 airports in 179 countries. The security 
committee in ACI cooperates with organisations such as ICAO, ECAC and the EU on 
issues relevant to the airports they represent (Airports Council International, 2013).  
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Thus, it is possible to say that the arena for influence had moved from the 
national to the international level. However, in order to nuance the discussion 
on influence through interest organisations, an example from the interview 
with one of the national leaders of SGS (SAS Ground Services) demonstrated 
how they perceived the transition had led to less influence for the handlers as 
a group. Prior to 9/11, the handling companies had been just as involved in 
national regulatory hearings as other work groups. With the phasing out of 
hearings as a channel for influence nationally, the handling company, SGS, 
became included in the SAS airline organisation where SAS was organised 
through a European airline organisation that worked toward the EU. Within 
this new organisation, the leader perceived that the handlers became more 
placed in the background of the other working groups as pilots and cabin 
crew. Therefore, although the handlers were represented in the EU, the factual 
influence for the handlers was perceived to have declined.  
In order to sum up, the channels for influence had become predefined 
(through authorities and interest organisations), and arenas that had been in 
use prior to 9/11, such as the hearings where there had been a larger 
possibility for direct influence of the affected parties, had changed contents to 
become a more or less purely informational channel.  This moving from the 
national to the EU setting also had consequences in that different parts of an 
organisation could experience to have different degrees of influence.  
5.5 Risk-based regulation 
The Ministry of Transport and Communications (MTC) were primary 
actors in the transition period after 9/11, together with the Civil Aviation 
Authority (CAA). However, according to the interviews with the CAA, it was 
not until 2005 that the CAA’s Security Department, in the state it was at the 
time of the interviews, were established. The interviewees had, therefore, not 
been part of the transition in the same way as the interviewee at the MTC. As 
described in Chapter 2, the CAA is the competent authority responsible for 
advising the MTC on issues regarding aviation. The CAA’s Security 
Department is, therefore, an advisory authority for the MTC 
(Samferdselsdepartementet, 2010). This is why I found it relevant to interview 
representatives from the CAA’s Security Department to be able to understand 
more of the direction that Norwegian aviation was moving in, or stated 
differently, the direction of the national strategy at the time of the interviews.  
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Based on the interviews at Avinor’s Central Offices and in Iceland, there 
were some issues that had crystallised, including prescriptive as opposed to 
risk-based regulations and the appropriateness of having the same regulation 
for all Norwegian airports. These formed the basis for my interview with the 
CAA. 
5.5.1 Status on regulatory strategy 
During the interview with the CAA representatives, it was quickly stated 
that the CAA was satisfied with the security system as it had been 
accomplished in Norway. This was underscored by one of the Security 
Officers (SO): 
 
The CAA’s stand is that we want to maintain the system of today. If 
we were to scale down it would inflict great costs to the large 
airports, and in turn it may entail that all the large airports have to 
be reconstructed. 
(Security Officer, CAA) 
 
What he meant by ‘scaling down’ was that if the system were to return to 
the pre 9/11 state, the large airports would have to be reconstructed in order to 
work as hubs, much in the same way as Keflavik International Airport did. 
The conclusion seemed thus to be that since all Norwegian airports at that 
point had implemented the security regulation, this was maintained as the 
most reasonable solution for the continuance of airport security. The argument 
seemed to be mostly of an economical character.  
During the interview we discussed the Icelandic implementation strategy. I 
asked them how they perceived the Icelandic system, which had applied for 
an exemption to the national aviation system. The SO explained that he 
perceived Iceland as a completely different setting and that Kato Air was 
critical for Norway and Norwegian aviation: 
 
That there have been incidents in regional airports results in that 
politically, it would be difficult to not have the same security level 
on regional airports. [...] You can imagine ending up with a system 
where all regional airports are defined as unclean, but I doubt it 
would be political sympathy for such a solution. And this in spite of 
many being negative to the security regime we have today.  
(Security Officer, CAA) 
 
REGULATING SECURITY POST 9/11 
 
142 
 
The Kato Air incident was presented as a decisive force for the Norwegian 
implementation of security regulation. Consequently, the Kato Air incident 
received a legitimating status for the implementation. It demonstrated the 
need to have security screenings at all airports, including the regional. Later, 
the other SO added that he believed we would see changes in the Icelandic 
system if they were to have an incident similar to the Kato Air incident. He 
seemed to be convinced, in other words, that Iceland would change its system 
if it experienced its ‘own’ Kato Air incident.  
5.5.2 “Of exceptions for small airports/aircraft” 
A case that further exemplifies the stance taken by the CAA toward the 
implementation of security regulations in Norway was the case called “Of 
exceptions for small airports/aircraft” by the Norwegian authorities. The aim 
of this case that developed between the MTC and the CAA, starting in 2008, 
was to develop a common standpoint regarding an EU regulatory proposition, 
the (EF) No. 1254/2009.   
In short, the setting for this case was that in the transitional phases between 
the first ‘mother’49 Regulation 2320/2002 and the new mother regulation 
300/2008 (see Chapter 2 for an elaboration of the regulations), the EU 
AVSEC Committee sent out a regulation proposal to member countries 
(Norway included), asking them to take a stand toward the regulation No 
1254/2009 (pertinent to the 300/2008). This regulation was “setting the 
criteria to allow Member States to derogate from the common basic standards 
on civil aviation security and to adopt alternative security measures” 
(Spesialutvalg-Transport, 2010, p. 1). The working group ‘Spesialutvalg 
Transport’ wrote in their assessment that: 
 
The proposition of an exception for small aircraft/airports is meant 
to give the member countries a room for action to decide “within 
one’s own house”, i.e., that Norwegian authorities would be able to 
decide the necessary security measures on the small aircraft/airports 
that are included in the proposal. 
       (Spesialutvalg-Transport, 2009b, p. 2 [My translation]) 
                                                     
49 The word ‘mother’ is used by the informants as a way to describe the main 
Regulation 2320/2002 to separate between the main regulation and all the small 
additional regulations that fall under it. 
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This proposal, then, opened up a possibility for national autonomy on how 
security measures were to be handled by the small airports within the new 
Regulation 300/2008. The proposal was sent out before the new regulation 
was implemented (which in Europe was in 2008 and in Norway 2010), and it 
was sent out to get input from the member countries in advance of the 
implementation.  
The first of four discussion papers establishes a dialogue based on aircraft 
weight and the importance this should have as a unit for delineation. One of 
the main remarks made by the competent authority (not stated which one) 
opens up the possibility for delineating between the small airports and the 
larger airports:  
 
Avinor has established a security regime where all airports are 
comprised by the same security regulation. If the weight limit were 
20.000 kg, all ‘Short Take-Off and Landing’ airports [regional 
airports] would, according to the CAA, be under that limit. 
       (Spesialutvalg-Transport, 2009a, p. 2 [My translation])  
 
This meant that if the Norwegian authorities were interested in achieving 
an exception from the security regulation for the small airports, they needed to 
propose that the EU increase the weight limit to 20.000 kg. The original 
proposition from the EU suggested that the limit was to be set at 10.000 kg or 
aircraft with less than 20 seats. The CAA’s response was to suggest lowering 
the limit even further so that no commercial aircraft fell in under the limit. 
They also suggested abandoning the weight limit altogether and instead 
separate between whether operations were open to the public or not. The 
reason they gave for not wanting any possibility to adapt local regulations for 
regional airports was the security-as-service aspect:  
 
The CAA’s statement in relation to the first proposal from the EU-
Commission was that the weight limit should be 5.700 kg. The 
reason given for this was that the CAA meant that a passenger who 
has purchased an airfare has the same demand of high security – 
regardless of type of aircraft, size or number of seats. The CAA 
would, therefore, rather separate between operations open to the 
public and those that are not.  
      (Spesialutvalg-Transport, 2010, p. 2 [My translation])  
 
This meant that the possibilities this proposition provided, the CAA’s 
response clearly stated that they cautioned against having an exception for the 
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regional airports. They could have proposed raising the weight limit to 20.000 
kg., thus opening up for an alternative implementation like the Icelandic 
arrangement. Instead, they suggested lowering the limit to 5.700 kg or 
delineating between public and non-public operations. The final document in 
this case was published on the 13th of January, 2012, stating that the final 
decision of the EU in this matter landed on operating with a weight limit of 
15.000 kg (Spesialutvalg-Transport, 2012). This was too low for most of the 
aircraft operating the regional Norwegian airports; therefore, an alternative 
system for regional airports in Norway became less than likely. 
As can be derived from this case, from the Norwegian authorities’ side, 
represented by the CAA, there did not seem to be any wish to change the 
already implemented system of 100% security on the small, regional airports. 
Instead there can be seen a clear stance to uphold and maintain the already 
instated system.   
5.5.3 Toward a more risk based regulation? 
As indicated above, at the time the interviews were conducted, a new 
mother regulation was on the verge of being implemented in the EU. The new 
regulation, 300/2008, was on the verge of replacing the entire Regulation 
2320/2002, and it entered into force in the EU on the 29th of April, 2008. 
Norway had an interim agreement stating that Regulation 300/2008 was to be 
implemented no later than the 29th of April, 2010, or two years later. In this 
chapter we have seen that Regulation 2320/2002 was perceived by the main 
actors in the Norwegian civil aviation system as excessively secretive and 
prescriptive. The objective of Regulation 300/2008 was to moderate this and 
become less secretive and less prescriptive, thus opening things up for more 
risk-based approaches. As stated in the published version of Regulation 
300/2008 in the Official Journal, the intention was that “this Regulation 
should lay down the basic principles of what has to be done in order to 
safeguard civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference without going 
into the technical and procedural details of how they are to be implemented” 
(European Parliament & European Council, 2008, p. L97/72). The new 
Regulation 300 also aimed at being more risk-based. The Chief of Security at 
Avinor’s Central Offices reflected on the transition to more risk-based 
approaches to security, which would entail more differentiation between 
places and airports, including basing measures on assessments: 
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If you look at the cost and combine it with probability, risk and 
threat assessments, it might lead to different regulations at different 
places. At least we think so, especially because there is already 
differentiation within the regulation today. For instance, if you have 
an airport with less than 40 issued ID cards, you can deviate from 
some parts of the regulation. But then again, the nuances are so 
small that you do not really save much. But there are discussions in 
the Commission on whether there should be an alternative 
regulation for small airports, so we hear that there is some 
movement in that area. We are very excited to see what is going to 
happen. 
(CoS, Avinor Central Office) 
 
He was not convinced, however, that there would be any regulatory relief 
in the near future: 
 
But for now the regulation is very prescriptive. The only way to get 
29 member countries in the EU to act fairly uniformly is to explain 
in micro detail how they should perform a service or duty. For 
myself, I usually compare the regulatory system on security to 
Norwegian regulatory legislation in the mid-1960s. It is very 
detailed and very casuistic. While we in Norway up until today have 
been very accustomed to framework legislation and functional 
descriptions, here we go down to a very detailed level. However, it 
is not only Norway who thinks that there should be a more risk-
based approach to this. But in light of the special events aviation has 
been subjected to, it has been necessary to act rapidly and to make 
some special moves regarding regulation. So we just have to see if 
things get any better. We are a little sceptical to whether... Let us 
just say that we do not necessarily see any signs on the demands 
being lowered. So we think that maybe technology will play a part 
in helping us to move forward. Maybe technology can provide a 
more lenient and simple future within the security field. Time will 
show. 
(CoS, Avinor Central Office) 
 
As we see through the new mother Regulation 300/2008, there is a clear 
direction, or ambition, of the EU to moderate the degree of micromanagement 
of the regulatees. The direction of the EU is clearly to move toward more risk-
based approaches, which presupposes less prescription. It is also a clear 
preference of the main agents within the civil aviation system to become more 
risk-based. However, there seems to be some differences in what this ‘risk-
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based-ness’ should entail. According to Avinor, through the statements from 
the Chief of Security, and through the signals from the EU, both through the 
new regulation and the proposal to differentiate between smaller and larger 
airports, the aim seems to be to base more of the regulation on risk 
assessments. The CAA did not seem to concur with this differentiation, at 
least not in the state the EU proposed it. 
 In this last part of the chapter, I will summarise what has been described 
in this chapter in relation to the two empirical questions posed in the 
introduction of this chapter.  
5.6 Concluding summary 
The first empirical question aimed to create an account of the post-9/11 
transition of the regulatory system from a Norwegian perspective: how it 
progressed, how the Norwegian authorities positioned themselves in relation 
to this transition and, closely linked to this, the strategy chosen for the 
Norwegian implementation. The second empirical question aimed to create a 
description of how the main actors in the Norwegian civil aviation system 
perceived the new regulatory system and its consequences. I have divided this 
summary part into two sections, following the two empirical questions.  
5.6.1 Transforming the security regulation 
Although the regulatory transition for aviation security that took place in 
Europe after 9/11 was initiated and organised by and for the European Union, 
Norway became involved and juxtaposed with the other EU member countries 
due to its European Free Trade Association country (EFTA) membership. 
Because the European Economic Area (EEA) processes regarding regulatory 
implementation were much more time consuming than the EU processes, 
Norway could not implement the new security regulation simultaneously with 
the EU. In order to stay on the inside of the EU civil aviation security system 
and avoid designation as a third country, Norwegian authorities compensated 
for the time lapse between EU implementation and EEA processes by 
amending the national regulation to hold the same level as the EU, while 
applying for an interim agreement for the regional airports. This interim 
agreement, however, while not permanent, can be considered to facilitate the 
transitional phase so that the Norwegian airports had time to reconstruct 
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airports and train personnel to accommodate the demands of the EU 
regulation. The interim agreement cannot, therefore, be considered as an 
application for more lenient regulatory measures at the small, regional 
airports.  
The Kato Air incident hurried the Norwegian implementation of the EU 
security regulation and, thus, transcended the interim agreement Norway had 
with the EU. The result was that 100% security screening was instated on the 
regional airports a mere half-year prior to its original implementation date. As 
already stated, the EU security regulation was planned to be implemented 
eventually at the regional airports. Therefore, one can say that the reactions 
taken after the incident were only following what had already been decided. 
However, the handling of the Kato Air incident can also be seen as signifying 
the Norwegian authorities’ strategy toward security regulation. This becomes 
clearer when we compare the Norwegian and Icelandic implementations.  
If we begin by looking at the Icelandic strategy toward the EU regulation, 
we see another kind of discourse. Iceland was also obligated by the EEA 
agreement, but the Icelandic Authorities chose to apply for a total exemption 
for their national aviation system. The discussions in Iceland had been how 
they were to handle the new regulatory system imposed on them by the EU 
while finding alternative solutions that the EU could accept without them 
having to implement 100% security on all airports. Their solution was to 
completely separate the national and international systems by having two 
airports connected to their capital, Reykjavik. Since these were physically 
distant from each other (approximately 30 km), it was easy to separate the 
domestic and international aviation systems. At the international airport, the 
EU regulation was fully implemented, while at the national airport, security 
measures were implemented on the basis of risk assessments performed by the 
national police. This alternative provided the Icelandic civil aviation system 
with the possibility of implementing what they found relevant, based on the 
national risk assessments. Not only was this a more economical way to 
operate the national aviation system, but the Icelandic Head of Security at the 
Civil Aviation Administration (CAA) explained that it was valuable to them 
to maintain this self-determination over their own national system. This 
viewpoint was emphasised even to the extent that it was asserted that if a 
similar attack as the Kato Air incident would happen in Iceland, they would 
most likely continue with the solution they had already implemented. 
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Seen in the light of the Icelandic case, the Norwegian implementation 
strategy was to implement all of the EU regulation. The interim agreement 
was a ‘via media’ for the Norwegian authorities in being able to buy time to 
establish a system that met the EU regulatory demands while not being 
excluded from the European One-Stop Security system. As described by the 
Vice President of the Ministry of Transport and Communications (MTC), 
being part of the European civil aviation system was a clear strategy by the 
Norwegian authorities. To achieve that, the practiced strategy was to be 
involved in the European Commission, to lobby and be visible and to 
demonstrate cooperative willingness through amending national regulations 
while EEA regulations were pending. The European Commission rewarded 
Norway by giving extra time for implementation without giving Norway a 
‘Third Country’ status. 
Iceland had taken a clear stance in relation to the implementation of EU 
regulation, which was to follow the EU regulation for security in all 
international aviation activities but simultaneously to keep the autonomy of its 
national aviation activities. This made it possible to combine the prescriptive 
EU regulation with a risk-based system for the national aviation system. Since 
Norway chose to implement the complete EU system at all airports, the result 
was that all Norwegian airports were subjected to the same prescriptive 
system. In relation to the implemented security regulation at Norwegian 
airports, the CAA stated that they were pleased with the current state of the 
system. Their stance was also further supported by the case ‘Of exceptions for 
small airport/aircraft’ ((EF) No 1254/2009), whereby their recommendation 
was to decline the possibility for differentiated implementation between large 
and regional Norwegian airports.  
In the interview with the CAA, the Kato Air incident was also presented as 
a justification of the need for security measures at the regional airports. Seen 
in relation to both the Icelandic system for aviation security and the Blenheim 
hijacking case, this suggests that alternative strategies for handling regulatory 
transition and intentional incidents can be found that do not necessarily fall 
under the kind of risks that Regulation 2320/2002 was constructed to avoid. 
What can be deduced from this is that the strategy chosen by the Norwegian 
authorities led to an implementation that is founded on purely prescriptive 
regulations, while the strategy of Iceland (and New Zealand) opens up 
possibilities for a combination between prescriptive and risk-based systems.  
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5.6.2 Consequences and perceptions of the transformation 
Based on the interviews with the main actors in the Norwegian civil 
aviation system, three words have been recurrently applied to describe the 
security regulation and its implementation: secrecy, rapidity and reactivity50. 
These three words will guide the descriptions of the consequences the 
transition has had for the main actors in the civil aviation system.  
5.6.2.1 Secrecy 
The regulatory system that was implemented after 9/11 had a much larger 
degree of secrecy than its predecessor, a level of secrecy that some of the 
interviewees stated was problematic and/or inexpedient. For instance, the 
MTC Vice President stated that, to an extent, she found this practice to 
‘oppose her sense of justice’, because since most of the regulations were 
undisclosed (secret), this also ruled out the possibility of having hearings 
where all affected parties could be part of the process. She compared this to 
how they handled issues that were disclosed (open), where they held large 
hearings and the input they received was considered to be very important. The 
increase of the secrecy level had, therefore, resulted in an exclusion of a larger 
portion of affected agents. 
5.6.2.2 Rapidity 
The rapid way security regulations were implemented had consequences as 
well. Because of the time span between the event and the regulatory 
implementation, this ruled out the possibility of performing thorough 
assessments prior to implementing them. Avinor’s CEO explained how safety 
regulations had worked as a model for the development of the security 
regulation. However, in safety regulations, time has been considered to be 
important for performing sufficient assessments prior to an implementation, 
particularly for documenting the effectiveness of procedures before an 
                                                     
50 The three describing words were first used by an interviewee from the legal 
department at the Civil Aviation Authority in one of the preliminary interviews in 
2008. The concepts have been useful in delineating properties of the 2320 regulation 
as informants and interviewees have described the regulation through the same or 
similar concepts. I have therefore used these concepts throughout the thesis in relation 
to main changes of the security regulation.  
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eventual implementation. The same procedures have not been followed with 
the security regulations. As the CEO explained, there were good reasons for 
why the implementation happened so rapidly within the security arena. The 
time-consuming processes of documenting effects prior to implementation 
would not have been satisfactory after 9/11, since the attacks had 
demonstrated an urgent need for better security measures.  However, the 
consequence of this was that security measures were not subjected to the same 
profound analysis and assessments because they were implemented too 
rapidly. Based on this, it is possible to say that, while the safety regulation 
process has been used as a model for regulatory development within security, 
there has only been a partial transfer of the principles for regulatory 
development from the safety to the security realm.  
Additionally, and linked to the previous section (secrecy), the rapid way 
security regulations were implemented offered less opportunity to create 
hearings prior to the finalisation of regulations. As described by the 
interviewees, when regulations were finalised and implemented, there was 
minimal possibility to change anything, which implies that influencing had to 
be done prior to a finalisation. In short, both the heightened level of secrecy 
and the rapid way of development and implementation resulted in less 
opportunity for the affected actors and agents to be included and to exert 
influence before the regulations were finalised.  
5.6.2.3 Reactivity 
Aviation security is highly event-based, and when one examines the major 
regulatory developments, there has usually been an antecedent event. The 
Regulation 2320/2002 was developed and implemented after 9/11; the liquid 
ban was instated after the Christmas-day bomber; and even in Norway 
(although it was eventually coming), the full EU regulation was implemented 
within 48 hours after the Kato Air incident. This reactive way of regulatory 
development and implementation was, according to the Avinor CEO, also 
taken from safety regulation. Within safety and the traditional field of 
accident prevention, the methods for regulatory development have evolved 
over decades and build on hindsight. Incidents are investigated, followed by 
the implementation of new procedural regulations and technological solutions. 
This process, however, is not rapidly exercised, since the different steps take 
time, especially when the aim is to certify that what has been implemented is 
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effective and appropriate. Although it is a time-consuming process, the CEO 
underscored that the main benefit of this practice is that it ensures and 
documents that the implemented measures are in fact improving procedures.  
In the next chapter, we move from the authority level of the civil aviation 
system to the airport level, where regulations are implemented and handled in 
practice. 
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6 SECURITY REGULATION AT THE AIRPORT: ONE SIZE FITS 
ALL 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter’s aim was to describe the environment in which EU 
Regulation 2320/2002 was developed and implemented, including its 
perceived consequences. The interview data were mainly gathered at the 
administrative level of the Norwegian civil aviation system. This chapter aims 
to delve deeper into the implementation at the airports: what it was like to 
work with, and according to the security regulation on both leader and 
employee level. The last two empirical questions presented in the Introduction 
have guided this objective: 
 
3. What challenges caused by the security regulations were described by 
people working at the selected airports? 
4. What are the consequences attached to implementing a common 
security regulation, regardless of airport size? 
Asking these questions makes it possible to investigate how the work of 
different actors at the airports (both regulation enforcers and the enforced) 
was affected by the regulations. By connecting this to the variable of different 
airport size, it is possible to reveal some consequences of implementing a 
common, prescriptive security regulation on all Norwegian airports, 
regardless of their size. This chapter is, therefore, oriented around the more 
practical aspects of operating with and according to the security regulations at 
the airports. The data presented in this chapter were gathered through 
empirical fieldwork that applied participant observation, unstructured and 
semi-structured interviewing methods.  
6.1.1 Chapter construction and guide 
This chapter is largely based upon the empirical fieldworks conducted at 
the three Norwegian airports. I have chosen to present the data from these 
fieldworks in a single chapter to be able to juxtapose them under a ‘single 
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roof’ and to discuss them together in the concluding summary of the chapter. I 
have also included the issue of airline crews in this chapter, as this was a 
group highly affected by the security regulation, although not pertaining to 
any singular airport. Since including all these elements entails a 
comprehensive quantity of data, I will here describe how this chapter is 
constructed and how the different parts are delineated.  
I have chosen to present data from each airport as a separate section. As 
elaborated in Chapter 4, I selected four companies representing three work 
groups (airport administration, security and handling) where I conducted my 
fieldwork. These were the groups I found to be most in contact with, and 
affected by, the security regulation, which was an important criterion for 
including them in my study. At Sola Airport, I have focused on the main 
challenges for each group (both on leader and employee level), while at 
Fjellvik Airport, this delineation between the groups was not very suitable, 
since they were few employees and all worked quite intertwined. At OSL, I 
started out with the same group delineation as I had done at Sola. While this 
worked well for the most part, some adaptations were needed (see Chapter 4 
for an elaboration). Notwithstanding, it is appropriate to say that en masse, the 
same design was applied at all airports, which included fieldwork among the 
same companies at each airport.  
I spent more time at Sola than any of the other airports51. The fieldwork I 
conducted at Sola can be considered as the ‘main’ fieldwork, while the two 
fieldworks at OSL and Fjellvik were more supplementary. Sola, therefore, 
worked as a point of departure for comparing the differences between the 
airports in this study, and it is, therefore, also more extensively elaborated 
than the other two fieldworks. In addition, in the section dedicated to the Sola 
fieldwork, I have included a case that affected all the three employee groups. I 
have called this ‘the Barracks case’, which refers to the barracks placed 
between the security zones (higher and lower) at airside at Sola Airport. I 
include this case to depict the kind of adaptations that airports that were not 
constructed for the 2320/2002 regulation have had to make and the 
consequences of these adaptations for the airport employees. The barracks 
solution was also applied at other Norwegian airports, which makes it 
                                                     
51 See Chapter 4, ‘Methodology’, for an elaboration of the apportioning of time 
between the airports and the construction of the case. 
SECURITY REGULATION AT THE AIRPORT: ONE SIZE FITS ALL 
 
154 
 
interesting beyond the setting of a single airport, because it can be considered 
as an examination of a commonly applied regulatory implementation in a real-
life setting. 
In addition to the three sections dedicated to the three airports, I have 
included a section called ‘the crew perspective’, which describes the main 
challenges, obstacles and questions seen primarily from the perspective of 
airline pilots. This part is based on interviews with representatives from the 
pilot/crew interest organisations and media coverage of airport conflicts 
between pilots and airport security staff.  
The chapter concludes with a summary that intends to draw up some main 
lines of the presented data in relation to the two empirical questions posed in 
the introduction. But first, we move over to the context of the airports, where 
we begin with the main fieldwork at Stavanger Airport, Sola. 
6.2 Sola Airport  
In Avinor’s delineation of airport sizes presented in Chapter 2, the main 
categories of Norwegian airports were regional, medium and large airports. 
This delineation was based on annual passenger numbers and number of 
flights. Sola represented the large airport category and had approximately a 
passenger flow of 3,4 million in 2009, including charter, transfer and transit 
(Avinor, 2013a), making it the third busiest airport in Norway. Although Sola 
was one of the largest airports, it was not constructed for a regulation like the 
2320/2002. In this first section of the chapter, I intend to depict how people, 
both leaders and employees, worked with, according to, and in relation to the 
security regulation at Sola Airport, thus revealing the challenges the security 
regulation caused at the airport level of implementation. I begin by describing 
how the transitional phases unfolded at the airport after 9/11, based on 
accounts from the Sola Avinor Department and the security company, 
Securitas. 
6.2.1 The transition 
A major regulatory change like the one that occurred after 9/11 will 
necessarily affect how the airport companies operate. I organised two initial 
interviews with, respectively, Avinor and Securitas at Sola in which the 
transition period was the main theme.  The intention of these interviews was 
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to shed light on the differences between operating at an airport before and 
after 9/11. The reason for focusing on these two groups was that they had to 
implement the new Regulation 2320/2002 into the airport: Avinor through 
administering it and Securitas through training and recruiting personnel to 
meet the new demands in the regulation. The information from these two 
interviews is presented in the following two sub-sections.  
6.2.1.1 Avinor 
Avinor held the administrative positions as the airport operator at each 
individual airport (owned by Avinor). Sola Airport, as a representative of the 
large airports, had dedicated full time positions working with security issues. 
Although some people on the team had more tasks than just security (as safety 
issues), three people worked directly with security. Since safety and security 
issues often coincided and overlapped each other at the airport, it was 
impractical to work with these areas separately. This overlap was due to the 
airport’s size, because the fewer flights and, hence, employees an airport had, 
the more various work tasks each employee would be assigned.   
During the initial meetings with the Chief of Security (CoS) at Sola, he 
explained how the changes had occurred in security and how it had become 
organised after 9/11. The CoS had worked for 27 years in a range of positions 
at the airport. It was first in 2004 that he began working directly with security, 
since it had not been a delineated field prior to that. He recalled getting the 
order from the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) when they, at Sola, had been 
asked to write the local security regulation for the airport. This task was a 
direct demand from the new 2320/2002 regulation. They had been given three 
weeks to accomplish this, and the CoS and his colleagues had almost locked 
themselves into their offices during those three weeks to complete it. This 
resulted in them being the first airport to send the local regulation over to the 
CAA, which again resulted in them also being audited as the first ones. The 
CoS described the first auditing as a ‘slaughtering’, and the main reason for 
this was the level of details they were supposed to have included in the 
regulation. This was a quite different approach than what they were used to, 
and as the CoS explained, “It just goes to show how little we understood at 
the time about what was expected of us”. The main critique they received 
from the CAA revolved around the lack of detailed descriptions of 
procedures, where details should have been included about how and where, 
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how often and by whom the single procedure was performed. This, then, 
demonstrated the entirely different way procedures were to be described, with 
minute details of how they should be executed. It marked a new way of 
thinking about security. In this transition the difference between the fields of 
safety and security became increasingly clear. From being fields that were 
previously more similar to each other, they now became increasingly distinct 
and clearly separate.  
The Chief of Security exemplified this by telling about a case regarding a 
safety issue to show how the difference between safety and security 
materialised.  
 
The Runway Strip Case 
Around runways there are demands to have a safety area, a so-called 
‘runway strip’. The runway strip is constructed to protect aircraft that end up 
outside the runway for various reasons. During the early 2000s, a new 
national regulation was implemented (Luftfartstilsynet, 2006), which resulted 
in large adjustments on several Norwegian airports, with overall conjoined 
costs for Avinor. In agreement with the CAA, and in cooperation with other 
safety organisations, such as Det Norske Veritas (DNV), a risk management 
consulting company, risk analysis tools were developed to assess risks 
connected to the deviations. The CAA performed their own assessment. On 
the basis of these assessments, the CAA provided instructional material in the 
‘Regulation on Large Airport Design’ (BSL E 3-2) attached to an alternative 
design of safety areas (BSL E 3-2, attachment 1 A 2.1.2) as a cost-reducing 
possibility. A further outcome of the assessments was the risk ranking of 
Avinor airports, so the work of adjusting the airports according to the new 
runway-strip regulation could start where the possible safety gain was 
greatest. This approach was applied instead of the more common strategy of 
attaching improvements to technical operative approval due dates.  
The main point for the CoS was to illustrate, through this case, how the 
CAA demonstrated a will to consider compensating measures in safety 
regulations, even describing these in the regulation’s instructional material. 
Thus, the signal from the CAA was that deviations could be accepted if 
compensating measures were implemented instead.  
The CoS explained that this would never have happened if it was a security 
question. Within the security environment, everything was so detailed and 
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strict that there was no room to apply anything that was more adapted, 
suitable and/or economically beneficial to the actual airport. This was also 
considered to be a problem, in that they had no power to reallocate funding 
where they felt it was needed. For instance, the security department at Sola 
would have liked to use money to perform background checks of their 
employees more often than the CAA demanded. The reason for this was that 
on several occasions in Norway, some airport employees (security guards 
mainly) had been convicted of felonies yet they continued working at the 
airports during the time in between the obligatory background checks. This 
was possible because the CAA only demanded that personnel be background 
checked every five years. This left open a large window for doing criminal 
offenses between the background checks, which would normally disqualify 
people from working with security. This example given by the CoS 
demonstrated how the security and safety regulation had become more 
differentiated after 9/11. Safety regulations had maintained possibilities for 
adaptation, while security had become more an issue focused on fulfilling the 
predefined requirements, with little possibility to apply resources where the 
single airport found it expedient and appropriate. From being treated in a 
more or less similar way prior to 9/11, security began to move away from 
safety into a new direction of less autonomy and more prescribed routines 
after 9/11. This was further elaborated by the new and expanded local 
regulation, as described by the CoS, especially regarding the level of 
prescriptiveness that ensured the airports had less autonomy when handling 
security measures.  
6.2.1.2 Securitas 
As described in Chapter 2, ‘Securitas Transport Aviation Security’ was a 
subdivision of the transnational Securitas Company. Securitas had already 
been involved in airport security prior to 9/11, but on a much smaller scale. 
After 9/11, Securitas’ airport security division grew rapidly, because they 
possessed the needed competence of security screening at airports. In an 
industry that multiplied itself within hours after the attacks, it was natural for 
the aviation sector to utilise Securitas’ competence when implementing the 
100% security screening at the airports. Securitas had, thus, the possibility to 
grow together with the development of aviation security, leaving them in a 
fortunate position to expand as a company. As Norway was steadily 
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implementing security screenings after 9/11, the exemption for regional 
airports, as described previously, came to an abrupt end with the Kato Air 
incident. Then, Securitas had to send out their already trained personnel to all 
other airports to train them and to participate in implementing full security 
screening within the 48 hours that was provided. Although not contracted for 
Norway’s largest airport, OSL Gardermoen (the only airport that used another 
security company), Securitas was also hired to train and certify security 
guards there.  
At the beginning of my fieldwork at Sola in 2008, a new 5-year contract 
had just been signed between Avinor and Securitas to provide security to all 
Avinor airports (except OSL). Securitas had won the bid for all 45 Avinor 
airports.  
In the first interview with the Securitas Leader and Second Leader at Sola, 
we discussed the transitional period, and they elaborated how their work had 
been influenced by the transition. I was actually fortunate to be able to ask 
questions about the transitional phase, since most of those who had worked 
there during the transition were no longer employed at Sola. This was mainly 
for two reasons; the first was that 9/11 initiated an enormous increase in the 
security workforce. Consequently, a large percentage of the workforce 
became employed after 9/11 and, hence, had not been part of the transition. 
Secondly, the security company had experienced a large turnover in their 
workforce, which meant that employees were continuously shifting.  
However, it was clear that there had also been a large changeover for 
Securitas. Prior to 9/11, there had also been security screenings but only on 
10% of the passengers. The Securitas Leader at Sola emphasised that it 
became almost easier to do security screenings after 9/11 because it became 
so evident to the passengers why they were doing them, bearing 9/11 freshly 
in mind. The fact that everything was prohibited right after the 9/11 attacks 
seemed to be easily accepted by the passengers and, hence, the control was 
easier for the security guards to accomplish. A large change for the 
employees, however, had been the employee security control that had started 
in 2004. It had been difficult to get the employees to accept this control, since 
all airport personnel had to have a security clearance, and thus, perceived it to 
be unnecessary to go though more screening. The security guards had to 
withstand much negative pressure, since they were the ones who had to 
perform the security check on the other employees. This had improved, 
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according to the Securitas Leader, and it seemed as if the employees had 
become more accustomed to it. While this may have been right, the employee 
security control was still listed as the least popular place to work by most of 
the security guards I was in contact with during my fieldwork.  
As a company and as the main provider of security services, Securitas, 
then, had some advantages in the transitional period, because they had already 
been providing security services at the airports prior to 9/11 (although not 
being the sole provider). They were therefore able to grow with the transition 
by being present while everything happened and steadily increased both the 
employees and airports they provided services to. Thus, the transition 
Securitas had gone through was different to Avinor’s transition, since their 
roles at the airport were very different. One was the airport operator (Avinor), 
and the other (Securitas) was a company contracted to provide a service to the 
operator. The main challenge for Avinor had been the scope and 
comprehensiveness of meeting the regulatory demands in the very rigid way it 
was given to them, while Securitas had an opportunity to increase and grow 
together with the enormous increase in the demand for security guards. 
However, to be in the front line enforcing the regulation had also been a tough 
job at times, and when one employee group was assigned the task to control 
all others, a potential area of tension developed. The Securitas Leaders 
described this tension in relation to the introduction of the employee security 
control, but this was also a common theme in other areas between the security 
guards and other employee groups. This will be further described in later parts 
of this chapter.  
We now move from the transitional phases over to the more company-
specific issues related to the security regulation. In the interviews with the 
Leaders (both prior to and after each fieldwork), they described some of the 
main challenges and areas of tension caused by the way the security 
regulation was enforced and implemented. Avinor’s role as an airport operator 
implied that they worked more in a facilitating and supervisory function at the 
airport. They were responsible to the Civil Aviation Authority for the 
regulatory implementation and ensuring that procedures were performed 
satisfactorily according to the regulation. The contracting companies, on the 
other hand, were ‘end-users’ of the regulation and were, therefore, in a 
different position than Avinor’s. The Leaders’ descriptions of challenges 
presented in the following section provide a complimentary contribution and a 
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backdrop to the employees’ descriptions, which will be presented later in the 
chapter. 
6.2.2 Challenges: Avinor, Securitas and handling companies 
This part describes some of the main challenges in regards to the security 
regulation, based on the interviews of the Leaders of the different companies.  
Due to the different relationship the companies had with the security 
regulation, they described different challenges. However, there were also 
overlapping concerns. I begin with Avinor, continue with Securitas and finish 
with the handling companies.  
6.2.2.1 Avinor 
In the interviews with the Chief of Security (CoS) at Avinor, Sola, it 
became clear that he had put a lot of thought into the various challenges and 
obstacles created by the security system. One of his major concerns was that 
he wanted the airport employees to better understand what they were doing. 
He knew that it was sometimes difficult for the employees to make sense of 
the regulatory procedures, and he received many complaints from both 
employees and leaders of other companies because of this. The CoS used an 
example to elaborate this where the CAA had sent out a message to the 
airports about a certain person whom the CoS did not know but who was 
allowed to bring his walking sticks with him in his hand luggage (these were 
prohibited items according to the regulation). This meant that when this 
person came to the security control, he could deliver a permission note and be 
let through. All the security guards had to remember this so he could be easily 
let through. This did not make much sense to the security guards. The CoS 
also thought this was peculiar, and he explained that they had not received an 
explanation of the reason for this special treatment. In a regulation where 
everybody was to be treated equally and to undergo the same controls, this 
special treatment of a single person seemed odd. Since situations like this 
appeared without any explanation, they ended up confirming the employees’ 
opinion about the regulations being inconsistent. For the CoS, this caused a 
dilemma for him, because in these situations he agreed with the employees.  
However, the CoS also believed that he should not and could not express 
this to the employees, because he thought that by expressing his own 
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frustration to them, it would discourage them even more. He also understood 
that these things influenced employee motivation. 
 
The CAA asks us in Avinor things like ‘how do you motivate the 
employees to take responsibility for security at the airport?’… And 
in my opinion, to motivate employees to do this [taking 
responsibility] at the same time as they’re stripped of responsibility 
through a regulation that is so rich in details is a large antagonism 
[motsetning]. It’s pulling in two different directions. 
(Chief of Security, Sola) 
 
Although the CoS clearly was critical of some points about the system, he 
was simultaneously clear about the role he felt that people’s attitudes also 
played. He thought that how one related to the regulation was of great 
importance. For example, he explained how a leader for one of the operating 
companies at the airport had claimed that security easily became an HSE issue 
(Health, Safety and Environment) because the security control took so much 
of the employees’ time and that it caused people to stress and hurry other 
things because of this.  
 
This, to me, is a typical example of attitude. There isn’t done 
anything from your side to facilitate the situation. Take for 
instance… I’m commuting to work, and now they’re reconstructing 
the road again and I have to drive 3 kilometres extra each way, 
because they have closed part of the road that I usually use. Ok, so 
what’s the result of this? Well, I leave a little earlier from home! I 
don’t leave my house at the same time that I used to every morning, 
getting surprised every day that I’m getting late! […] This way it’s 
also a question of how one chooses to relate to security. Like if you 
act in order to underline how difficult it is.  
(Chief of Security, Sola) 
 
He also gave another example of the kind of negative attitude he thought 
was present, when, at an aviation conference held a few weeks prior to our 
conversation, a leading person in Norwegian aviation opened his speech by 
saying that he ‘hoped everybody had had a nice travel despite the security 
control’. The CoS thought that this demonstrated the prevailing attitude to 
security. “This is why a change of attitude may be needed”. 
For the CoS, then, although he saw a kind of negative attitude toward 
security among employees, he also recognised that the way the regulations 
were applied in practice created problems for them. To the CoS it was a 
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problem that procedures seemed inconsistent and, at times, meaningless to the 
employees, and he found it difficult to find ways to motivate them. We will 
return to these questions later in the chapter, especially in the barracks case.   
6.2.2.2 Securitas 
In the preliminary interview with Securitas, the Leader explained that there 
was a much larger portion of situational assessments than one could expect in 
a system that was as detailed and prescriptive as the security regulation. She 
described that there was still room for interpretation, although there were 
instructions for almost any conceivable situation. For instance, the regulation 
stated that passengers could not bring knives or similar items longer than 6 cm 
through the security control. However, the leader then explained that there 
would always be differences in how passengers were handled.  
 
Let us say a passenger is perceived to be drunk or unstable and he 
carries with him a 6 cm knife. Then consider a 90 year old lady 
carrying with her a pair of handicraft scissors. You would not 
hesitate to remove the 6 cm knife from the drunk, unstable man, but 
maybe not from the old lady. The regulation states that you should 
not bring items that are not needed on the journey on board the 
plane, so in this sense there is a legal authority to take people’s 
things away, even though it is a borderline case.  
(Leader of Securitas, Sola) 
 
In other words, even though the regulation was thoroughly detailed, 
situational assessments were applied. What followed from this, as we shall see 
later, was that different perceptions about how the regulation was to be 
understood could develop, because there were room for situational 
assessments; some would choose to follow the rules very strictly, while others 
could choose to apply the situational assessments possibility more.   
Since the job as a security guard involved front line work with both 
passengers and other employees, being a security guard could be challenging. 
I therefore asked the Securitas Leaders how they handled different challenges 
the employees faced in their jobs. The leader explained that most of the 
problems were handled by the Shift Leader on site. Each shift had one leader 
who was on the floor in the security control area all the time. The Shift Leader 
was supposed to note all recurrent problems and report them to one of the 
Leaders. They, in turn, were supposed to bring these reports to Avinor’s 
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Security Department at the airport; however, this was where things were 
described as becoming more cumbersome. Most of the decisions in cases of 
doubt were made at the airport. For instance, this was the case after the 
implementation of the liquid ban, when items such as eggs and goldfish in 
plastic bags had to be determined as being prohibited or not. Performance 
challenges were difficult to amend since the possibility of changing how 
procedures were performed or adapting the routines in any way, was low. This 
was a direct result of the way regulations were developed and implemented, 
whereby the regulation that had arrived at the airport was extremely hard to 
change. Consequently, the Securitas Leaders did not consider it worthwhile to 
go through a process of suggesting procedural alternatives that would most 
likely lead to nothing. Thus, problems that arose in relation to practices and 
routines were set aside, since it was considered a low yield use of time and 
resources. 
To sum up the main arguments from the Securitas Leaders, they did not 
perceive that Securitas, as a contracting company, was in a position to 
influence the practical implementation of the regulations. The lack of any 
possibility to adapt the regulation in context and/or to influence it through 
reporting back on ill-fitting routines gave them the impression that they had 
little or no influence regarding the practical application of the regulation. 
While there was some room for interpretation when it came to the smaller 
details, this seemed to be more a point of distress than a possibility to make 
things work more seamlessly. This was also reflected in the security control 
area, where the possibility to interpret, which we will see later on, seemed to 
cause conflict and ambivalent procedures, because the assessments became 
individual-dependent, to some extent.  
Next we will deal with the handling companies’ Leaders and their accounts 
of the challenges they experienced because of the regulation. 
6.2.2.3 Handling companies 
During the initial interview with the first handling company, it became 
evident that operating a handling company involved demands from many 
angles. The handling companies were contracted by the airlines to handle their 
on-ground services52. ‘Quality’ was an essential word in relation to this. The 
                                                     
52 As described more thoroughly in Chapter 2, ‘Background and Context’. 
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airlines had quality demands, also called an SLA, which determined the 
turnaround-time (unloading/reloading the aircraft with passengers and cargo), 
and high quality was also demanded on cargo and luggage procedures to 
ensure a low number of errors. In order to achieve this satisfactorily, there had 
to be a focus on quality at all times in the handling companies’ procedures. 
On top of these requirements came the demands in the security regulation. 
One of the handling company Leaders expressed, “When you put security on 
top of an already strained time schedule, this is sometimes hard to do in 
practice”. What the Leaders seemed to be generally concerned about was that 
the time strain could lead to a loss of focus on other important issues, such as 
safety-related issues. The major concern was that this time strain could lead to 
cutting corners or other ‘quick solutions’ that could again lead to injuries and 
accidents. Since there were no possibilities to do ‘quick fixes’ in relation to 
security, this would most likely be done on the safety-related issues.  
What the Leaders were very clear about was that security was sometimes a 
burden to the employees and was one of the main reasons for the heightened 
stress levels among them. The barracks53 was a typical example of a straining 
factor on the employees. As one of the Leaders elaborated, “The barracks are 
a large stress factor to the employees. […] Very much time is spent on 
checking the employees. This is a regular complaint from our employees”. 
One of the other Leaders added another example. 
 
For instance, you have the increased number of hand luggage after 
the security regulation was implemented. There hasn’t been given a 
larger time window because of this. Everything is the same as 
before, except that there is more work to do. All companies have a 
so-called SLA, which means a service level that should be met. It’s 
a combination of quality and time limits on operations. This isn’t so 
easily done when people are stressed. 
 (Leader, Handling Company) 
 
A recurring theme was the difficulty of motivating the employees to 
perform procedures according to the security regulation that did not make 
                                                     
53 The barracks were check points at the airside, manned by security guards who 
controlled all entering into the most secured area of the airport. It is further elaborated 
and discussed below. 
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sense to them. One of the Leaders elaborated on how this conflicted with his 
opinion of what a leader should be. 
 
I think it is the leaders’ responsibility to motivate the employees to 
do what they are supposed to according to the legislation, but when 
you [the employees] see obvious things that don’t make sense, you, 
as a leader lose credibility with the employees. When they ask you 
why something is as it is, you don’t really have an answer. […] 
Demands just arrive and it isn’t like the background for it or the 
assessment behind it comes together with it. This makes it hard to 
convey the meaning behind it to the employees.  
(Leader, Handling Company) 
 
One of the main reasons why procedures sometimes seemed to lack 
meaning was when employees encountered what they saw as inconsistencies 
in the system. The barracks were brought up several times in relation to 
inconsistencies and will, therefore, be discussed more thoroughly below, but 
there were also other examples. One of the Leaders exemplified this through 
the handling of the ID cards. Avinor was responsible for issuing ID cards at 
the airport. All airport employees had to wear their ID cards visibly at all 
times while working at the airport, and employees could not get through the 
employee security control, and thus not get into the work areas, without it. It 
held, then, a great deal of importance and Avinor, being responsible for these 
cards, always stressed them as something that should be guarded well. The 
Leader felt that this exemplified the inconsistency, because he saw it as 
problematic that everybody took their card home. He found it difficult to 
believe that the cards really were that important when it would be easy for 
these cards to get lost thus, something that did occur.  
 
I think it would be more secure to leave these cards at the airport 
after your shift has ended and reclaim them when you go on duty 
again. Then you would have full control over all the cards at all 
times. [...] to me this would make things more secure.  
(Leader, Handling Company) 
 
His main point was that since the ID cards received this very high attention 
and were given such importance, he did not find this compatible with people 
taking them out of the airport, where they could be lost. He thought this 
practice constituted a security risk. The inconsistency was that security 
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received such great attention, yet he thought that the handling of the cards was 
taken lightly.  
To sum up the main points from the handling companies here: the 
conflicting goals between safety and security were exposed. This was mainly 
due to an already strained schedule caused by the demanded Service Level, or 
SLA, having security procedures added to it. The normal turnaround time for 
an aircraft was 20 minutes for a domestic flight. This meant that within these 
20 minutes, the aircraft should be parked at the gate, passengers, luggage and 
cargo should be unloaded, possibly the aircraft would need refuelling, then the 
aircraft should be boarded again with passengers, luggage and cargo and the 
doors closed. It cost money for every minute that exceeded this time frame. 
This was part of the SLA as described by the Leaders, the service label they 
were supposed to fulfil. Adding security measures to this equation could at 
times create conflicting goals with the SLA and/or safety routines, and this 
was a concern for the handling companies’ Leaders. They recognised that this 
pressure from different angles put a strain on their employees, and their 
concern was that focus could be lost on safety issues, since this was the only 
place shortcuts could be made.  
The second main point was what the Leaders labelled inconsistencies. 
These were mainly issues in which security were given a lot of focus, but 
when it came to the actual accomplishment and implementation of certain 
routines, the Leaders did not see this importance mirrored in the procedures. 
We will get back to this issue later in the chapter, also. 
So far I have focused on the contracting companies’ Leaders. We now 
move the focus over to the employees of those companies who were working 
as security guards and ramp agents54. What was it like for them in practice to 
work with and operate according to the regulation? What challenges did the 
employees meet in their work caused by the security regulation, and how did 
they handle them? Motivation was an issue the Leaders accentuated, and I 
wanted to find out if motivational issues could be traced back to the practice 
of the regulation.  
The next two sections present data from the employees in the security and 
handling companies. Here, the main aim is to create descriptions from their 
practical work day, tasks and procedures in order to see where the employees 
                                                     
54 Handling personnel working at airside of the airport 
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met different challenges and how they worked with, and in relation to, those 
challenges.  
6.2.3 Securitas: security control of passengers and employees 
In this first section I present some of the main challenges of working in the 
security control area, as described by Securitas employees. I have chosen to 
present the accounts of three employees: two of them working as security 
guards and one who worked both as a security guard and as a Coordinator. 
The section concludes with a summary of the main findings from the security 
control. 
I began my fieldwork at Securitas in the passenger security control55. The 
working day in the security control varied throughout the day; hence, the 
shifts also varied. The first shifts opened up the security control area at 04 
AM. The contract between Avinor and Securitas at Sola stated how many 
security gates should be open at all times based on passenger flow 
calculations. This meant that during the day, from hour to hour, security gates 
were opened and closed according to the flow estimate. This formed the basis 
of the number of personnel present throughout the day. This stood in contrast, 
to the system at OSL, where the security gates were opened or closed 
according to the number of minutes people were lined up in queues. The 
system at OSL was an optional type of contract that focused on the 
passengers’ waiting time and not on the actual number of security gates. 
Although it may be easier to meet a higher service standard and put less stress 
on the security guards in times of high pressure, it is also a more expensive 
way to organise the security control.  
Each shift at Sola had a Shift Leader and a Coordinator. The Shift Leader 
was in charge of the shift in the security check and was the primary contact 
person for the security guards. The Shift Leader, for most part, worked with 
the security guards in the security control. The Coordinator had a dedicated 
office in the security control and had the responsibility to oversee all the 
different areas where the security guards worked during the day. This meant 
having contact with the different areas and solving problems that came up 
                                                     
55 See Chapter 4, ‘Methodology’, for an overview of my fieldwork time 
distribution between the different areas Securitas were responsible for. 
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during the day. In addition, the Coordinator had to organise unforeseen things, 
such as supervising outside construction work.  
6.2.3.1 Being in the front line 
Securitas employees can be considered as the front line enforcers of the 
security regulation, because they enforce the regulatory procedures regarding 
passenger, employee and luggage screening. This also put them in a very 
exposed position, since they had to front the regulation and maintain and 
‘defend’ it to the passengers, airline crew and employees, and receiving, to an 
extent, responsibility for how these activities were performed and/or 
implemented. The security guards handled problems differently and were 
either less or more influenced or affected by the challenges and pressures they 
were exposed to because of this front line work. In this following section, I 
present the accounts of three security guards to describe the work in the front 
line and what challenges this caused for the guards’ work. Not all of the 
challenges were directly caused by the security regulation, and this will be 
illustrated in the text. 
 
Difficult passengers and Leader support  
The people working in the security control were very different and had 
different motivations for having such a job. Yvonne was in her early 20s and 
had been working for a few months in the security control. She explained that 
her reason for wanting to work as a security guard was that she considered 
working in a supermarket or similar environment to be ‘boring’. She also 
explained that some of her friends seemed to feel sorry for her for having the 
job, since it was sometimes considered as a ‘low status job’ where one should 
almost expect threats and verbal abuse. Yvonne did not consider it as such, 
saying, “Many people around me say things like, ‘Oh, poor you who have to 
work as a security guard’, but it’s not like that. I actually like it. I see it as a 
challenge… You know; a challenge in a good sense”. The challenge to her 
was that she never knew what the different shifts would bring, and this 
included the handling of passengers. She elaborated on this with an episode 
she had recently experienced in the security control:   
 
For instance, there was this man in his 40’s, these are the worst, you 
know… men in their 40s and 50s. So he got really upset because he 
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couldn’t bring his liquor through the security control because the 
bag he had the liquor in wasn’t sealed. He had probably spent 1300-
1400 [NOK] on it, and I had to call the shift leader because he was 
so pissed off. And I was like ‘can you tell him why…’ to the shift 
leader, because it isn’t me who decides these rules. I’m just doing 
my job, but I understand that people can be upset about it.  
(Yvonne, Securitas) 
 
Yvonne perceived these challenges to be positive and something that gave 
her variation in her work. In her story, she also touched upon the Securitas 
‘chain of command’ where, in situations of so-called ‘difficult passengers’, 
the first step in the procedure was to call on the Shift Leader. If the passenger 
then did not calm down, the police (which had a small department at the 
airport) were called and the passenger would usually be denied boarding and 
escorted away. This happened very rarely, since most often the situations 
were dealt with before it went as far as what was labelled ‘denied boarding’. 
Yvonne perceived that the chain of command worked well, since calling on 
the Shift Leader solved her problem and justified her handling of the situation 
with the passenger. This was not always perceived to be handled equally well 
by all Leaders56.  
Gro was a security guard in her 50’s who had worked in the security 
control a few months longer than Yvonne. She described herself as being 
almost a ‘veteran’ at that point, underlining that people did not stay long in 
the job. One of the largest problems for Gro was what she perceived to be 
different practices among the Shift Leaders:  
 
There are different practices between the different Shift Leaders. 
Some want everything done a certain way… But then they end their 
shift and someone else comes on shift and they may question why 
you do things the way you do. In that manner you are often just left 
looking like an idiot.  
(Gro, Securitas) 
 
She explained that this could occur in situations of doubt. If seen in 
relation to what the Securitas Leader described in the initial interview 
regarding the use of situational assessments, this becomes more 
comprehensible. What Gro had experienced was that at times, asking 
                                                     
56 The term ‘Leader’ here refers to superior positions in Securitas, including 
Leaders of Securitas Sola, Shift Leaders and Coordinators. 
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questions could be connected with some form of ridicule. According to Gro 
this variable handling led to people sometimes ‘turning the blind eye’ on 
situations when they were in doubt. She explained that she had witnessed this 
several times. Her explanation of this practice was that some of the guards 
were reluctant to ask their superiors questions in fear of looking stupid. Gro, 
herself, expressed that to her it was too important for her to do a good job and 
that she preferred to be a ‘nag’ and get things right.  
Gro perceived that practices varied between the Shift Leaders and that this 
resulted in a situation where the support from the Shift Leader was not as 
automatic as what Yvonne had described. The problems of variable handling 
of situations by the Leaders translated also into situations of difficult 
passengers. She perceived that these situations put a strain on her, because she 
felt that she did not receive the support she should have from her Leaders. She 
exemplified this by an episode from the security control: 
 
This guy got really upset in the security control and he said 
something like… ‘If I wanted to, I could strangle both you and your 
colleague with my shoe laces…’ he was asked to take off his shoes 
and some other things. One of the leaders was also standing there 
with us, and the only thing he said to the passenger was ‘what kind 
of thing is that to say?  
(Gro, Securitas) 
 
Gro thought the Leader handled this badly and that the way the situation 
was handled was kind of disloyal to her and her co-worker. She thought the 
passenger should perhaps have been denied boarding, which, as described 
above, was one of the sanctions possible to use on difficult or threatening 
passengers. She said she sometimes felt like a ‘sitting duck’ (Norwegian: fritt 
vilt), when people could do and act in whatever fashion they wanted. What 
seemed to be Gro’s main complaint was that the reaction from the Leader did 
not validate and corroborate the security guards’ authority. She explained that 
after the incident, a Shift Leader commented to her that one has to expect 
episodes like that in that job and that she should not let it get to her. Gro did 
not feel that this was meant as a supporting statement or comfort, but more as 
a comment that she should ‘man herself’ and get over it.  
In relation to the carrying out of the regulatory procedures, Gro summed 
up by saying that she thought that the difference between how the leaders 
carried out the procedures was what gave her sleepless nights. She continued 
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by saying that “it is always the positive things that mean so much more than 
the negative ones. The tip of the scale always goes in favour of staying in the 
job”. She especially perceived that great colleagues made it all worthwhile.  
So far, we have seen that working on the front line challenged the security 
guards. The chain of command was supposed to back up the security guards 
in situations of conflict, but this was not perceived to work at all times. It was 
perceived, instead, to be person-dependent. To some, as Gro, this gave the 
feeling of being powerless and to not get the expected support she needed. 
However, these issues can be seen as problems arising from the way Securitas 
was organised and not as a direct result of the regulation.  
Next, situations of difficult passengers are described through the account 
of one of the Coordinators who worked both as a regular security guard and as 
a Coordinator.  
 
Authority 
Mari was a substitute Coordinator, which meant that she worked both as a 
security guard and as a Coordinator. She did not have the Coordinator job 
permanently but filled in when they were short of a Coordinator for a shift. 
Mari had worked at the airport for about three years. I followed her on some 
of her shifts when she stepped in as Coordinator; sometimes for a few hours, 
and on a couple of occasions we spent almost her whole shift together. 
Usually she was located in the security control, but sometimes she had to go 
out to check or control something. On one of these occasions, I asked her if I 
could join, thus getting a nice opportunity to talk. We went outside the 
terminal building toward the fence between the airport and the heliport, where 
she was going to inspect the fence. We talked about the handling of 
passengers, and she explained the difference in authority she had experienced 
between being ‘only’ a security guard and being a Leader wearing a Leader-
armband: “I can see a large difference between my work day with an armband 
on my arm and when I don’t have it on”. She pointed to her arm where she 
was wearing the armband saying ‘Shift Leader’. The armband was worn by 
both Shift Leaders and Coordinators. It was red and stood in contrast to the 
light blue uniform shirt. She continued: “There can be a situation in the 
security control, like a difficult passenger or something like that, but all of a 
sudden they become nicer when you come over wearing the armband”. There 
was, hence, an amount of authority connected to wearing the armband, which 
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had been easily observed by Mari who had experience as being both a normal 
security guard and in the Leader position wearing the armband. Mari 
continued to explain that she had observed this differentiation not only with 
passengers but with pilots as well and she then told an episode from the 
security control when a pilot had refused to take off his jacket, as everyone 
has to do in the control. As he refused to do as he was told by the security 
guard, they had called on the Shift Leader, “So the shift leader comes and asks 
him politely if he can remove his jacket, and then he takes it off!” In Mari’s 
view, the armband was what had made the difference in this case, and to her, 
illustrated the difficulty of sometimes receiving respect as a security guard. 
Pilots and flight crews also went through the same control as the passengers, 
and she explained that there had been several episodes between pilots and 
security guards in the security control. Mari was glad that the passengers 
could see these conflicts themselves, since it often were the security guards 
who were presented as the ‘bad guys’ in media. She underscored this by 
another incident that had occurred in the security control when a pilot had 
thrown sort of a ‘tantrum’: 
 
Actually it was his last day on the job, and I don’t know what he 
expected us to do about that, but he acted like a real ‘a-hole’. So the 
passengers are just standing there watching the whole scene and one 
of them walks over to the pilot asking him if he’s going to fly to 
Oslo. The pilot answers ‘no’ and then the passenger says that that 
was good because if that was the case he would have changed his 
flight.  
(Mari, Securitas) 
 
I perceived that the situations the Securitas employees described were used 
to portray a sometimes difficult job in which the security guards had to deal 
with both unruly passengers and pilots. It was perceived as unfair that they 
received this much opposition and what can be perceived as a lack of respect, 
since they were only doing their job according to the regulatory procedures.  
6.2.3.2 Summary Securitas 
 Being a security guard was clearly at times a difficult job that required 
good personal skills. To be in the front line also involved confrontations 
between the security guards and passengers or airline crew. Their job was to 
ensure that procedures were followed, regardless of the pressure they were 
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exposed to. What was described by all three Securitas employees was the 
importance of the authority of the Shift Leaders/Coordinators in handling 
difficult situations in the security control. Mari described how the appearance 
of someone wearing the Leader armband worked as a conflict-solving device. 
What all three security guards accentuated was the exposed position the 
security guards were in and that the support by the Leader would be important 
to aid them when their own authority proved to be insufficient. The 
experience that the Leaders did not always apply this authority to support the 
security guards resulted in an unpredictable environment, because it was 
difficult to know when to expect support or not.  
We now move over to the handling companies and the challenges they 
experienced because of the security regulation. Whereas Securitas could be 
considered as an enforcer of the regulation, the handling companies were the 
ones being enforced. This created different challenges for them as a work 
group. 
6.2.4 The handling companies 
At Sola Airport there were two handling companies responsible for all 
aircraft, passengers, luggage, and cargo entering the airport; they were 
responsible for redistributing or redirecting them and ‘turning them around’. 
This meant receiving the aircraft after landing, guiding it to gate, getting 
people off the aircraft and giving them their luggage, while receiving cargo 
that either needed redirecting or sending. Then they organised the turnaround 
which entailed boarding of the passengers, luggage and, cargo and guiding of 
the aircraft out of the gate.  
The fenced in area on the airport was referred to as the ‘airside’. At Sola, 
one part of the airside had the highest level of restriction and was called the 
Critical part of Security Restricted Area, or CSRA. This was the area outside 
of the terminal building where the aircraft parked in front of the gates. This 
implied that all work related to the aircraft’s turnaround, including passenger 
and luggage boarding, occurred at CSRA. The barracks, a security check point 
security controlling all persons and vehicles moving into the CSRA, were 
located between the normal airside and the CSRA. Securitas performed all 
these security controls.  
The handling companies were one of the employee groups most in contact 
with the security control, as they often had to move between security 
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restricted areas and non-security restricted areas or between more and less 
restricted areas. An example of this is the gate personnel who started out in 
the check-in desks (non-restricted), where they checked in passengers and 
luggage. Then they moved over to the gates to board passengers on to the 
aircraft afterwards (restricted). After boarding was finished, they returned to 
the check-in area for the next flight. Thus, they moved back and forth between 
the restricted and non-restricted areas and also back and forth through the 
employee security control. The employee security control was no lighter or 
more superficial than the passenger control. Another example is the ramp 
agents who moved continuously between less or more restricted areas at the 
airport (between the airside and the CSRA). They had to go through security 
controls for each passing. Some workers experienced up to 20-30 controls 
during a shift.  
As described previously by the Leaders of the handling companies, due to 
the many demands from different angles, the handling jobs were straining at 
times. Security was placed on top of this already quite strained schedule, and 
the security controls easily became an ‘arena for tension’ between Securitas 
and the handling companies. However, it was not only time pressure that 
caused the tension between the two employee groups, but also the experience 
of inconsistencies and superficiality in the practical enforcement of the 
security regulation. Since Securitas was the enforcing agent, they therefore 
also received the negative feedback from the handling company employees. In 
other words, there was tension between the two employee groups that was 
caused by how the regulation was enforced in practice. The most frequent 
points of intersection were the employee security control and the barracks. 
The barracks are discussed separately in the next chapter section while also 
appearing in the general descriptions below.  
6.2.4.1 Inconsistencies and tension  
The relationship with Securitas was an ongoing theme among the ramp 
agents, where some seemed to be very annoyed with Securitas. One of them 
was Torstein, who explained that he thought the security guards exaggerated 
their jobs and that the security controls were, as he said, all a ‘play to the 
gallery’; “You put ignorant 20-30 year olds to tell us how to make things 
secure […] it really makes me frustrated”. He referred mainly to the employee 
security control and the barracks, which they had to pass several times a day.  
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Comments from other ramp agents dealt with issues such as the way the 
security guards did their job. The comments ranged from the security guards 
being overtly persistent to power-crazed, and some claimed that Securitas 
sometimes checked unnecessary thoroughly on the body. In summary, the 
security controls, both in the employee security control and in the barracks 
were an area of tension between Securitas and the other employee groups. 
The employee security control seemed to be equally unpopular with both 
the security guards and the handling company employees. Several of the 
security guards I talked with during the fieldwork listed the employee security 
control as their least favourite working area. Mari, the combined security 
guard/Coordinator, explained that she tried to switch her shifts in the 
employee security control if she could. When talking about the employee 
security control, security guards described that they sometimes felt like the 
other employee groups saw them as inferior and ‘over achieving’ in the way 
they performed their job. They, however, perceived it as just doing their job. 
This tension was described differently by both sides. The other groups (not 
including airline crew of the aircraft, since they went through the passenger 
security control) confirmed much of what the security guards perceived; they 
thought that many of them were grumpy and unpleasant and did a more 
thorough job than necessary. One of the handling company employees stated 
that,   
 
You can even see it [the inconsistency] among the security guards 
where some are really persistent and some even grumpy while 
others are very nice and polite, while others again just do their job 
quite superficially. 
(Middle manager, handling company) 
 
This followed the statement from one of the handling company Leaders, 
who stated that “There is a clear lack of consistency in how we deal with 
security. How we check the vehicles in the control and at the barracks shows 
that there is a lack of consistency”. The lack of consistency reflected that the 
controls were perceived to be superficial and variable, and this caused a loss 
of confidence in the controls’ appropriateness. When the controls were 
perceived as ‘an act’ or as described above, ‘a play for the gallery’, tension 
rose because people felt that they were going through unnecessary routines 
and procedures.  
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Another dimension to this ‘strained’ relationship between Securitas and the 
handling company employees was that security was something that everybody 
was trained to be concerned about. This was closely connected to the labelling 
of everyone with the security courses57 so-called ‘security workers’, which 
meant that everybody at the airport had a responsibility for security. Everyone 
was supposed to think ‘security’ at all times. This was accentuated by 
statements like: “The invisible security wall is the positive attitude toward 
security”, which was written in one of the summary pages of the security 
course. When tested out in reality, the strained relationship between Securitas 
and the handling companies did not lead to increased cooperation. One of the 
ramp agents exemplified this through a situation where he tried to cooperate 
with Securitas. 
Trond was one of the ramp agents who continually had to go through the 
security controls. He also described a rather tense relationship with Securitas, 
and he perceived that it was difficult to cooperate with Securitas in security 
issues. He described a situation where he and Securitas had interacted:  
 
Not long ago I saw this woman outside (outside in the CSRA), she 
was like a cleaning lady or something, and she wasn’t wearing 
signal clothes (you are obliged to use a signal vest outside) and I 
couldn’t see her ID card. I went outside and tried to tell her nicely to 
put on a vest and get her ID card. She became angry with me and 
asked me if I was a security guard, which I’m obviously not 
(because of his work clothes), and told me to mind my own business 
and don’t bother her. I went inside and called security on the 
‘walkie’ and told them about the woman. I continued to hear them 
(security guards) talk over the radio the next half an hour, trying to 
find her and stuff. And I was like, you could just have asked me, 
and I could have shown them where she was and then they could 
have told her the rules and that way that I was right. It would have 
shown her that I did the right thing in stopping her and sort of 
legitimate what I did.  
(Trond, handling company) 
 
His frustration was mainly connected with the fact that he was doing the 
‘right thing’, but he did not feel that it was much appreciated. Instead he had 
                                                     
57 Everyone who was going to work at the airport needed to take a safety and 
security course. The two courses were computer based and each took around 1,5 hour 
to go through. 
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to suffer the scolding from the woman and if it had not been for him listening 
in on the radio afterwards, he would not have heard anything more of how the 
situation developed. I asked him what he thought of the episode in hindsight 
and he told me that he doubted that he would do the same thing again. He 
explained that next time he would consider looking the other way. 
This part has laid the foundation for the tension and perception of 
inconsistencies in the intersection of practical enforcement of the regulation. 
In what follows, tension and inconsistency will be elaborated through an 
actual regulatory implementation. 
6.2.5 Case: the barracks 
In this section, the tension and frustration become even more evident and 
elaborated for all the inflicted parties. The barracks is chosen as a case where 
it is possible to depict the adaptation of a regulation in practice. The barracks 
solution was also applied at several Norwegian airports and, hence, was 
considered an acceptable solution by the authorities and not only an 
emergency solution in a single setting. In order to describe this situation as 
profoundly as possible, I have included Securitas and the handling companies, 
both leaders and employees, and in addition Avinor as the airport operator, 
who is responsible for the barracks arrangement. I begin this section by 
describing the context of the barracks. I then continue describing the barracks 
first from the Securitas point of view and then from the handling company 
viewpoint. Lastly, the leader group meeting (including leaders from Avinor, 
Securitas and the handling companies) is described, in which the Leader 
viewpoint is presented regarding the barracks and how these affected the 
employees.  
Most airports faced challenges when the new security regulation was 
implemented, since the actual construction of the airports was hard to 
combine with the new demands. Therefore, emergency solutions, such as the 
security barracks, were designed to solve these problems. The barracks were, 
as elaborated above, a security check point placed between the airside and the 
CSRA that controlled all persons and vehicles moving into the CSRA. At Sola 
Airport, these barracks were operated by security guards from Securitas. The 
main idea behind the separation of these security restricted areas was to 
rationalise the security screening of the physical area of the airport. Since 
there was a much higher level of control inside the CSRA, everything that did 
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not require the highest level of security screening was, therefore, placed 
outside the CSRA. Having an area with less control made it easier and less 
demanding to do certain operations. For instance, by letting private planes58 
take off and land on airside, passengers did not have to go through security 
screening before entering the plane. Cargo was another area that was handled 
at airside, as the cargo airplanes landed and stayed on the airside, thus never 
entering the CSRA. However, the cargo agents were under a separate control 
regime (regarding security) and were, therefore, approved to screen all the 
cargo themselves. This caused a practice wherein, for instance, when cargo 
was to be sent on a normal flight, the ramp agent would have to collect the 
cargo at the cargo area at the airside, cross the CSRA border and, hence, both 
the ramp agent and the vehicle would be searched by security guards at the 
barracks. The cargo would not be screened again. 
The level of screening between airside and CSRA had gradually increased 
year by year. It started out as random sampling of people and vehicles, 
meaning that only 10% of both people and vehicles were checked. At the time 
of my fieldwork, they were implementing a 100% check of everyone and 
everything, which meant that there would be a full security check on both 
persons and vehicles at every passing. During a shift, a security guard could 
perform anything from 10-20 up to 30-40 controls. The number of controls 
depended on the time of day and the level of activities at the airport. For 
instance, some days there could be much cargo coming in, or it could be much 
fuelling of aircraft, or it could be much maintenance going on. Thus, traffic 
passing the barracks could vary.  
The barracks were small cabins measuring about 1,5x3 meters. They were 
placed with the short end (with windows) facing out toward the airside. Inside 
the barracks, below the window, was a desk large enough for two people. The 
rest of the barracks was sparsely furnished with a small fridge, a coffeemaker 
and a microwave at the opposite end of the desk. The door was on the long 
side of the barracks. There were no toilet facilities connected to the barracks, 
so the security guards had to walk to the airport terminal a couple of hundred 
meters away to use the rest rooms there. This was considered to be 
                                                     
58 Private planes pertain to the category of ‘General Aviation’ (GA) and include 
aircraft that are used for everything except scheduled air services. GA includes, 
among other things, flying clubs, flight training and/or corporate jets.  
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insufficient by both Avinor and Securitas, however, and an arrangement was 
going to be made to amend this in the near future (after my stay). Although 
there were two barracks, one on each side of the terminal building, barracks 
number 2 was the main barracks where most of the traffic passed, hence its 
staffing with two security guards59. Barracks no. 2 was also the only one open 
during the night, since it was possible to enter the CSRA through both sides 
and, hence, both of the checkpoints, although this implied a longer drive for 
the vehicles that came from the other side of the airport.  
We have now looked at the more practical sides and the background for 
the placement of the barracks. Next follows the descriptions of how the 
procedures were carried out and also how this was perceived by both 
employees and leaders for the different companies. We begin with Securitas. 
6.2.5.1 The barracks: Securitas 
 
The two guards walked outside every time there was another vehicle 
passing. The vehicle stopped and the driver stepped outside. I stayed inside 
only observing and waiting for them to step inside again. The security guards 
performed the control professionally, checking all the predefined areas they 
were supposed to check in the car, searching the driver of the vehicle (hand 
search of the body) and also his jacket. All together the search took maybe 5 
minutes. The driver also acted professionally, letting them do their job. 
Dependant on his job, he would pass this point anything from one to maybe 
thirty times that day. The security guards came back in. They sat down by the 
desk and logged the control they just had performed into the log book. I 
waited for them to finish before we started talking again. 
 
The description above is included to give an impression of how the 
barracks control was carried out. Despite the impression that everything went 
on quite unproblematically, there were many opinions and feelings connected 
to the security control performed at the barracks. I spent several shifts with 
different security guards in the barracks in order to try to understand the many 
opinions connected to it. I asked the security guards about the control; what 
                                                     
59 Barracks No. 1 had less traffic and was, therefore, manned with only one 
security guard. 
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they thought about it and what it was like to do that part of the job. On this 
question, Lena, one of the security guards, turned around to me and sighed, 
“the control is one of the most meaningless things I do”. She continued by 
saying that “it is against everything I believe in”. I asked her to clarify what 
she meant by this and she continued by explaining that they had a predefined 
list they should follow in these controls60. Through her explanation, it became 
clear that the whole situation where the guards were only to control the 
predefined things was what she found to be ‘meaningless’. The words 
‘meaning’ and ‘making sense’ were mentioned several times. She concluded, 
“You would need two hours and 30 employees to really search through the 
car”. That they used just a few minutes searching through both the car and the 
driver just underscored, according to her, how superficial the control was. 
These words recurred in many of my conversations with the security 
guards in the barracks. Vidar was a security guard in his 50s who had worked 
at the airport for seven years. He expressed much of the same opinions as 
Lena, describing the control they did in the barracks as meaningless. He 
expressed that what made things appear meaningless to him was consistency, 
or rather the lack of consistency, between the importance security received 
and the feeling he had that the security control they performed at the barracks 
was transparent and superficial. He saw the importance of having security 
measures, “Security is good, and necessary, but many things we do seem a 
little... peculiar [så der]”. Vidar was also preoccupied with the background for 
the procedures: 
 
When something is new [procedure or regulation], there is put up a 
note on the wall in the break room. I often wonder why? Has 
anything happened in advance that cause these new rules? I think 
this is really interesting and it would provide meaning to us all 
[mening for alle] 
(Vidar, Securitas) 
 
Julian, a security guard in his early 20s, asked some of the same questions 
as Vidar. When, for instance, I asked how they were updated on the new rules, 
regulations or procedures (usually stricter routines), Julian leaned his chair 
back from the desk and raised his arm toward a board and tapped with his 
                                                     
60 I have left out detailed explications of the procedures, since these are restricted 
information. 
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pencil at a binder hanging on the board. “They appear here mostly. You’re 
supposed to read this when you start your shift”. I asked him (with a smile) if 
he had done this before he started his shift. He began to smile as well, pausing 
for a bit before he answered that, “well… no. To be quite honest, I don’t 
remember when I read it the last time”. He rose from the chair, pulled down 
the binder and starting flipping through it. He skimmed through the pages, 
giving some comments during this. It seemed like he knew most of what was 
there, although not everything. After finishing, he pointed at me with the 
binder “We receive it only like this, you know. I know we are supposed to 
read it though, but it doesn’t seem very important when we get it like this”.  
For Lena, it was difficult to do a job that felt meaningless. She later added 
that the only way to continue with her job was through not thinking too much 
about it, “The best thing is not to think. You’re not paid to think, so I try the 
best I can to just do the job without thinking too much”. This sentence was 
also uttered by another security guard but in a different context. Roy, a 
pensioned army professional who was also working as a security guard, had a 
quite different approach to the job than many of the others I had talked with. I 
asked him the same questions I had asked everyone else about how he 
perceived his job and the barracks controls. He seemed to think that the job 
was easy as could be, adding that he thought there was too much whining 
from the others “Just do your job! There’s nothing more to it than that. You’re 
not paid to think about everything. Just do it!”  
The security guards in general seemed to agree that the barracks control 
was so superficial and predefined that they did not see the point in having it. 
Therefore, the procedure was perceived to be more of an act and their work, 
thus, ended up being somewhat meaningless. This became utterly amplified, 
since they did not know the reason behind the routines they were doing, and 
the new procedures that arrived were just put up on the wall in the break room 
and the barracks. Consequently, these did not seem very important to the 
employees.  
We now move over to the handling companies and their perceptions of the 
barracks. 
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6.2.5.2 The barracks: handling companies 
This chapter has established that the intersecting point of the regulation, or 
how it was practiced, caused tension between Securitas and the handling 
companies. It has been indicated that the barracks were the point of 
intersection that caused the most tension. From the preceding sections, we 
saw that the security guards found the security controls at the barracks to be 
problematic, and we now continue to the handling companies and their 
perceptions of the barracks. 
 
We went in a Jeep over to the cargo hangar. Leaving the CSRA, we rushed 
past the barracks, since no control was required to go into the normal airside 
area. We went to the cargo area of the airport, picked up a parcel that Lars 
was supposed to get on one of the passenger aircraft that was leaving within a 
short time. We went inside the cargo hangar and signed it out before we 
headed quickly toward the airport terminal again. Closing in on the barracks, 
Lars slowed down, halting at a line that read ‘STOP’. Here we exited the car. 
Two security guards came out of the barracks. I removed my jacket, which 
was then controlled by the security guard. Then followed a hand search like 
the one you receive in an after control in the passenger security control. Then, 
the guards continued to check inside the vehicle, checking all the predefined 
areas and parts I had become familiar with after staying in the barracks. The 
security guards finished their work, said ‘thank you’ and ‘good bye’. We 
hurried over to the terminal and managed to get the parcel on board well 
before the aircraft departed.  
 
The description above is provided to give an impression of the other side 
of the security control at the barracks. The control had become a mere routine 
for Lars and the other ramp agents, but the control often became a hindrance 
for the ramp agents who were occupied with completing their tasks within 
small time frames. That the ramp agents knew the procedures like the back of 
their hand made the control into more of a ritual to them than something they 
connected with a security measure. As Lars later added, “If I wanted to bring 
something into CSRA, I would know how to do it”. Through our later 
conversation, it was obvious that it was not so much the control itself he 
opposed since he understood well the reason for having controls; it was what 
they controlled. He knew the control by heart and stated that, “If I wanted to 
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do harm and to bring something with me, I would never have it in the ... 
[naming the location]… But they check it eeeevery time the same way”. Lars 
thought that the control was so predictable that he could easily find places to 
hide things if he wanted to. Thus he, together with most of the people I talked 
with about this, felt that the control was more for show than anything else. 
Many expressed that the barracks became a point of annoyance instead of the 
security measure it was designed to be.  
There were variations in the ramp agents’ reactions to the security checks 
in the barracks, where it could vary with the number of times an employee 
passed through. One ramp agent told me about an incident where another 
ramp agent had just sped up and passed the barracks at full speed without 
stopping. This story was used as an example of what the continuous stopping 
and controlling was doing to them.  When the ramp agent told this story, it 
was told in a humorous manner such that the employee who did this was 
being praised, in a way, for having the guts to do what many would have liked 
to do. He was not given the role of a hero or anything like that, but he was 
given credit for following his own will. I was also told the same story by the 
security guards during my time in the barracks, but the situation was not 
portrayed in the same way. The ramp agent was described more as a ‘hothead’ 
who had problems obeying rules. The security guards underscored that 
although they could understand that the ramp agents got bored with the 
continuous control, the control and how it should be performed was not their 
responsibility and, hence, should be followed.  
Although the episode described above was a more extreme example of 
how some employees reacted to the barrack controls, it was more typical with 
small conflicts, exchange of comments and bickering. The security guards 
who worked at the barracks told that they sometimes received scolding from 
the ramp agents or were met by an unpleasant attitude when they tried to 
perform the control. This behaviour was perceived to be unfair, since the 
control was predefined and they were only doing their job. The ramp agents, 
on their side, had a quite opposite opinion of the situation, in that they felt the 
security guards had a bad attitude towards them. 
The control at the barracks was there to ensure that people, vehicles and/or 
dangerous items could not enter the CSRA where the aircraft were located 
and, hence, allow someone to harm them. The ramp agents had no problem 
with there being a security control into the CSRA. The problem to them, 
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however, was that it was perceived to be a time-consuming hindrance that was 
there more as an act than as something that would actually improve the 
overall security. Since it was perceived to be superficial, tension rose when 
this became a delaying factor in their job.  
We now continue with the Leaders and their perception of the barracks and 
the concern this gave them for their employees. The data was gathered 
through a meeting with the Sola Security Network Group and the interviews 
with the Leaders of the different companies. 
6.2.5.3 The barracks: Leaders and the Security Network Group, Sola 
Airport 
The Risk Assessment Security Meeting was the meeting that came closest 
to what can be seen as a status check and assessment on security by the 
Leaders of the different companies at the airport. Attending were Leaders 
from the Avinor Security Department, from Securitas and from the handling 
companies. None of the local companies at the airport had legal authority to 
perform any risk assessments concerning airport security. What they could 
assess, however, were issues concerning punctuality. Hence, this could be 
seen almost as entering the ‘back door’ to security issues, since the meeting’s 
main agenda was punctuality, and security was but one of the ‘threats to 
punctuality’. By focusing, instead, on how punctuality could be improved, the 
focus was on everything that could be an obstacle to punctuality, including 
security.  
Without revealing details about the actual issues and the assessments made 
of their importance, much attention was focused on the same issues that also 
occupied the employees. And aligned with this, the barracks received the most 
attention. The meeting group was questioning quality, resentment and 
motivation among the employees, seen from both sides of the control. The 
Leaders discussed and agreed with the employees’ claim that some of the 
controls made little sense, because they were perceived to be superficial. The 
meeting attendees seemed to understand that the result of this was that it was 
hard for the employees to comprehend the point of having the control at all. 
The Avinor Chief of Security (CoS) said he thought the ‘problematique’ they 
had encountered in relation to the barracks was very indicative of how 
security within aviation was organised. Within a system, something could be 
deemed ‘good enough’ but when put in a local setting, it could demonstrate to 
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be neither suitable nor practical. Another Leader said that this should be a 
concern, and he could not see how this could be fixed until the whole barracks 
control was adjusted and, perhaps, a new kind of check point was built 
instead. Participating in this meeting gave me a valuable perspective, because 
out in the field there seemed to be little conviction among the employees that 
the Leaders cared much about their challenges. Listening in on this meeting 
gave me an insight into how the situation seemed to be sort of locked. This 
was because the system was accepted as good enough by both the Civil 
Aviation Authority (CAA) and the EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) and, 
hence, there was no room for Sola Airport to reconfigure their system. Thus, 
the situation was at a standstill. Ideally, there should have been air tight 
controls (if such things even exist), and also conceived as such, because it was 
obviously difficult to motivate the employees to embrace the system when 
they perceived it to be inadequate. The conclusion of the meeting was that 
since the system was accepted by the ESA, and since they found no grounds 
to claim that the barracks influenced punctuality (which was the purpose of 
the meeting), they could not do very much except register it as a concern. At 
the end of the meeting, the CoS asked rhetorically, “Can we do anything else 
than follow the book? No. When someone has told us that this is how we 
should do things, we have no real option to do things otherwise”.  
I found it significant that although the aim of the meeting was punctuality, 
it was an apparent overweight of focus put on security issues compared to the 
other issues that were brought up. I believe that this was caused by a need to 
discuss security related issues, although they had, in effect, no real authority 
to change anything. It was also evident that they were concerned with much of 
the same issues as their employees and were also frustrated that they 
perceived their hands were tied in most issues concerning security.   
6.2.5.4 Summary: the barracks 
The barracks had been placed at the airport to fix infrastructure 
shortcomings that could not handle the demarcation of a CSRA without large 
alterations of the airport area and the complex of buildings. The barracks were 
not intended to be used for such a long time, but as time passed there seemed 
to be no other acceptable or cost-effective solutions. In one of our 
conversations, the Avinor CoS asked, “Who should pay for such a costly 
reconstruction? Security is supposed to be paid by the passengers, but I do not 
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think you will get them to pay for this. We would need special funding in 
order to be able to pay for something like that”. Since the barracks were 
functional and also approved by the CAA and the ESA, it was hard to raise 
money to construct a completely new CSRA to phase out the barracks.   
Following the accounts of the employees who worked in the barracks, their 
Leaders and Avinor, which was ultimately responsible for the barracks 
construction at the airport, it was clear that the barracks was a kind of ‘sticky’ 
issue at the airport. It was difficult for all involved parties; the Leaders were 
constrained from doing anything, since the possibilities seemed small to find 
better solutions. These constraints were mainly caused by airport economy 
(limited funding for adaptations without directives from the CAA or the ESA) 
and the regulatory system, which gave no room for local risk assessments and 
adaptations. The employees, on their side, had to work with and around the 
barracks.  Both security guards and ramp agents had issues with the control 
performed at the barracks, with the main complaint being what we can label 
‘credibility’; for both sides, the control seemed to be more of a spectacle than 
an actual security precaution. Thus, although the barracks and its effects on 
the employees were a concern for both the Leaders and the employees 
themselves, the possibilities for changing anything seemed small and, thus, 
the situation remained stalled. 
We now move over to the fieldwork at the small, regional airport, Fjellvik. 
Here, the main focus is on how this small airport managed the implementation 
of such a large, comprehensive and detailed regulation that was not intended 
or designed for small airports.  
6.3 Fjellvik Airport 
6.3.1 Introduction 
 
I left from OSL, Gardermoen to Tromsø (Norway’s eighth largest city) 
in a Boeing 737 with room for 131 passengers. From Tromsø, we 
moved over to a 39-seater Dash 8, and then we followed the milk 
round, landing on several small airports, before we finally were 
closing in on Fjellvik. Not long before arriving at the airport, we went 
into heavy snow weather with much wind. Just some 10 minutes 
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earlier the weather had been sunny with clear blue skies. The pilot 
explained to us that due to the wind, he was not sure that we would be 
able to land but that he would try. The snow was so heavy that I 
wasn’t able to see the runway as we were attempting to land. We tried 
to land twice but had to abort the landing both times. After the second 
failed attempt, the pilot informed us that we had to fly to another 
airport some 300 kilometres away. We were three passengers who 
were going to Fjellvik on that flight, so after landing the three of us 
were put in a taxi that would drive us the 300 kilometres back to 
Fjellvik. Halfway, the taxi driver stopped at a roadside cafe where we 
were to have dinner, paid for by the airline. There we sat, the three of 
us, only connected by a wish to travel to the same place, eating our 
dinner making small talk, while the taxi driver sat outside with his 
coffee cup and cigarettes. After about 30 minutes had passed, we all 
found our places back in the taxi continuing this randomly 
compounded road trip to Fjellvik.  
 
This small story illustrates the different reality in which the smaller 
airports operate. The small Dash-8 planes travel between these local, often 
remote, places, in some ways functioning more like buses. This is one of the 
main forms of communication between these small places and the rest of the 
world, and there are often large distances between them. In addition there are 
often few passengers either leaving or coming to the airport. Many of these 
airports are located north of the Polar Circle, and one should expect rather 
than be surprised by tough climatic conditions. 
Fjellvik Airport is one of the 26 regional Norwegian airports and is located 
in northern Norway. The regional airports in Norway are in a quite different 
situation and have additional functions to what the other airports have. It has 
been a clear priority in Norwegian regional policy to maintain and uphold 
communication between small communities and the rest of the country to 
avoid depopulation. Therefore, there has not been an exclusive demand that 
the regional airports should yield profits, but rather that they should be upheld 
as a service to the public. This is also exemplified by the service of medical 
transportation, which in many cases is done by airplane. This makes it even 
more important for the communities to have an operating airport.  
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The township of Fjellvik had, at the time of my stay in 2009, 
approximately 2.000 inhabitants. The economy has historically relied mostly 
on fishery. While this has receded, the main industries in the town are still 
largely fish and fishery products, in addition to tourism. Fjellvik is also a port 
that the coastal steamer (Hurtigruten) calls on twice a day. Except for that, the 
town’s communication with the outer world is by the main road that goes over 
a mountain pass. If the weather is bad, one could risk not being able to drive 
over the mountain or having to expect convoy driving.  
At the time of my visit, the airport had 26 employees (full- and part-time), 
with 13 of them employed by Avinor. The 13 others were employed by 
Securitas and the handling company. Four  flights arrive and leave Fjellvik 
daily, and the passenger number was approximately 11.50061 in 2009 (Avinor, 
2013a).  
Within security, all airports in Norway, including regional airports, are 
defined as large airports; meaning that regulation is not divided into small or 
large airports. This was also the main reason for including the regional 
airports in this study. I wanted to find out how the airport employees were 
able to implement and work with the comprehensive regulation in an 
environment that was not constructed to handle it. How were they able to 
distinguish between clean and unclean passengers? And how was it perceived 
to have to implement a regulation based on a risk scenario that did not seem 
suitable to the actual risk scenarios they were faced with? In order to answer 
these questions, I followed the airport employees in their jobs to see how they 
managed their duties (both in relation to security and other tasks) and how 
they met the demands of the regulations they were obliged to follow. I spent 
the most time with the Airport Director (AD) and the Chief of Security (CoS), 
who were working more directly with security related tasks, although I took 
part in all other activities, including handling and receiving aircraft and 
passengers, clearing the runway of snow and spending time in the airport 
tower. I also talked with the security guards working at the airport.  
What follows is a description of how the employees at Fjellvik Airport 
adapted the security regulation into the context of the airport. 
                                                     
61 Not counting transit passengers 
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6.3.2 Transition and adaptation 
The airport in Fjellvik had not been constructed to handle the separation 
between clean and unclean, regarding either passengers or luggage. Since 
security-screened passengers and luggage needed to be separated from the 
unscreened (the clean from the unclean), the airport had to address this 
problem after the 2320/2002 regulation was fully implemented in 2004. They 
had done construction work to build a wall between the entrance area and the 
waiting area where screened passengers could wait for their flight. Prior to 
this, the part of the terminal building open to the public had been one large 
open room with no separation. The waiting area had a gigantic window, 
giving the waiting passengers an orchestra seat to everything that went on out 
on the airside62. The security control, with an x-ray machine and a portal 
(metal detector), was placed between the entrance area and the newly 
constructed waiting area. Thus, they were able to meet the criteria of 
Regulation 2320/2002 regarding the separation. However, when an airplane 
was about to arrive, it became more complicated. Outside on the airside where 
the runway was located, there was no fixed Critical part of Security Restricted 
Area (CSRA). The security regulation, however, stated that when an aircraft 
opens the door, both passengers and luggage on board the aircraft are ‘clean’. 
In order to not ‘contaminate’ the clean passengers and luggage, the airport 
also needs to have a separation between clean and unclean. For Fjellvik, to 
have a permanent CSRA would imply many additional measures and 
precautions that would make the daily tasks and operations on the airport 
much more complicated for airport employees working between the flights. 
For instance, if all of the airside should have been a CSRA, all vehicles and 
personnel that had a working task within the airside would have to be security 
screened and, hence, could not move between the inside and outside without 
being screened every time. It would resemble the security check described at 
Sola with their barracks control. This would have meant that additional 
security personnel would have to be employed for this. In order to avoid these 
additional measures, an adaptation called ‘CSRA in time’ was made. The 
point with ‘CSRA in time’ was that instead of having a fixed CSRA zone, the 
                                                     
62 Airside includes the runway and its surrounding area (some 70 metres on each 
side of the runway) and the area between the runway and the airport buildings. All of  
this area is fenced in  
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zone was established every time there was a flight. The person that was going 
to receive the plane went outside on the airside and was met by a security 
guard. The security guard performed a security hand search on the person, and 
the person was now deemed clean. Then the person would begin to pace off 
an area in which he placed markers in every corner. This zone had now 
become ‘CSRA in time’. When an airplane arrived, it had to park within this 
area which was then the CSRA. This procedure went on every time a flight 
was expected.  
I talked with the Avinor employees who were responsible for receiving the 
flights, about how they perceived this arrangement and going through this 
procedure every time a plane arrived. The arrangement was clearly unpopular 
and perceived as somewhat unnecessary since everybody at the airport knew 
each other and everyone who worked at the airport had a security clearance. 
The procedure thus seemed to be more an act with no real function. In 
addition, it was regarded as somewhat uncomfortable to be hand searched 
right outside the large window where the passengers were waiting so they 
could watch the entire spectacle. I asked if it was possible that this search 
could be done in another place, but evidently this had been difficult to 
accomplish, and that they had tried to improve these procedures earlier but 
had not succeeded. Through the explanations I was given in relation to this 
performance of the regulation, what seemed to bother the employees the most 
was not the actual security hand search but that they did not feel there was any 
point in doing this, especially not on this remote airport where everybody 
knew each other. As long as it was perceived as an act and not as something 
‘real’ to improve security, it seemed to be hard to take it seriously. Because of 
this, some reluctance was connected to performing the procedures although 
the employees carried them out regardless. In addition, that this had to be 
done in front of an audience that for most parts consisted of people they knew 
from their own community was by some considered somewhat degrading. 
After all, they were security cleared and worked to improve security at all 
times at the airport. This responsibility and trust they were normally entrusted 
with was taken away from them in a moment as soon as a plane arrived. 
6.3.3 Priorities – Being a small fish in a big pond 
A large part of the regulatory transition of airport security can be seen as a 
change in priorities. In the old system there seemed to have been a much 
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larger degree of self-governing at the actual airport. This meant that much of 
the assessments of priorities would happen at the airport and not be predefined 
from the central office. This was also important for the areas of security and 
safety, which was not as clearly separated but more assessed according to 
importance in each specific case. This changed drastically after the 
implementation of the very detailed and predefined Regulation 2320/2002. 
Thus, we can say that there was a large decrease in self-governance and local 
risk assessments, especially regarding issues approximating security. With the 
centralisation of regulation, there had also been a recognisable retrenchment 
of the airport’s self-determination in general. The Airport Director (AD) 
explained that it had been very important for the smaller airports to negotiate 
deals for various services and get them as cheaply as possible, since they 
operated on limited budgets. As an example, he described that Fjellvik 
previously had a very favourable deal on diesel fuel with a local supplier. 
Diesel was used for all vehicles at the airport and was bought in bulk. One 
day, they received a message that Avinor’s central office had negotiated a 
deal with a national supplier and that all Avinor airports from then on should 
use this supplier instead of their own. The new deal meant that the cost of 
diesel was now 0,7-0,8 KR more per litre than the other deal they had had 
with the local supplier. Through this example and situations similar to this, 
the AD had perceived that a wave of centralisation had followed in the wake 
of the transition to the security regulation. It was in connection to issues like 
the diesel fuel case, that expressions like ‘Bjørvika (the location of Avinor’s 
main office) is a long way from here’ were applied, implying that not only 
was the main office far away geographically but it was also experienced as 
being far away when it came to decision making and possibilities to influence 
or even receive information. It seemed that the airport employees felt they had 
limited influence on things that were directly affecting their daily work lives.   
The perception that Fjellvik Airport was far away from Bjørvika, may also 
have been caused by a restructuring of Avinor in 2005 and not by the 
regulatory change alone. The AD explained that things were organised 
differently prior to ‘Take-Off 05’63. Up until 2005 there had been regional 
                                                     
63 ‘Take-Off ‘05’ was a reorganising and cost-saving process implemented by 
Avinor. The proposition, passed by the Avinor board on 4.12.2003, stated that in 
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offices to which every airport pertained instead of one central office, which 
happened after Take-Off ’05 went into effect. Fjellvik had previously 
pertained to a regional office in the North of Norway. The AD explained that,  
 
it is clear that the competence of a person who already sits in the 
North of Norway, and who knows the local conditions, finds it 
easier to see common challenges and problems to, for instance, the 
Northern areas. Now it feels like we’re a little forgotten. 
(Airport Director, Fjellvik) 
 
He continued by underlining that although they were very content with the 
people from the main office who worked with the regional airports and 
perceived them to do the best they could, they also understood that there were 
limits to their capacity as well.  
 
They do the best they can… But you know it isn’t always as easy to 
get answers from Bjørvika. This is the greatest difference between 
the regional and the larger airports, because at the larger airports 
they have dedicated personnel as secretaries and production 
managers. Here we have to be everything at once […] we all wear 
many hats.”  
(Airport Director, Fjellvik) 
 
This was also exemplified a few days later when I arrived at the airport in 
the morning, and the Airport Director was nowhere to be found. When I later 
encountered him, he told me that he had been working in the airport tower 
directing the air traffic, since the two regular employees (AFIS64 agents) were 
both absent for various reasons. The AD had previously worked as an AFIS 
agent and was, therefore, also licensed, which one had to be in order to work 
in the tower. Thus, in order to maintain traffic to and from the airport, he had 
to step in to the AFIS duty and postpone his regular duties.  
Hence, the employees perceived that after both the regulatory change and 
the reorganising processes Avinor had been through, there was a marked 
decrease in the power of influence. The AD exemplified this further through 
                                                                                                                              
2006, Avinor should achieve an annual cost-reduction of 400 million KR and reduce 
the total staff by about 700 employees (Voldnes, 2004) 
64 AFIS stands for Aerodrome Flight Information Service and the AFIS agent’s 
task is generally to provide local flight information (to the aircraft), alarm and 
emergency duty and weather observation. They work in the tower at the airport. 
SECURITY REGULATION AT THE AIRPORT: ONE SIZE FITS ALL 
 
193 
 
the signing of the new contract with Securitas as the main supplier of airport 
security65. Until the new Securitas contract was signed, Widerøe66 had been 
the main provider of security services on many of the small airports. Since 
Widerøe was the airline company and the handling company, one of the 
reasons for choosing another supplier was the policy that a company should 
not screen itself. The AD explained that before the contract was signed, they 
had been invited to write an e-mail to the central office to share their thoughts 
on new security providers and what they thought this service should entail. 
After this invitation to contribute and the response the AD sent, they heard 
nothing until the contract was made with Securitas. Sometime after the 
contract had been signed, the AD and the CoS were invited to a meeting for 
leaders of airports in their region where the contract was presented, including 
its demands and instructions. This presentation was made by Securitas 
employees. Among other demands and instructions, it was stated that 
Securitas should from then on have their own offices, changing rooms and 
facilities. The AD perceived that there was no room for discussing these 
issues, as the representatives who had been in charge of negotiating the 
contract were not present at the meeting. It was clear that the purpose of the 
meeting was not to negotiate the contents of the contract but to inform the 
airport management of their obligations according to it. Thus, although the 
airport building at Fjellvik was not built in a way that made it easy to 
accommodate Securitas’ demands, it was not possible to discuss or negotiate 
this at the meeting. After the meeting, they had to organise it the best they 
could, amending the airport in order to meet the obligations in the contract. To 
accommodate one of the demands, they ended up redecorating the handicap 
toilet to make it into a changing room/office for Securitas. Although it was a 
solution no one was overtly happy about, at the time it was the only 
possibility they had had to facilitate it on such short notice. This became a 
recurrent issue, since the security guards felt this was not a very good 
solution, and the AD, as the airport director, was asked by Securitas’ central 
office on several occasions to fix this. In an attempt to try to work something 
out, he invited Securitas to come to the airport so they could try to find a 
                                                     
65 This was the same contract that was celebrated when I did my fieldwork at Sola. 
66 Widerøe is the largest airline in the Nordic countries that is operating on the 
regional airport network.   
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solution together within the possibilities of the building. The answer he 
received was that if they were to come, Securitas would charge six hours per 
person who went up there that the airport would have to pay. The AD was 
quite annoyed by this and chose to not go forward with the invitation. His 
perception was that he had tried to be forthcoming in finding a solution but 
felt that instead he was met with additional demands in addition to an 
economic cost. He thought this response from Securitas only illustrated that 
they were not interested in finding solutions and cooperating with them. From 
having a local provider of security where conditions could be discussed 
locally, it had now become a national contract where the individual airports 
had less power or influence. They perceived themselves to be more or less 
receivers of information with little possibility to influence or take part, and 
their job was only to comply. 
In a small airport with few employees, the organisation of the airport is 
very different from a larger airport. With only four departures a day where the 
first flight leaves at 9:00 in the morning and the last leaves at about 22:00 in 
the evening, there was no need for much personnel, and the ones who worked 
there had to divide all the tasks among them. Thus, as the AD also said, they 
did not have dedicated positions like secretaries or managers in the different 
areas; instead everybody performed various positions simultaneously. The 
largest, and perhaps most important, consequence of having several positions 
at once was that at times it took time away from equally important tasks. 
When priorities were predefined, as it was in the security regulation, the 
assessment and prioritisation could not be made on-the-spot. Thus, if there 
were tasks that conflicted with each other, the employee could not make the 
assessment him- or herself but had to follow the predefined prioritisation, 
where security most often had precedence. This was an important issue for the 
employees and is described next. 
6.3.4 A safe airport 
To talk about the areas of safety and security in a small airport is a 
complex issue with sometimes conflicting goals. In the One-Stop Security 
rationale, it makes perfect sense that all airports that are going to be part of a 
system that feeds ‘clean’ passengers, cargo and luggage into the system need 
to have the same level of security screening. In other words, it was not the 
principle behind One-Stop Security that was a problem but applying it at the 
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small, regional airports sometimes created conflicts between safety and 
security. Since aviation is preoccupied not only with securing against intended 
attacks (security), but also with accident prevention (safety), it is difficult to 
predefine, in a regulatory system, when and how there is a need for the one 
over the other. However, a system in which security most often has 
precedence, this could create conflicts at small airports with less capacity.  
In Fjellvik this clash of interests happened frequently. Perhaps the primary 
reason for this was that they had to perform the same tasks and do the same 
obligatory work as all the other airports. An example of this was the ‘local 
regulation’ which was an adaptation of Security Regulation 2320/2002, and it 
was obligatory to have this on each airport (the same local regulation 
described under Sola Airport). Adaptation in this connection did not imply 
that adjustments or alternative approaches were made to the original 
regulation. In most ways it was more of a specification, since the local 
regulation specified the demands described in the regulation. An example of 
such a specification could be that since the regulation demanded that all doors 
leading into the airside should have a card ID check, the local regulation 
would describe how this was accomplished: e.g., ‘the entrance door (door ID 
xx) on the west-wall leading in to the Avinor office area has a card ID-check’. 
Creating this local regulation was a large job, especially because it was an 
ongoing process as new regulations came from the EU and had to be 
implemented at each airport. At the time of my stay in Fjellvik (April), they 
were working hard with this local regulation, because of a completion 
deadline in September. Everyone at the airport had to contribute, but the Chief 
of Security (CoS) was in charge. The writing of the local regulation was hard 
work and that sometimes it occupied all of the CoS’ time. He did not feel that 
this kind of work (meaning office and computer work) was his forte. He 
humorously depicted this by holding out his index finger and saying “with my 
one-finger touch-method, writing a regulation takes time”. He had worked 
operatively most of his working life and he felt that he was doing a good job 
with all his tasks at the airport. With his joke about the writing of the local 
regulation he underscored that he felt trapped in work he was not very good 
at, instead of using his capabilities for operative work. He was not an office 
worker, but he was, in a way, forced into being one. However, he did not feel 
that he was using his skills optimally when he was sitting in front of the 
computer to work with the local regulation. This predefined prioritisation was 
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also emphasised by the AD, who described the relationship between what he 
was obliged to do and what he himself wanted to do as sometimes in conflict. 
He spent far more time doing paper work and dealing with bureaucracy than 
he thought was right, because for him what happened out on airside and the 
runway was what was really important. I asked him how his job would be 
different if the regulation returned to how it was before Regulation 
2320/2002; he demonstrated this by pointing his finger from the computer at 
his desk, then pointing it out the window to the runway and said “then I could 
start running an airport again”. His point was the same as what the CoS had 
described, that he felt like he was spending too much time within his office, 
while simultaneously thinking that his focus should be out on airside.  
The descriptions above illustrate the conflicts that arose between safety 
and security, which mainly were about time management and focus. We can 
see this as describing the complexity of maintaining a safe airport. While safe 
procedures, good security regulation and a unified system were important 
elements of running a safe/secure airport, these sometimes were in conflict 
with each other. This is not to say that the airport procedures at Fjellvik was 
not fulfilling the demands they were obliged to perform, but that it was 
difficult for the employees to manage all the demands that sometimes were in 
opposition to each other. Simultaneously, it was perceived as difficult that 
their own assessments, based on years of experience of what was important 
and how prioritisations should be made, had to be set aside and they had to 
just act according to the regulation. This also created another issue, because 
by implementing the same regulation at all airports meant that the regulation 
was prepared according to a given risk and threat scenario. It is easy to see 
when comparing the risk scenarios for the large international airports, such as 
Heathrow in London and Charles de Gaulle in Paris, or even OSL 
Gardermoen, that their risk scenarios would be different than in Fjellvik or 
other regional airports. While Fjellvik was a gate into the system like any 
other airport, the risks in Fjellvik were of a quite different character than those 
of the large European airports. In many ways, the risks Fjellvik was most 
often faced with were safety issues. The airport was located in a tough climate 
where getting the aircraft up and down safely was their major concern. Much 
could go wrong in a setting like this, and this was also the reason why the 
employees felt like this was where their focus should lie. The AD explained 
that “the problem with the time consuming processes is that it moves the 
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focus into the building and away from airside. What has that got to do with 
safety?” He thought that there were some major differences between the 
regional airports and the larger airports by virtue of the societies where they 
were placed:  
 
The thing about the regional airports is that everyone knows 
everyone, and we have done so for generations. The conditions 
around here are also so small which means that we know the most 
about everyone. Thus, we know when someone is from the outside 
and we are then more aware”.  
(Airport Director, Fjellvik) 
 
During the conversations with the airport employees, they did not express 
a general negativity with having a security system. What they did express was 
their perception that the current system did not really fit the context. To them, 
the security system bore no relationship to the threats facing the airport, it 
disqualified them from adapting the regulations, and in some cases it resulted 
in strange solutions because it had to be carried out so literally.  
From one of the smallest airports in Norway, we now move over to the 
largest airport in Norway, OSL Gardermoen.   
6.4 Oslo Lufthavn (airport) Gardermoen AS - OSL 
Oslo Airport Gardermoen (airport code OSL) took over as Norway’s main 
airport on the 8th of October, 1998. It replaced Oslo Airport Fornebu, which 
began to have capacity problems during the late 1980’s. Thus, OSL was a 
fairly new construction and has been in continual expansion vis-à-vis both 
revenue and passengers. Compared to other main airports in the Nordic 
countries, OSL was in second place in 2010 if rated by the number of 
passengers, being surpassed only by Copenhagen.  
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Table 3: Growth at the main Nordic airports (2009-2010) 
Airports Passengers Growth 2009-
2010 
Share of inter-
national traffic 
Copenhagen  21 501 750 9,10 % 89 % 
Oslo  19 091 113 5,50 % 53 % 
Stockholm 16 962 544 5,60 % 76 % 
Helsinki 12 883 400 2,20 % 83 % 
        (OSL, 2010) 
 
OSL was funded differently than the other Norwegian airports, since it was 
formed as a daughter company under Avinor. Thus, funding was given 
through a state loan and not by money granted through the state budget, which 
was normal procedure. This difference was also demonstrated through OSL’s 
role in the Norwegian aviation system, in which OSL was juxtaposed to the 
other groups of airports: small, medium and large (See Figure 1, page 28: The 
Norwegian Civil Aviation System (2008)). Here, OSL’s independent role 
becomes more prominent. The differentiation between OSL and the rest of 
Avinor became a prominent feature throughout my fieldwork. OSL was 
Norway’s only de facto large airport compared to the other large European 
airports, and it was, thus, the only airport really constructed to handle a 
regulation like 2320/2002. Because of the differentiation, OSL also had a 
much larger degree of self-governance, which translated into how they 
adapted and adjusted challenges caused by the security regulation procedures. 
In what follows, the aim is to provide examples of how the implementation of 
the security regulation worked at an airport constructed to handle it.  
6.4.1 Differentiating OSL and Avinor 
As already indicated, OSL held a unique position in the Norwegian civil 
aviation system, as the airport was in a category of its own. This was also 
reflected in its identity, wherein OSL employees did not seem to identify 
themselves as Avinor employees, which in reality they were. For example, 
shortly after my arrival at OSL, I noticed that the Avinor logo was absent 
from the airport, and I also noticed that things were talked about in terms of 
OSL and not very often in relation to Avinor. During my initial conversation 
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with the Chief of Security (CoS) at OSL, we talked about this. He confirmed 
that OSL had a very strong identity. He added that this had been even stronger 
before he started working there in 2004, when OSL had a much more fixed 
perception of its own identity. Although it had become more open, the OSL 
identity was still strong. Even if all airports were owned by Avinor, it was 
evident that OSL’s special role did something with its identity as well. Not 
only was OSL Norway’s main airport, but at times it was also more or less 
placed on equal terms with Avinor when it came to representation in national 
and international forums. The CoS explained that this special status began 
with the way OSL was financed. In addition, they had a different position than 
the other airports when it came to influence. For example, in the different 
forums that the airports could influence (nationally and internationally), it was 
typical that Avinor sent one representative on behalf of all the 45 Avinor 
airports and that OSL sent its own representative. Therefore, it was much 
easier to coordinate issues and opinions from OSL than it was for any of the 
other airports that only had one representative for them all. Another example 
of OSL’s position was in the quarterly ‘Security Forum’ meeting. This was a 
meeting for all the large airports discussing issues concerning security. Here, 
the OSL Chief of Security (CoS) was the manager of the meeting, and he was, 
therefore, the representative on behalf of the forum also. In that meeting, he 
mainly informed the other Airport Directors about the movements regarding 
security equipment and procedures in the EU. His role was thus different from 
the other representatives in the meeting. 
It was evident that OSL was pertaining to its ‘own league’ in the 
Norwegian aviation system and that they identified themselves more as an 
own organisation than as an Avinor-owned airport. For instance, this identity 
could be seen in the usage of the airport code67 OSL when referring to the 
airport. Among the OSL employees, this airport code was used as a proper 
name, as one does with ‘real places’, such as cities or towns. During one of 
the first days of my stay at OSL, one employee expressed this:  
 
OSL is a city in its own right. All together we are 12.000 people 
working here, which is quite large compared to a city in Norwegian 
scale. We work here 24/7, and we have police, infirmary, fire 
                                                     
67 The airport codes are given through the ‘International Air Transport 
Association’ system, or IATA, and are used to identify the world’s airports 
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brigade, etc… Everything that a normal society has […] We even 
have our own ZIP code.  
(OSL/Avinor employee, OSL) 
 
This underscored the identity of OSL being conceived more as a society 
than ‘just’ an airport. I later also learned that OSL had its own e-mail domain, 
@osl.no, in contrast to all other airports including the central office in 
Bjørvika, which all had the domain @avinor.no.  
As outlined above, OSL was also more autonomous when it came to 
choosing different solutions than the other Avinor airports. The contract with 
the security company G4S is as an example of this autonomy, since OSL is 
the only Avinor-owned airport that held its own bidding on their airport 
security service, while the other 45 Avinor airports fell under the same 
contract with Securitas as the sole provider of security screening services.  
The next part focuses on how OSL was able to act more autonomously and 
how this solved some of their challenges. 
6.4.2 Separating OSL and Avinor 
At OSL, there were systems and an economy that one could not find at any 
other Norwegian airport. The systems of improvement pertained to a different 
scale and entailed different possibilities than the other airports had. For 
example, the contract OSL had with G4S stated that G4S had the 
responsibility to provide the security level as defined in the contract, while 
OSL, as the airport operator, had the responsibility to make sure that G4S had 
the possibilities (physical and environmental) to perform to that level. In 
itself, this was not much different from the situations at the other airports, 
where Avinor was responsible for facilitating the environment in which the 
security company would work. However, the difference was that OSL seemed 
to have a bit more elbow room in this facilitation. The CoS explained that, for 
instance, OSL had hired Det Norske Veritas (DNV)68 to do a survey for them 
in 2007 to find out how the security guards perceived their work environment 
and jobs in general. The main results from the survey were that the physical 
design of the security control area was inconvenient and troublesome, that the 
noise levels were high and that people were complaining about physical pains 
                                                     
68 Det Norske Veritas is a risk management consulting company 
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caused by the hard floors. Based on the results of the survey, OSL were 
reconstructing the passenger security control with a budget of 30 million 
NOK at the time of my fieldwork. 
Another survey had also been conducted on the issue of satisfaction among 
the passengers in relation to the passenger security control. The results of this 
survey, given to 400 passengers, were that most people were satisfied with the 
security control, despite the sometimes negative focus the security control had 
received, especially in the media. A recurrent theme, however, was 
complaints about the service-mindedness among the security guards, who 
received some negative feedback, especially regarding communication. This 
was an area the airport management were working on at the time of my 
fieldwork and was reflected in the meetings I attended regarding the security 
service. Here, the survey was applied as a foundation for future work to 
enhance the service level. In one of the Security Network Meetings I attended 
at OSL, this survey was the main issue on the agenda. The results from the 
survey had been important in deciding the strategies for moving forward and 
improving the security service. They had decided on a security campaign that 
should be launched simultaneously with the opening of the new security 
control, which was under construction at the time. The campaign’s main goal 
was to improve the relationship between passengers and security guards 
(based on the passenger survey) and the working environment for the security 
guards (based on DNV’s survey from 2007). The key words for the campaign 
were words like ‘quality’ and ‘communication’. Hence, the realisation of the 
surveys depicts a very different situation in handling issues than what I 
observed at the other airports. OSL were able to apply a much more 
systematic approach to assessing problems and dealing with them that no 
other airport would have the possibility to copy, due to both economic and 
autonomy restrictions.  
The time I had at OSL provided valuable insights into the implementation 
of the security Regulation 2320/2002 in practice at an airport that was able to 
handle it. This is not to say that there were no challenges for OSL in relation 
to the regulation but to demonstrate that there was a quite different way of 
handling challenges than the other airports I have presented in this chapter had 
the possibility to do.  
In addition, at a large airport, many obstacles disappear that one can find at 
the smaller airports. For instance, at OSL, all of the airside area, including 
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cargo, was located within the CSRA. Therefore, they had no need for a 
security control between zones at the airside, as both Fjellvik and Sola had. 
The result was that the job of ramp agents, for an example, was quite different 
in Fjellvik and Sola than at OSL, because all operations they did during their 
work day were located within the CSRA. Consequently, the only security 
control the ramp agents went through during the day was the employee 
security control when they came to work. Because of this, the ramp agents did 
not need to relate directly to the security regulation as did their colleagues at 
the other 45 Norwegian airports.  
In summary, we see that operating according to the security regulation at a 
large airport as OSL was quite different in nature than at Fjellvik and Sola 
airports. OSL’s autonomy and resources, in addition to its size, made 
adaptations and adjustments possible. This difference is further discussed in 
the final part of the chapter. 
The next part shifts the focus over to the airline crews and the challenges 
the security regulation presents for their job.  
6.5 The airline crew perspective 
Crewmembers can be considered to be nomads, in that they continuously 
move around and, hence, are not deeply rooted in any one airport. The media 
have given much attention to the obstruction the security regulation has 
caused for airline crew in their work. After the implementation of Regulation 
2320/2002, conflicts became prominent between airline crews (mainly 
through the Pilots’ Association) and the airport operator (Avinor), together 
with the CAA (as the enforcer of regulation). The pilots have opposed and 
criticised the way Norway has implemented the security regulation. No other 
professional group has received similar space in the media as the pilots have.  
During my fieldwork at OSL, I interviewed airline crew members, crew 
coordinators (mainly chief pilots) and representatives from the Pilots’ 
Association69. There were mainly two recurring issues during my interviews 
with these representatives. The first was the claim that there were different 
practices between airports and across countries, despite the fact that the 
regulation should ensure similar practices across all airports and countries 
pertaining to Regulation 2320/2002. The second issue treated the difficulties 
                                                     
69 See Chapter 4, ‘Methodology’ for an elaboration of the interviews 
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caused by the implementation of the regulation, especially at the regional 
airports. The Pilots’ Association claimed that the security regulation and its 
demands generated safety issues for the pilots. This is further described in the 
next section  
6.5.1 Security regulation and airline crew 
In the interview with the Pilot’s Association (PA) representative, who was 
also a pilot for SAS, he explained that the Association worked for two 
particular goals regarding the security regulation: first, a simpler, standardised 
regulation with fewer details and more consistency; secondly, a more 
reasonable enforcement of this regulation. He explained that, for example, it 
did not make sense to the Association that some people were exempt from the 
security control, while the pilots, who operated the aircraft, had to go through 
the security control. The people who were exempt from the security control, 
the PA explained, were people from the ministries, police and customs, in 
addition to some predefined customers (unnamed). The PA expressed that 
having exempt groups meant that the regulation actually had room to make 
this exemption. Why these people were exempt and others were not made 
little sense to the pilots who were subjected to the same security screening as 
the passengers. Their main argument was that if the pilots wanted to inflict 
harm on aviation, they could do so by using the aircraft as weapons since 
they, only minutes after the security screening, were in control of an airplane. 
Thus, why some groups were exempt from the control, where the pilots were 
not was incomprehensible to them. 
Some of the main quarrels between the security guards and the pilots have 
occurred on the actual airports. Generally, the conflicts have followed two 
directions. First were those conflicts caused by direct confrontations between 
the security guards and the pilots, in which the themes revolved around the 
interpretation of the regulation. As an example, in 2007 there was a case 
where a Widerøe flight was cancelled after a quarrel between the pilot and a 
security guard (Rapp, 2007). The pilot claimed that he had already been 
through the security control and was not obliged to go through it again. The 
security guard on the other side claimed that the pilot had to go through it 
again. The quarrel had been heated and was taken in front of passengers at 
Hammerfest airport. The result was that the flight was cancelled, since the 
pilot felt he was too agitated to fly safely. Apparently, the security guard had 
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been right since everybody who exits the CSRA, pilots included, is obliged to 
take another security check to re-enter it. Thus, the first direction of the 
conflicts is those direct confrontations caused by different interpretations of 
the regulations. The second direction of the conflicts, however, was more 
indirect, typically caused by building constructions and logistics. These 
conflicts were mainly outplayed on the small airports often involving Widerøe 
pilots (the company that mainly operates the small airports). On these airports, 
pilots and crew often had to leave the CSRA in order to enter the airport 
building. Usually, due to limited building capacity, the break room and even 
the toilets were located outside the CSRA, which meant that pilots and crew 
had to exit the CSRA to use the airport facilities. To re-enter the plane, they 
would have to go through the security control again. When combining these 
logistical and constructional elements with other variables such as time 
pressure and stress, this constituted the second direction of conflicts. These 
conflicts were often outplayed in the security control and could be conceived 
as an obstacle to the pilot being able to do his job. Even if the results were not 
direct conflicts, it seemed to create a generally negative perception of the 
security system, in which the security control was seen as an obstacle to the 
performance of their regular duties.   
6.5.2 Different practice at different airports? 
One of the major factors in having a single regulation for every airport 
across Europe was to have a standardised performance that would ensure an 
equal level of security. In theory, this meant that going through the security 
control in one place should be more or less identical to any other place. The 
impression given by the crew (pilots and cabin crew) was that they did not 
perceive the system to be this universal. This was perplexing, considering that 
these people had an actual possibility to compare the different practices 
between airports, since their job was, after all, to travel from airport to airport 
across the world. Variations could be expected to a small extent. As 
mentioned previously, there is always a possibility to implement more 
measures or to a certain extent the security guards could do some situational 
assessments. However, the difference in practice the crew described went 
beyond this. One pilot who had worked for many years with the SAS had 
experienced clear differences between both countries and airports:  
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I think there is a different kind of focus on security in other places. 
For instance there is a clear difference between Spain and Norway 
[…] In Spain the whole source of irritation has been removed 
because they let pilots go through even when the machine beeps. 
They don’t do the ‘after-control’ on pilots. Take for example the ID 
card. Today in Norway this is not used as a ‘control point’. In other 
places the card is always checked. Just think about the uniform! 
There are several things with the uniform that ticks off the beeping; 
the belt, your wings… In Spain they just wave you through. No one 
reacts to that; neither the security guard nor the passengers […] You 
have to trust somebody… 
(Pilot, SAS) 
 
 Spain is obliged by the same regulation as Norway, due to its EU 
membership. Therefore, in theory there should be no different practice 
between Norway and any of the other EU countries.  
There were many stories of different treatment in different airports. 
Common to them all was the perception that Norway, often together with 
England, was the strictest country in enforcing the regulations. Although 
England, and especially Heathrow, was mentioned as about as strict at 
Norway, it was not perceived as annoying. As one pilot said “it may be that 
London and Norway are equally strict, but everything is just more seamless or 
painless, so it doesn’t seem that way”. As the representative from the 
Norwegian Pilots’ Association said in the first interview, there was a wish for 
a more standardised regulation, and since there was a perception that there 
were variations between airports and countries, for crew and pilots this 
resulted in annoyance and negativity towards the security regulation and the 
Norwegian enforcement of it.  
6.5.3 Avinor on the crew controversies 
The discussion around crew and regulation was also discussed by other 
interviewees who had different views of the problems the pilots expressed. 
The issue of crew (especially pilots) and the security control was discussed in 
one of the interviews with the Sola CoS and another employee in the Sola 
Security Department. The CoS described his view of the crew controversies: 
 
I think that it sends a signal to the passengers that the pilot has to go 
through the security control. I know that this has been a somewhat 
controversial issue since the pilot in practice can do whatever he 
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wants with the airplane when it’s in the air… Ok, so take for 
example this new HMS [Health, environment and safety] leader we 
have. We had this meeting the other day and there was a cable lying 
across the floor. He refused to begin the meeting until it was taken 
care of and secured. When a leader has this kind of attitude, it will 
eventually rub off on others, too. You take it more seriously. As it is 
now, the pilots don’t take this responsibility, but I believe that if 
they had stood out as good examples, the ‘flock’ would have 
followed them. 
(Chief of Security, Sola) 
  
The other Avinor representative agreed with the importance of the signal 
effect and elaborated that, “I’m not sure that the pilots today are aware that 
they have this leader position, but in their defence they never asked for it, but 
then again they do certainly not embrace it”. The paradox, for the pilots, as 
also touched upon by the CoS above, was that the pilots had to go through the 
same security control as everybody else, although they were already 
thoroughly background checked and, most importantly, they had control of 
the aircraft and could cause disaster if they wanted to. The CoS had no trouble 
understanding this argument, but he countered this argument with a new 
question: 
 
What if someone, let’s say a terrorist, switches the pilot’s suitcase 
with another suitcase containing something harmful? Or what if a 
pilot’s family is held hostage to pressure the pilot into bringing 
something onboard the plane? I know these are only fictional 
examples, but they are not inconceivable. So in one way, you can 
say that ‘forcing’ the pilots to go through the same control is a way 
of relieving them from possible harm and responsibility, too. 
(Chief of Security, Sola) 
 
Much work has been done, especially regarding airport construction, in an 
attempt to accommodate the Pilots’ Association demands. In the aftermath of 
the extended media coverage from 2007 and onwards, large restructuring 
grips were initiated to, for example, move the break rooms and bathrooms 
over to the CSRA, which eased up on the need to go through excessive 
security controls. But this has not been possible to do everywhere and has, 
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therefore, continued to be a stress and annoyance factor, especially on the 
regional airports70.  
6.5.4 Summarising comments: airline crew 
The airline crew, and principally the pilots, have been a much more visible 
group than many of the other groups profoundly affected by the security 
regulation. In Norway this has especially been a recurrent issue at the regional 
airports. Media coverage has documented conflicts at the airports, and 
newspaper articles report about pilots who miss their flight time and where the 
flights consequently were cancelled, because the pilot got stuck in the security 
control on his way back from the bathroom. In many ways, it demonstrates an 
additional side of the consequences of implementing a unified regulation 
regardless of the airport size, particularly where airports and procedures were 
not constructed to cope with the new security regulation and where practices 
bear the evidence of this. 
The second point conveyed by airline crews was their perception of 
inconsistencies in the practice of the security regulation. Inconsistencies 
resulted in inconvenience for them, since what was regarded as acceptable at 
some places was considered unacceptable at others. These inconsistencies 
were, according to the crews I interviewed, found both within Norway and 
between other countries, with some countries considered more lenient than 
others. This results in an interesting observation, namely that there were 
differences in how the regulation was practiced, even though the regulation 
was supposed to counter variable practices through the level of details 
employed. 
The last part of this chapter reviews the main findings from this chapter. 
6.6 Concluding summary 
This chapter has provided a comprehensive account of the regulatory 
transition and its consequences at three different airports. I have presented 
data that elaborate the experience of leaders and employees operating with, 
and according to, Regulation 2320/2002. I have also included the transition as 
                                                     
70 For further elaboration on this ongoing conflict between security regulation and 
safe practices for pilots, see Pettersen and Bjørnskau 2011. 
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seen through the airline crews’ perspectives. In this final section, I summarise 
the empirical material presented in this chapter in relation to the two last 
empirical questions posed in the introduction. The two questions are 
intertwined, especially since challenges caused by the regulation to a large 
extent are connected to the size of the airports. Therefore, the questions are 
not answered separately, but summarised through three sub-sections. I begin 
by looking at the regulatory transition and its consequences for the different 
airports.  
6.6.1 Transition and adaptation 
The introduction of the new security regulation was followed by great 
changes in the organisation of security at the airports.  As described by 
informants at both Sola and Fjellvik, the level of details and detailed 
procedures greatly increased with the implementation of the new regulation. 
Simultaneous with the regulation’s implementation, a new division occurred 
between safety and security as separate areas. As described by the Chief of 
Security (CoS) at Sola, there had not been such a clear division between the 
two areas prior to the security regulation’s implementation. The first task 
given to the Security Department at Sola in the transitional phases was to 
adapt the new Regulation 2320/2002 into a local regulation that would specify 
all security procedures in detail. According to the CoS, the evaluation they 
received on this attempt was what he described as a ‘slaughtering’, and the 
CAA did not accepted it. To the CoS, this illustrated how unfamiliar they 
were with this approach of prescribing and specifying even the smallest detail 
and that they had not fully understood the level of detail they were supposed 
to include. After this, they realised that they had to think about security in a 
very new way.  
The transition at Fjellvik was described similarly to the transition at Sola. 
However, in Fjellvik it may be possible that some of the changes the 
employees experienced at the airport were caused by the restructuring project 
Take-Off ’05, especially since the time period coincided between Take-Off 
’05 and the full implementation of the security regulation on regional airports. 
For instance, the centralisation of the regional Avinor offices to Bjørvika, 
Oslo, could typically be seen as a change caused by economic downsizing. 
With this being said, the point that the leaders at Fjellvik made was to 
describe a new situation where they suddenly perceived they had less 
SECURITY REGULATION AT THE AIRPORT: ONE SIZE FITS ALL 
 
209 
 
autonomy and that decisions were made without their participation. This 
seemed to have left them with the impression that they had been deprived of 
some of the self-governance they previously had regarding security questions 
and that their local expertise and skills were no longer taken into 
consideration to the same degree.  
At OSL, however, these problems were not presented as an issue. This 
stemmed, in all probability, from the fact that there had not been a transition 
there in the same proportion as the other airports had experienced. From its 
opening in 1999, OSL was designed as a hub that received ‘unclean’ 
passengers from the other airports, and that were consecutively security 
screened before being sent out to the rest of the world. Thus, their security 
system was already in place and operating, and, therefore, they did not have 
the same pronounced transition as the other two airports had.  
6.6.2 Size matters 
Implementing a regulation that had been prepared primarily for the large 
airports had consequences in its accomplishment in the practical context. To 
compensate for lacking structures and/or infrastructure, the smaller airports, 
which in practice included all airports except OSL, had to make amendments 
in order to fulfil the demands in the regulation. The barracks at Sola illustrate 
such an amendment. Since the barracks had already been approved as a 
solution, first by the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) and later by the EFTA 
Surveillance Agency (ESA), Avinor, as the airport operator and facilitator, 
therefore had little possibility to find alternatives that would have been more 
suitable in the local context. Resources were, to a large extent, ear-marked or 
bound up and the airport, therefore, could not reconstruct the barracks without 
external funding from the outside (primarily through the state budget). This 
became difficult to accomplish, since there had been no remarks from either 
the CAA or the ESA as inspectorates. Leaders from Securitas and the 
handling companies received complaints from their employees about the 
barracks that they presented to Avinor. Avinor, although accepting and 
understanding the complaints, did not have the resources or mandate to 
accommodate them. Thus, the barracks appears as an example of a situation 
difficult to amend that few (besides the authorities) perceived to be 
satisfactory. It was hard for the leaders of all the companies to realise that 
they were unable to motivate their employees to do their jobs, when the 
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employees felt that they worked in situations that seemed meaningless or 
unnecessary. The employees were not opposed to the screening per se, only to 
those screening procedures they perceived to have no real purpose. 
Another consequence of the security regulation was that the airport 
employees perceived that the tasks imposed upon them tied them into a fixed 
prioritisation. This seemed to result in larger consequences the smaller the 
airport was, because, as we saw in Fjellvik, the leaders there perceived they 
were restrained by the number of bureaucratic duties they were obliged to 
perform. The predefined procedures in the regulation resulted in decreasing 
the possibilities for prioritisation of time, personnel and resources. This 
particularly made the leaders feel that much of their time and effort was 
caught up in the security bureaucracy, instead of focusing on the general 
safety of the airport (including security). For a small airport in a remote 
location where they knew most of their passengers, it seemed inappropriate to 
apply security measures intended to reveal and avoid terrorist acts, such as the 
9/11 attacks. Although it made sense in relation to the principle of One-Stop 
Security, where threats travel within the system, it seemed difficult to accept 
that they should spend such a large portion of their time and effort to secure 
against risks that seemed irrelevant to them, while the risks they perceived as 
more ‘real’, most often safety risks, were not necessarily prioritised as high as 
the airport employees felt they should be. Instead, they were often 
overshadowed by security regulations and bureaucracy. Operating an airport 
in tough climatic environments also led to different challenges than the other 
airports had, and their main focus was to get the aircraft up and down from the 
sky safely, but these were safety, not security, issues. In such scenarios, the 
risks and threats the security regulation was intended for seemed somewhat 
misplaced, and the amount of work they were obliged to do according to this 
regulation seemed, therefore, also to be misplaced.  
6.6.3 Safety and security 
The ‘separation’ of safety and security that occurred with the 
implementation of the new regulation made the contrast between them very 
large; whereas it was possible to make local assessments and apply for 
alternative solutions within safety, this had become very difficult within the 
security environment. This also entailed that it would not be possible to 
reallocate resources as the airport found it appropriate; rather, resources were 
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placed in predefined areas. The new way of organising aviation security was 
in many ways perceived to happen over the heads of the airports and their 
management and was only to be implemented as instructed. At the employee 
level, some of the implemented measures were perceived as inconsistent, 
unnecessary and/or superficial.  
The difference in how safety and security were handled after the new 
regulation was implemented was exemplified by the CoS at Sola through the 
example of alternative solutions in relation to the ‘runway case’. What he 
especially highlighted was that they were able to adapt the new demands 
based on risk assessments, thus reducing costs and make the regulation more 
appropriate in the actual context. As the CoS stated, this would not happen 
within security, because it was not possible to apply assessments in security as 
they did within safety. This meant that the leverage was very different in 
safety and security, since security regulation was only to be implemented. 
Although the barracks could be perceived as an amendment of the regulation, 
it was not based on any local risk assessments. The barracks were constructed 
with consideration to the screening levels given in the regulation. How this 
amendment worked in practice, its consequences for the employees in the 
context, or whether it was appropriate or not, was not assessed.  
In the two preceding chapters, I have thoroughly explored the regulatory 
transition post 9/11. By including both the authority level and the airport 
level, my aim has been to provide as broad a picture as possible of the 
regulatory change and implementation processes in the Norwegian civil 
aviation system.  
To summarise, the implementation of a unified security regulation in the 
Norwegian setting has had consequences. Many of the challenges caused by 
these consequences seem to be related to the rigidity in the construction of the 
regulation, which again is connected to the fact that the regulation was not 
constructed with respect to the difficulty the smaller airports would have in 
implementing this.  
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7 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
The major empirical contribution of this study is the profound description 
of the transition of the regulatory system for civil aviation security in Norway, 
including the impacts and consequences of the implementation on different 
levels.  Applying an integrated approach to this study has made it possible to 
gain a more comprehensive picture of the implementation than if a more 
‘pure’ ethnographic, sociologic or political scientist approach had been 
applied. The major advantage of this approach is that it includes data from 
several levels of the civil aviation system, lest that implementation strategy 
and processes at governmental and authority levels can be seen in light of how 
it is perceived in practice by the ‘end-users’ where the regulation is 
implemented within a context. The study, however, has never intended to 
assess the security measures in themselves but rather to identify and describe 
consequences of the implemented measures and to abstract from this a 
discussion of what regulatory choices may look like in a context and what 
they may entail. The integrated approach also includes the application of 
typical political science literature on the subject of regulation and to apply 
organisational safety literature to the security field. This was done to acquire a 
wider picture of the constraints and possibilities of regulation when applied in 
the organisational setting and to shed light on alternatives to the regulatory 
choices Norway made after 9/11.  
In the Introduction, I illustrated how uncertainty-induced the field of 
security is and therefore why it is so difficult to assess. In a setting where the 
absence of incidents cannot be ascribed to the success of the security system 
alone, I suggested that a way around this issue was to focus on the processes 
leading to high reliability. In this setting, where it is difficult to assess the 
success, one can look to the exploitation of the possibilities within the 
organisational setting that leads to high(er) reliability.  
This chapter is directed at assembling the different parts of the thesis to 
present the findings that have been elucidated through the four empirical 
questions and to discuss these findings within the frames of the literature of 
regulation and organisation presented in Chapter 3. I have therefore divided 
the chapter into two main parts. The first part is dedicated to the empirical 
findings through answering the four empirical questions. This section will 
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form the basis for the subsequent discussion part of the chapter, which 
discusses the consequences and implications of the findings in relation to the 
theory and literature presented in Chapter 3. In the final part of the chapter, I 
address the research problem and draw some general lines, including recent 
developments within aviation security, to nuance and situate the findings from 
this study.  
7.1 Addressing the empirical findings 
The empirical questions first introduced in Chapter 1 have provided a way 
to approach the comprehensive field of this thesis, breaking it down to 
describable and analysable parts that offer the necessary information for 
answering the general problem of the thesis. The empirical questions have 
also guided the two empirical chapters and are now drawn in again to be 
answered. This section will summarise and accentuate the findings from the 
two empirical chapters and provide a basis for the subsequent discussions. 
The questions will be answered separately.  
7.1.1 Empirical question 1 
How was the security system for civil aviation transformed after 9/11 
from a Norwegian perspective? 
The transformation of the security system was based on a change in 
regulatory style. The regulatory transformation was not an exchange of one 
type of regulation with another but rather an escalation of one type of 
regulation over another during which an intensification of prescriptive 
regulation took place. Use the pictorial illustration of a volume control. We 
can say that there was a security system for civil aviation prior to 9/11 but it 
was on a low volume. After 9/11, however, the volume was turned up (close) 
to maximum, engaging all procedures and possibilities that already lay within 
the system. In the continuance of this escalation, new rules and regulations 
were added progressively on top of the existing ones.  
After 9/11, the European Union, which from the outset had a function as a 
politico-economic union (European Union, 2015), gained a function as a 
legislative body for aviation security. Although the regulatory transformative 
processes in the EU were obligating the EU member countries to implement 
the new regulatory system, we find a similar process in Norway. The 
DISCUSSION 
 
214 
 
differences we find in the implementation have to do with Norway being an 
EFTA member and not an EU member, which caused the processes of 
regulatory development and implementation to, among other things, be more 
time consuming. Hence, although Norway is not an EU member, the EFTA 
membership with the EEA Agreement obliges Norway in practice to follow 
the EU regulation for civil aviation security in line with the EU countries. 
7.1.2 Empirical question 2 
How was the transformation perceived by different agents within the 
civil aviation security system? 
This question is best answered by separating between, first, describing the 
transformational process and, second, presenting the different agents’ 
hindsight reflections on this transformation. This becomes more clarifying 
since, if we first look at the transformation itself, the different agents in this 
study described it similarly. The agents’ reflections on the transformation in 
retrospect, however, were more disparate. We begin with describing the 
transformation. 
 
Describing the transformation 
The transformative process was identified mainly through the words 
secrecy, rapidity and reactivity, which will principally be used as collective 
terms to organise the agents’ descriptions.  
 
Secrecy  
Secrecy described the increase of the level of secrecy that followed in the 
wake of the new regulation. This increase had consequences for the 
distribution of information and involvement within the system. The increase 
of secrecy was displayed both for the passengers and for agents and groups 
within or connected to the aviation system. Passengers were met with more 
restrictions and longer lists of prohibited items (and even the list of items was 
classified for some time). Groups that would previously have been involved in 
the preparation and development of regulations were now left out.  
 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
215 
 
Rapidity  
Rapidity described the time span between an event and the implementation 
of the new regulations. The rapid way regulations after 9/11 were 
implemented had consequences for the involvement and evaluation of the 
regulations: the quicker the implementation, the fewer the possibilities to take 
part in and contribute to the developmental phases of regulatory work. We see 
here that both the secrecy and the rapidity traits, to some extent, preclude 
involvement. A rapid way of developing and implementing regulation also 
precludes profound testing and evaluation of the regulations. This is also 
closely connected to the reactivity trait as described by the agents.  
 
Reactivity 
The reactive way of constructing regulation is closely connected to 
traditional accident prevention found in safety industries. Within accident 
prevention, rules and procedures are constructed based on past events. 
However, in order to make sure these procedures are fit and appropriate, the 
processes are long and time consuming, and testing and evaluating are 
essential. Within security regulation, the reactive way of constructing 
regulation has been copied without including the time and testing that 
ordinarily follow it. Thus, it has only been a partial transfer of this approach, 
and it is reasonable to assume that without the time and testing, procedures 
and regulations may, to some extent, become unfitted and/or maladjusted.  
Describing the transformation through the words secrecy, rapidity and 
reactivity is not to say that these elements were not present prior to 9/11, but 
if we also apply the illustration of the volume control, we see that the volume 
has been turned up on all these traits and that this increase has led to various 
consequences within the civil aviation security system. These consequences 
can mainly be found in the degree of involvement and participation as well as 
possibilities for contextual adaptation.  
If we leave the three descriptive words characterising the transformation 
for a moment, there is a last change that is significant for the Norwegian 
system: the moving of regulatory processes from the national to the 
international arena of the EU. Regardless of the perceptions of this move, it is 
clear that it has also had effects on involvement and participation. 
Accordingly, we cannot say that only the properties of the regulation affect 
the level of involvement in regulatory processes since this can also be 
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explained by the relocation of where the regulatory work is done. The mere 
fact that the Norwegian Aviation Act declares that all regulation that is found 
relevant to the EEA Agreement takes precedence over Norwegian law 
illustrates that national law, and hence national legislation regarding 
procedures of developing and implementing laws and regulations (through the 
Public Administration Act71), are overridden because of the EFTA 
membership when it comes to security. The Public Administration Act (and 
the Freedom of Information Act72) are made to ensure that processes of 
regulatory work are open to affected parties and that the processes are to take 
due time to ensure that all parties are given time to contribute. The aim here is 
not to conclude that this change indicates that regulatory development is 
undemocratic since the processes of the EU ensures affected member 
countries and Norway involvement. However, by moving these processes out 
of the national context and to the international level, it is reasonable to assume 
that there will be different groups that are involved in the EU than if the 
processes were kept nationally. To some extent, this relocation may therefore 
lead to lesser degrees of democratic involvement than there was before in the 
national context. If we then combine the relocation of regulatory development 
together with the boost of the volume on secrecy, rapidity and reactivity, we 
see that the consequences are mainly oriented around involvement, 
participation and possibilities for adaptation of the regulations. We can 
therefore say that these are the main consequences of the regulatory 
transformation.  
 
The transformation in retrospect 
The transformation of the security system, or rather the effects or 
consequences it has had, was perceived differently by different agents within 
the aviation system. The assessments made by the Civil Aviation Authority 
and the management of Avinor were not alike, while those of the Ministry of 
Transport and Communication (MTC) and the Civil Aviation Authority 
(CAA) approached one another. The MTC informant emphasised the 
importance of being part of the European system for civil aviation security, 
                                                     
71 See Section 2.4.2. 
72 A law to ensure transparency in public administration, among other things 
safeguarding democratic principles and the rule of law. 
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while simultaneously observing that the level of secrecy had consequences for 
involvement and participation in the Norwegian context. She even said that 
she did not see those processes as very democratic. Notwithstanding, it was 
most important for the MTC to be part of the EU regulatory system and not to 
be left outside. Exactly why this was so important was unfortunately not 
directly expressed by the MTC informant, except through referrals to the 
National Strategy Group, where the decision to keep in line with the EU was 
presented as a settled political strategic decision. However, since the MTC is a 
political body, it is the Civil Aviation Authority that works directly with 
recommendations on behalf of the aviation system regarding Norwegian 
aviation. This way, even though the regulations are owned by the MTC and 
the MTC is an active agent in regulatory development in the EU, it is the 
CAA that makes assessments and recommendations to the MTC in questions 
regarding Norwegian civil aviation. Because of this allocation of duty and 
responsibility, one can expect that the decision to follow the EU is a political 
decision and that it is the CAA that provides the recommendations from the 
practical aviation setting to the MTC. Therefore, we can look to the CAA and 
its assessment of the regulation in hindsight because it is the authority that 
mainly provides the foundation for the MTC’s strategic approach.    
 
The CAA 
The CAA informants in the Security Department expressed satisfaction 
with the implementation of the regulation and the large improvements it had 
advanced for the aviation security system in Norway. The Kato Air incident, 
in their view, supported and justified the need Norway had for a security 
system equivalent to the EU system. It was clear that there was no desire for a 
partially implemented system, as Iceland had accomplished. This was 
elaborated through the assumption that an event corresponding to the Kato Air 
incident would lead to different assessments in Iceland as well. The 
significance of the Kato Air incident formed a basis for the expressed need 
Norway had for a system like the EU security system. The CAA was not 
inclined to move in the direction of leniency but rather toward a more 
conservative course, as exemplified through the case ‘Of exceptions for small 
airports/aircraft’ (5.5.2).  
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Avinor 
The informants from Avinor concurred with the view that the security 
system had improved considerably since the implementation of the 2320/2002 
regulation. Like the CAA, the CEO of Avinor emphasised the need for 
security measures and based this on referral to incidents, both known and 
unknown to the public, directly threatening Norwegian aviation. Hence, in his 
view, the continuing threats to civil aviation justified a security system 
comprehensive enough to reveal those intentional threats. His first major 
question, however, was whether the current security system was appropriate 
to the type of threats Norwegian civil aviation faced. It is clear that 2320/2002 
was mainly constructed for threats in the same category as 9/11 and not 
threats similar to the Kato Air incident. To apply the category from the 
Icelandic Civil Aviation Administration, these latter threats were not terrorist 
threats but rather threats caused by mentally unstable persons. However, the 
security system may intercept intentional actions pertaining to both 
categories; thus, the question of appropriateness does not treat questions 
regarding whether the system is wrongly implemented but rather more in 
relation to the economy (can we justify the expenditures of such a system with 
the threat levels we are faced with) and that of autonomy, to be sui juris 
(‘Decide in one’s own house’), in which regulatory decisions, to some extent, 
are nationally maintained. Continuing the line of thought regarding 
appropriateness, we see that the New Zealand Blenheim case demonstrates an 
assessment contradicting the Norwegian CAA’s assessment. In contrast to 
Norway, New Zealand decided that the implementation of a security system à 
la the EU system was disproportionate in relation to the type of threats they 
were faced with. Secondly, Iceland demonstrated a different assessment in 
which autonomy is more important than implementing an EU system 
nationally.  
The second major question that the informants from Avinor posed was 
about the way the regulation was constructed. This follows the point from 
above about the reactive way of regulating and the partial transfer of the 
principles from traditional accident prevention. In addition, the Chief of 
Security at Avinor described the regulatory system as ‘casuistic’; an 
expression that implies that one bases rules on a particular instance, which 
may cause deceptive and unsound reasoning. The Avinor informants 
recognised the necessity of both an improved security system and the 
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exigency of taking immediate action after a groundbreaking event such as the 
9/11 event. They did, however, simultaneously pose questions reflecting 
expected consequences of the regulatory type that was chosen.  
7.1.3 Empirical question 3 
What challenges caused by the security regulations were described by 
people working at the selected airports? 
Direct challenges caused by the regulation were closely linked to the 
rigour of the regulation, which increased massively after 9/11. The increase of 
detailed descriptions of procedures and the increased frequency and extent of 
security procedures together formed a different reality in which all airport 
employees, regardless of level (both leaders and employees), had to operate. 
Within this reality there was much less possibility to influence and/or 
participate and to adapt the regulations contextually. To a large extent, the 
constraints in the system affected both leaders and regular employees 
similarly in that their space for action (see Figure 2, p. 45) became 
diminished. Their role toward the regulation, however, was not the same. 
Leaders were in a compound pressure situation between their employees on 
the one hand and the obligations they had from above on the other. As airport 
operator, Avinor was obligated to implement the regulation as prescribed, and 
this would be controlled by the CAA through inspections. Securitas and the 
handling companies were in a similar position in which they, as contracted 
companies, were obligated to perform their services according to the contracts 
and regulations framing their work. Simultaneously, the leaders experienced 
pressure from below since employees expressed challenges connected to their 
practical work within the regulatory reality. However, the leaders had few, if 
any, possibilities to facilitate and/or to adapt the procedures to meet the 
employees’ requests and complaints. This again caused frustration among the 
leaders because they were bound by the strings of the system, and some 
expressed that this hindered them in performing good leadership. This 
situation also demonstrated the disqualification within the rigorous 
prescriptive system since such systems are designed to ensure unified 
performance within the system. Local expertise (typically concerning 
conditions as building architecture, climate and employees) and professional 
expertise that people working within a trade for many years accumulate could, 
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to a lesser degree, be applied and utilised since possibilities for participation 
and adaptation was limited.  
Employees, on their side, expressed frustration over cumbersome, 
incomprehensible and, to some extent, seemingly unnecessary procedures. 
They experienced the lack of facilitation by their leaders as needs not being 
met, which again gave them a perception of unimportance. Working in a very 
static way to do the procedures that seemed superficial and maladjusted 
resulted in, as many of the informants reported, employees’ tuning out in 
different ways, meaning that they changed into auto-mode, just doing their job 
and not thinking, reflecting or evaluating. I do not claim that this was done by 
all employees within the groups included in this study, but these perceptions 
were expressed by a majority of the informants working at the front line. The 
largest difference was how profoundly they expressed that they were affected 
by it. Some expressed that it would be difficult to work for a long time in such 
an environment, while others seemed to accept it more easily. Regardless of 
their acceptance of this reality, it was clear that the environment in which 
these employees were doing their jobs caused them to play down their 
independent, reflective and assessing sides as a coping strategy in a reality 
that requested neither.  
7.1.4 Empirical question 4 
What are the consequences attached to implementing a common 
security regulation, regardless of airport size? 
Regulation 2320/2002 was designed to withstand intentional attacks to 
which large European airports are vulnerable. The Norwegian government’s 
decision that the EU regulation should be implemented on all Norwegian 
airports required that it be translated into the Norwegian aviation system, 
where the majority of airports are small on the European scale. This becomes 
articulated when OSL is compared to Sola and Fjellvik airports. OSL, as a 
definitive large airport relative to other European airports, operated in a 
different realm than any of the other Norwegian airports. This becomes 
clearer when looking at the reported challenges from Sola airport. Sola was, in 
the Norwegian setting, defined as a large airport together with four other 
airports.73 Sola, albeit a large airport, had similar challenges to Fjellvik, 
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connected to the lack of possibilities to adapt the regulation contextually. 
Since Fjellvik is one of the smallest Norwegian airports and Sola is one of the 
largest, it is reasonable to assume that the challenges will most likely be found 
in most Norwegian airports and that they are caused by implementing a 
regulation designed for large European airports. 
If we consider OSL to hold a unique position in the Norwegian context, 
where the airport is designed in a way able to handle the regulation, we can 
instead put focus on Sola and Fjellvik; both reported challenges caused by the 
implementation of the regulation, which we can ascribe to the size variable. 
Some of the reported challenges from the two airports are quite similar, and 
most concern the reports on implemented procedures that seemed strange, ill-
fitted, etc., when put in practice. However, a large difference between the 
airports was in the proportion of work with the regulation, mainly in meeting 
the demands of the regulation through writing the local regulation and to fulfil 
the requirements regarding the physical environment of the airport. This 
difference can be illustrated with a linear graph in where the portion of the 
employees’ workload used on regulatory work increases the smaller the 
airport is. For the smallest airport in this study, Fjellvik, this large proportion 
of administrative work was considered to be restrictive and was also 
considered to consume a disproportionate share of people’s time. This again 
was combined with a perception of the work as, to some extent, excessive and 
superfluous, ending in an impression that effort was misapplied in the context. 
So far in this chapter, we have focused on the empirical findings. Now, it 
is time to change focus from the practicalities of the regulatory change to a 
discussion of the consequences and implications these findings have shown 
through the literature and theory presented in Chapter 3. The discussion is 
divided into two sections, regulation and organisation, and in the final part of 
the chapter, the inner coherence between the two parts is discussed.  
 
7.2 Discussion: Regulation 
7.2.1 Iceland and Norway – Representing different choices 
One of the premises I have worked out from in this study is that it is not 
only useful but also necessary to see the organisation of security in relation to 
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the regulation that frames it. I have contrasted the regulatory system prior to 
and post 9/11 because it elucidates regulatory types and their development. I 
have chosen to contrast prescriptive regulation with performance-based 
regulation, although they are presented as ‘ideal’ types of regulation where 
‘real’ regulation is found somewhere between the two. The focus of this thesis 
has been on the Norwegian national processes. The four empirical questions 
have been applied to extract a profound account of the regulatory transition 
both on the authority and organisational levels. Hence, this thesis answers 
questions regarding the transition from a Norwegian perspective and how it 
has been translated into the Norwegian aviation reality. However, including a 
contrasting case, as I have done with the Icelandic implementation provides a 
possibility to see the Norwegian implementation in a wider context in which 
the Norwegian and Icelandic implementations represent different ways of 
handling aviation security nationally and also in relation to a supranational 
regulator, as the European Union is. Here, it is beneficial to see it through the 
lens of regulation since the different implementations ultimately contain 
different regulatory strategies and preferences. In the following section, the 
regulatory choices of Norway and Iceland will be contrasted and discussed.  
 
7.2.1.1 Performance-based and prescriptive regulation in context 
In this thesis, performance-based regulation and prescriptive regulation 
have been applied, representing two opposite sides of a continuum that 
balances the space for action for the regulatee. I have applied performance-
based regulation as a collective term that includes the types of regulation that 
regulate for goals or results to be achieved (goal-based) and/or basing these on 
risk assessments based on evidence (risk-based) (Peterson & Fensling, 2011). 
What is common for all of these types of regulation is that they have grown, 
in response to prescriptive regulation, as alternatives to the type of regulating 
that leans on command and control, and have moved to a focus on reaching a 
decided goal (or goals). From there, resources are placed where they are 
proved to be most beneficial.  
In this thesis, the Norwegian implementation has represented the 
prescriptive regulatory type, and the Icelandic national system has represented 
the performance-based type of regulation. This gives insights into regulation 
in practice in a setting where the point of departure for the two countries has 
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been similar. It also accentuates the boundaries and possibilities these 
regulatory choices generate.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Space for Action - modified 
 
 
The figure above (first presented in Chapter 3), which has been modified 
to include an indicating placement of the regulatory implementations, 
illustrates where Norway’s and Iceland’s implementations can be placed. As 
opposed to Norway, Iceland chose to have two regulatory systems: national 
and international. We can therefore see that the national implementation can 
be placed quite high in the figure, hence providing relatively large 
possibilities of space for action. The implementation of the international 
system is, however, placed together with the Norwegian system, where the 
space for action is low. But what does that mean? What consequences does 
this difference in space for action have for the aviation security system and 
the authorities that administer it? For Iceland, the exemption they had in the 
national system rendered possible to ‘decide in one’s own house’, as 
expressed by the Head of Security (HoS) at the Icelandic Civil Aviation 
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Administration, meaning that they were able to perform their own risk 
assessments and apply measures based on these assessments. This had two 
main effects: first, they were able to address risks specific to the setting(s), 
applying resources where they would be most beneficial. Second, safety and 
security issues were not that clearly demarcated. I will elaborate on these two 
points next. 
The Head of Security (HoS) at the Icelandic Civil Aviation Administration 
stated that the exemption they had in the national aviation system for security 
had benefits both from a cost/benefit perspective and from an autonomy 
perspective. If Iceland were to accommodate the EU regulation at all airports, 
it would demand great costs that were not considered appropriate to their 
assessed risk level. But having the exemption did not imply that there were no 
security measures. The HoS explained that there had been performed risk 
assessments by the Icelandic police, and the measures were implemented on 
national flights. The measures included doing background checks on people 
working at the airports, controlling boarding passes with IDs and baggage 
reconciliation. These measures were found appropriate for the Icelandic 
context, but as the HoS pointed out, in comparison to the EU regulation, the 
Icelandic security measures would be considered obsolete. She pointed out 
that, regarding the risk of terror in Iceland, the aviation authorities did not see 
that this was something very relevant in the Icelandic context. She did see, 
however, that mentally disturbed persons (which were the cases in both the 
Kato Air incident and the Blenheim incident) were a threat to aviation in 
every country, regardless of size, Iceland included. But this possible threat did 
not sway Iceland to give up the autonomy it had obtained with the national 
system.  
Because the risk assessments regarding possibilities for terrorist acts were 
deemed low, a measure such as baggage screening could be considered 
unnecessary in the Icelandic national system. However, because of the large 
number of air passengers bringing with them gas cylinders for cooking, 
baggage screening was necessary to remove these cylinders from the baggage 
(see Section 5.3.1). But removing them was considered a safety issue, not a 
security issue. Baggage screening in the national system was therefore a 
measure with more than one function since it can be considered to be both a 
safety and a security measure, but for the HoS, this measure was purported as 
a safety measure based on local risk assessments, which were context-specific 
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for Iceland with its large number of hiking tourists. Other security measures, 
such as security controls of passengers and staff, were not implemented. 
Through this example, we can see how the space for action may be expressed 
in a practical setting. 
The Norwegian regulatory implementation of security measures represents 
the prescriptive regulatory type in which there has been a complete 
implementation of the EU regulation in all airports. It is evident that the Kato 
Air incident became significant in the Norwegian setting since it placed focus 
on the possible effects of having more lenient security measures at smaller 
airports. This was also clear in how the incident was applied as a justification 
for the complete implementation, especially by the Civil Aviation Authority.  
Hence, we see that the largest difference between Iceland and Norway was 
that the national security system for civil aviation in Iceland was based on 
local risk assessments. It thus follows a performance-based regulatory type 
based on local risk assessments in the national system and the EU prescriptive 
regulatory system in the international system. Conversely, Norway chose to 
implement the prescriptive EU regulation at all airports, whether they had 
only national or both national and international flights. The statements from 
the Icelandic CAA underscored the general benefits for performance-based 
systems: the possibility to have autonomy in implementing what it considered 
to be reasonable measures in accordance with an assessed threat level, thus 
focusing on achieving a desired goal and setting the frames to achieve this 
goal contextually. The Icelandic authorities did recognise that they had a 
small, transparent system, especially compared to the rest of Europe. 
Therefore, to implement a security system that was mainly constructed and 
intended for large European airports was not considered to be reasonable, 
necessary or appropriate in the context of the Icelandic national aviation 
system. That being said, the Icelandic CAA explicitly stated that this applied 
only to its national system and not to its international system. Keflavik 
airport, which handled international flights to the rest of Europe, was strictly 
operated according to the EU regulation. This was based on the fact that risks 
travel within the One-Stop Security system, so local risk assessments would 
not be valid in that setting.  
Although the Norwegian Civil Aviation Authority, according to the 
interviews, assumed that the Icelandic system would change if it were to 
experience an incident such as the Kato Air incident, the Blenheim case 
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suggests that there can be alternative conceptions to this assumption. 
Although New Zealand is not subject to the same regulatory realm as Norway 
and Iceland, the Blenheim incident initiated national discussions of whether to 
implement a security system in line with the other OECD countries74 (where 
EU members make up a large percentage). The Norwegian Civil Aviation 
Authority was also approached and consulted in this process due to its 
experience with the Kato Air incident. The conclusion of the New Zealand 
government was, however, to implement more security measures directly 
aimed at these threats but not to implement complete security measures on 
their national system as it had on its international system. These threats were 
considered to be rare, so the cost of implementing such extensive measures 
was considered to be unjustified. Hence, a more performance-based approach 
was applied based on national risk assessments.  
Ultimately, the strategic choice of choosing a regulatory approach is going 
to be a choice over trade-offs. The choices will be based on what is perceived 
to be most important or valuable. Typical benefits of prescriptive regulation 
are that it is easier to inspect and correct, to have oversight and to control. In 
addition, in a large system, such as the EU regulatory system for civil aviation 
security, it may be considered valuable to take part in the expertise that comes 
from centralising competence. It is also difficult to dismiss the issue of 
liability. To apply a hypothetical case, if a terrorist incident were to happen in 
Iceland, which somehow translated or transported into the European aviation 
system, it would be hard for Iceland to disown liability. However, for the 
countries following the EU regulation, liability would have to be placed on 
the system as long as the airport or the country has fulfilled the obligations of 
the regulation. This way, compliance may seem a safer path than, as the Head 
of Security at the Icelandic CAA called it, to ‘decide in one’s own house’ 
when it comes to the issue of liability.  
In the Icelandic case, the authorities were very clear on their motivation 
and assessment behind choosing the regulatory solution they had chosen. The 
autonomy that laid in the exemption they had obtained for the national system 
was held as very valuable to them and not something they would easily give 
up, to the extent that, if an incident like the Kato Air case were to happen, it 
was assumed that they would maintain the exemption. For Norway, the 
                                                     
74 See Section 2.2. 
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principle of One-Stop Security would not have been possible to accomplish if 
Norway had attempted an exemption like Iceland had. Based on the 
interviews with Avinor and the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), to be part of 
the One-Stop Security system was considered important. Secondly, using the 
statements from the CAA as a basis for the second argument, we see that 
security was defined as a service to the passengers. Thus, the discussion turns 
into an argument over who should have access to this security service. When 
defined this way, security is understood as a right every passenger has when 
using commercial aviation. Thirdly, the Kato Air incident has been applied as 
a symbol for the need for security measures at the regional airports also. The 
example from the New Zealand case may, however, propose that this could be 
assessed differently, hence suggesting that the EU system may not be 
appropriate to handle those kinds of risks – in other words, seeing the 
implementation of such an extensive regulation as ‘using a sledgehammer to 
crack a nut’. This is also supported by statements from the informants in 
Avinor, who questioned the appropriateness of applying the EU system for 
the type of threats Norway was most vulnerable to. However, there is little 
doubt that, by implementing the EU regulation, one addresses both types of 
threats.  
Leaving aside the reasoning behind choosing one regulatory strategy over 
another, this study has aimed to explore the consequences of the chosen 
regulatory system for aviation security in the Norwegian context. In the next 
part of this chapter, we shift from the national strategies of regulation to the 
level of regulation in the organisational setting.  
7.3 Discussion: Organising Security 
At the beginning of this chapter, the four empirical questions were 
answered. In the previous part of the chapter, the main focus has been on the 
regulatory choices and implementation styles of civil aviation security 
regulation, and Norway and Iceland were contrasted. The discussion of 
regulatory strategies has been founded on the findings described through the 
first and second empirical questions and has mainly concerned the national 
administrative levels. The objective has been to describe and discuss the 
strategic choices, or national strategies, in the regulatory realm and pave the 
way for a discussion of the consequences and implication these choices may 
have. The aim for the following part of the chapter is to discuss the main 
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consequences and implications these choices may have in the organisational 
setting.  
It is clear that the security regulation implemented after 9/11 has had 
consequences at the organisational level of the airport. Through empirical 
questions 3 and 4, we established that the consequences of the regulatory 
implementation found at the airports were mainly caused by  
 
- The construction of the regulation, which inhibited participation and 
adaptation at the airport level. 
- The implementation of a regulation intended for large airports on 
small airports with limited possibilities for adapting it into the 
context. 
 
Seeing this in relation to Figure 2 on page 45, we see that, with the 
increase of prescription, there was a simultaneous decrease in space for 
action. Action here refers to actors’ possibilities for participation in the 
development of regulations and also having possibilities for adapting or 
modifying already established regulations. In addition, the security regulation 
that was primarily developed for large airports was implemented in all 
Norwegian airports practically unaltered. This resulted in an implementation 
that was described by the informants as somewhat ‘ill-fitted’. This again had 
consequences for how employees experienced their jobs, the tasks they were 
doing, the significance (importance/unimportance) of their own qualifications 
and also the perception of the effects or the results of the jobs they performed.  
If we follow the fundamental idea of the High Reliability Organisation 
theory, we see that issues such as the ones mentioned above are found to be 
essential in organisations striving toward high reliability. In line with the 
mindfulness perspective within HRO theory, organisations that successfully 
accommodate for cognitive infrastructures will have a higher degree of 
reliability than other organisations. In this thesis, I have applied Eede’s 
definition of reliability: “Reliability is the system outcome that can be 
described as safe, effective and efficient, in terms of average and variance” 
(Eede, 2009, p. 5). By focusing on reliability, we can say that we focus on the 
outcome, or the ‘end-product’ of organisational activity. In the airport security 
setting, this end product is the securing of air travel from intentional attacks.  
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7.3.1 High Reliability Organisation theory (HRO theory) 
Through the empirical material presented in this thesis, I have established 
that regulation for airport security has become more prescriptive and more 
detailed. In a prescriptive mentality, which builds upon the notion that 
procedures and rules lead to safer outcomes, more prescription will lead to 
more safety. As discussed in Chapter 3, prescription has clear advantages (and 
disadvantages), especially in industries where there is little or no room for 
error, where it needs to be right all the time. However, when it comes to types 
of organising, different choices will lead to different consequences and 
outcomes. Here, High Reliability Organisation theory (HRO theory) has 
provided insights into how organising may affect reliability. As elaborated in 
Chapter 3, HRO theory grew as an aspiration for the theorists to distinguish 
between normal organisations and organisations that “actively managed to 
control and reduce the risks of technical operations [...], [where] these 
organisations have not just failed to fail; they have actively managed to avoid 
failures in an environment rich with the potential for error”(Rochlin, 1993, p. 
15). These organisations could demonstrate great safety records; therefore, it 
became compelling to find out what made these organisations able to do so. 
The HRO theorists did not claim to have found a recipe for success, but they 
were able to discern some properties from these organisations that seemed to 
enable them to perform highly reliably.  
What is it that HRO theory can contribute to in the airport security setting? 
The HRO theory and mindfulness perspective brings insight into properties 
that enhances or diminishes high reliability, and it can therefore give insights 
to the way airport security is organised, including what one might ‘miss out 
on’ by organising it through highly prescriptive ways. It can also give an 
indication on whether the system constructed to bring security may have 
adverse effects on the product it intends to create, that is, on security itself. 
7.3.2 Mindful organisations 
As an explorative study, the empirical material was not predetermined to 
be interpreted and analysed through the lens of HRO theory. The material did, 
however, conclusively create a thorough account describing how it was 
perceived for different work groups to work within the security interface at 
the airport. Connecting this material with some of the main features of 
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mindfulness in high reliability organisations provides an opportunity to 
understand the significance of the findings from the airport in terms of 
reliability.   
In Chapter 3, general lines were drawn on the development of HRO theory 
and how this resulted in, for the Michigan school, the contribution of the 
‘mindfulness’ perspective. Their claim was that HROs are reliable because 
they are able to have a state of mindfulness (Eede, 2009). The mindfulness 
approach moved the focus away from theory of decision-making and accident 
prevention, which had been predominantly steered by technology-driven 
perspectives, and over to cognitive infrastructure. The cognitive infrastructure 
enables organisations to perform adaptive learning and leads to reliability. 
Clarifying cognitive processes that reaccomplish reliability in organisations 
will provide a mechanism in which reliable structures are accomplished. 
Weick explains that “this mechanism is often underdeveloped in non-HROs 
where people tend to focus on success rather than failure and efficiency rather 
than reliability” (Weick, et al., 1999, p. 82).  
7.3.3 The five processes and their relation to action 
In Chapter 3, a thorough description of the five processes was made. Here, 
I will summarise the main points before I connect them to the concept of 
action. 
According to Weick et al. (1999), there have been detected five processes 
in successful HROs, which together form a state of mindfulness: 
 
1. Preoccupation with failure 
2. Reluctance to simplify 
3. Sensitivity to operations 
4. Commitment to resilience 
5. Underspecification of structures 
 
1. Preoccupation with failure is to worry: “Worries about failure are what 
give HROs much of their distinct quality” (Weick, et al., 1999, p. 92). Since 
failures are rare in HROs, learning from error is more difficult in well-
functioning HROs. However, effective HROs turn every possibility, all and 
any failure and near failures into grounds for improvement (Weick, et al., 
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1999). Combining this with encouraging the reporting of errors, even more 
opportunities for learning are generated.  
2. Reluctance to simplify is about scepticism. In complex tasks, 
interpretations and simplifications are made. This is a way for anomalies to 
accumulate. In order to reduce complacency, which often follows the 
duplication of procedures and redundancy, scepticism may counteract this. 
“Concomitant with trust is the belief that all humans are fallible, and that 
sceptics improve reliability” (Weick, et al., 1999, p. 96). 
3. Simplified, sensitivity to operations can be described as situational 
awareness. It is not only about being present in the moment but also about 
sharing this information and the interpretation with others. One of the main 
inhibitors of sensitivity to operations is production pressure or overload 
(Weick, et al., 1999).  
4. Being committed to resilience is not only to being able to bounce back 
after incidents, in which HROs usually have few. It is also about being able to 
cope with unexpected surprises. It is a preparation and anticipation of 
inevitable surprises happening – in other words, to expect the unexpected.  
5. The underspecification of structures underlines that orderliness may 
amplify errors. Weick et al. use the ‘garbage can’ structure (Cohen, March & 
Olsen, 1972) to illustrate this concept. In this structure, more hierarchical 
structures disappear: “In a garbage can, problems, solutions, decision makers 
and choice opportunities are independent streams flowing through the system” 
(Weick, et al., 1999, p. 104). HROs, this way, gain flexibility through 
enacting moments of ‘organised anarchy’ (Rasmussen & Batstone, 1989; 
Perrow, 1994b, p. 216; Vaughan, in Weick, et al., 1999). This means that, in 
problematic situations, decision-making follows the problem and not 
necessarily the decision-maker.   
By accepting that mindfulness is essential for reliability, finding out what 
enhances or diminishes mindfulness will be imperative. Weick et al. argue 
that mindfulness and action are closely connected. If people have no 
possibility to act on what they consider to be hazards, a process of ignoring 
takes place: “[…] if people are blocked from acting on hazards, it is not long 
before their ‘useless’ observation of those hazards are also ignored and 
denied, and error accumulate unnoticed. The richness of a state of 
mindfulness is determined by the richness of the action repertoire” (Weick, et 
al., 1999, p. 90). Limited action and few possibilities for activating cognitive 
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processes result in a state of mindlessness or of situations where people act on 
‘autopilot’(Weick, et al., 1999). The rarer the cognitive processes are 
activated, the more a person moves over to autopilot. 
Thus, the main necessity for Weick et al. in order to achieve mindful 
operations in the organisation is action, specifically, the action that facilitates 
the enactment of the five processes. As we have seen, especially through the 
empirical material of this thesis, action (or the restriction of it) has been the 
crux of the challenges connected to the security regulation. I will therefore 
apply examples from the empirical material connecting these to the cognitive 
processes of mindfulness. I will then discuss the implications this has.  
7.3.4 The five processes at the airports 
The limitation of the space for action that followed the implementation of 
the 2320/2002 regulation became contextually pronounced in several ways. In 
order to discuss how the five processes described by Weick et al. have been 
obstructed at the airports, I have applied a selection of examples from the 
empirical material divided into three sub-sections to demonstrate this. The 
first section discusses the negative perceptions that the employees had of the 
procedures they performed and how this resulted in them ‘tuning out’. The 
second section looks at how learning and communication situations were not 
exploited, and the third section looks at how leaders experienced that they, to 
a lesser degree, were able to capitalise on their situational capabilities in 
security issues.  
7.3.4.1 Negative perceptions among the employees 
As described under empirical question 3, one of the main consequences of 
the implemented regulation at the airports was negative perceptions among 
the employees about the procedures they performed. This was particularly 
prominent in Section 6.2.5, where the barracks case was presented. Here, 
employees from both the security company and the handling companies 
expressed many negative perceptions connected to the security control that 
was performed there. There were several components of the work tasks and 
procedures that together formed a negative impression of both the work and 
the importance of the procedure itself. For instance, both the security guards 
and the handling agents had a clear understanding of why it was important to 
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have the barracks at the border of the Critically Security Restricted Area 
(CSRA). It was clear to them that all people, vehicles and cargo could be 
potential threats to the aircraft and that security screening before entering this 
area was an essential security measure. The design of the procedures, 
however, was very detailed and left little space for action. It was clear to the 
employees that the level of detail was there to ensure that the security 
screening was performed in a certain way to provide a high security level. 
Nonetheless, that the security guards did not have authority to, for example, 
check anything not described in the procedures created a negative perception 
of the procedures among the security guards. This was echoed on the other 
side by the ramp agents, who were the group mostly subjected to this control. 
The ramp agents perceived the control to be very predictable and superficial. 
One of the agents expressed, “If I wanted to bring something into CSRA, I 
would know how to do it” (6.2.5.2). The security control at the barracks 
therefore became something perceived to be also ‘for show’ besides being an 
actual security measure installed to hinder harmful objects and people from 
entering into CSRA. The measure had consequences regarding the perception 
the security guards had of their job and the procedures they performed, 
something that was also accentuated by corresponding opinions by the ramp 
agents.  
Similarly, many of the security procedures were perceived to lack 
meaning. That the employees were not provided with the information about 
why they were to do as prescribed, which would perhaps ameliorate this, was 
expressed as a difficult point. Vidar, the security guard, outlined this by 
stating, “When something is new [procedure or regulation], there is put up a 
note on the wall in the break room. I often wonder why? Has anything 
happened in advance that cause these new rules? I think this is really 
interesting and it would provide meaning to us all” (6.2.5.1). This was also 
brought up by one of the leaders of the handling companies who explained 
that he found this situation difficult. It was hard to motivate employees to do 
the job according to the regulation when he was not able to even explain why 
they were to do as prescribed (6.2.2.3). These situations together led to 
employees tuning down their thinking, even to the extent described by Lena, 
who expressed, “The best thing is not to think. You’re not paid to think, so I 
try the best I can to just do the job without thinking too much” (6.2.5.1). Lena 
perceived that the job did not request of her to think. To her, this resulted in 
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meaninglessness and something that she found difficult to cope with. Roy, the 
pensioned army professional, expressed almost the same as Lena, but he 
concluded in a more military fashion that the job was to do as told and not to 
ask questions. The effect, however, was still the same: thinking became 
downplayed.  
In relation to the five processes of mindfulness, the way the procedures 
were performed and perceived led to employees tuning down their cognitive 
processes. Process number 2, ‘reluctance to simplify’, is a way to counteract 
complacency, according to Weick (1999), by being sceptic toward the notion 
that precautions are sufficient and a wariness of perceived competence of 
oneself and others. This scepticism counteracts socialisation into ignoring the 
same things and taken-for-granted notions. Process 3, ‘sensitivity to 
operations’, is about situational awareness, being present and being present 
together. The commitment to resilience (4) is to expect and predict that 
potential dangers are coming. All of these processes necessitate that there is 
space for these processes to take place. They are all about awareness, of being 
present, which is directly contrary to the situations described above. Instead, 
moving into autopilot mode and not thinking is described as a coping strategy. 
This follows what Weick describes will happen if there are limited 
possibilities for action and few possibilities for activating the cognitive 
processes. In summary, we see that the autopilot mode directly obstructs the 
awareness needed to facilitate and induce the processes leading to 
mindfulness as described by Weick. 
7.3.4.2 Learning and reporting 
Besides the awareness needed for facilitating mindfulness, we find the 
importance learning is given. The first process, ‘preoccupation with failure’, 
especially accentuates this. Since learning of errors in an environment that 
seeks to have none is difficult, the idea of preoccupation with failure is to 
make use of all situations that are available. This includes reporting since 
reporting situations also provide a potential for learning. To apply an 
empirical example, we can look to the situation in Section 6.2.4.1, where a 
handling agent discovered a cleaning lady outside on the airside without an ID 
card. The cleaning lady could be considered a possible threat since she was 
walking around on CSRA without identification. The handling agent reported 
her being there to the security company. When later reflecting about this 
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episode, he seemed to think that the situation had been handled poorly after he 
had reported it. He had not received any feedback after the situation, which 
could have affirmed that he had handled the situation correctly (which he did). 
He was not involved in the subsequent situation, besides the short report he 
gave to the security company, which would have followed the fifth process of 
mindfulness, ‘underspecification of structures’, and the situation was not 
brought up later, which could be exploited as a possibility for learning 
(following process 1, ‘preoccupation with failure’). The handling agent also 
commented that he was not sure if he would report it next time because of the 
way the situation had been handled. There seemed to be a missing link 
between his training, where emphasis was put on being alert and reporting 
security breaches, and the real-life situation, which he perceived to not 
encourage reporting.  
In the security control, some of the security guards reported variance in 
what we can label ‘reporting climate’. This included how questions, reporting 
and communication were received by superiors in the security control, which 
was described as unpredictable and variable. This resulted in insecurity and 
sometimes hesitancy when it came to reporting since the reception of this 
could be very person-dependant. Some of the guards explained that they had 
been met with what they perceived to be a somewhat ridiculing attitude when 
asking questions. It was also indicated that this variety in communication led 
to some of the guards avoiding asking questions and, in cases of doubt, 
sometimes deliberately failing to notice things.75 Since reporting lies at the 
core of process number one especially, we can say that the sometimes 
inconsistent reporting climate limits the full potential of process 1.  
7.3.4.3 Situational capabilities 
The leader level in Avinor, Securitas and the handling companies had been 
bereft a large portion of their space for action after the post-9/11 regulation. 
Where there previously had been more possibilities to apply situational 
capabilities, such as assessments, prioritising and adjustments, the leaders 
now perceived these possibilities as severely limited. In Section 6.2.1.1, the 
Chief of Security (CoS) at Sola described the Runway Strip Case as an 
                                                     
75 There was never any indication that the security guards overlooked harmful 
objects or letting anything unscreened go past.  
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example that underscored how safety issues were much more subject to 
situational assessments and adaptations than security issues after 9/11. This 
meant in practice that, although leaders could see the benefits of adjusting 
security measures to fit more into a local context, it would be difficult to 
accomplish if it was a security issue. An apparent example was the barracks, 
which was always recurring as a quite poorly adapted measure. As long as the 
authorities (through the CAA and the ESA) found it to be satisfactory, it did 
not matter whether the leaders at the airport found alternatives that would fit 
better contextually. This became pronounced in such arenas as the Security 
Network Group meeting at Sola (6.2.5.3). Here, the leaders of Avinor, 
Securitas and the handling companies were able to do risk assessments of 
issues threatening punctuality. When it came to security measures, however, 
they had no legal authority to make any changes. Although issues concerning 
security were recurring, such as the barracks, they could only note them as 
concerns. The level of constraint was perceived as frustrating for the leaders.  
The CoS expressed this by asking rhetorically, “Can we do anything else than 
follow the book? No. When someone has told us that this is how we should do 
things, we have no real option to do things otherwise”.   
The possibilities to apply expertise in, for example, prioritising the 
application of resources were also limited. An example of this was how the 
CoS wanted to have more frequent background checks of the employees than 
what the CAA required (6.2.1.1). He recognised that the long time between 
each background check made it possible for employees to obtain a criminal 
record and still work with security at the airport. Since security resources 
were earmarked, the CoS had no possibility to find resources to implement a 
more frequent background check of the employees.  
In the small airport of Fjellvik (6.3.4), we could also see that the 
constraints of the security regulation had consequences for how the employees 
could distribute time and attention to other issues. Here, the intersecting point 
of safety and security appeared more clearly since the smaller the airport was, 
the more intertwined safety and security issues were. The main cause was the 
fact that, in airports with fewer employees, all working tasks were distributed 
among few people, while, in larger airports with more employees, people’s 
work was more specialised.  Since the smaller airports, in practice, had to 
implement the same measures as the larger airports, much of the time and 
attention were tied up due to the demands of the regulation. In addition, they 
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had to accomplish a much larger amount of administrative work than they 
previously had (for example, through the local regulations). This way, there 
was much less room for assessments of where attention should be put. This 
was underscored by statements such as the one from the Airport Director 
(AD) in response to the question about how it would be different for him if 
the regulation returned to how it had been before the 2320/2002. He said, 
“then I could start running an airport again”, pointing from his computer and 
then pointing out of his window to the runway. 
This way, we can say that Regulation 2320/2002 diminished possibilities 
for applying situational capabilities at the leadership level. Since security to a 
large extent takes precedence over other issues, it gives provisions for and 
prescribes how time, effort and resources are to be applied. We can see that it 
is especially processes 2 and 3 that contravene with the situations described 
above since the leaders assessment of what is ‘important’ is obstructed and 
limited by the predetermined structure of the regulation. The leaders did not 
express their reactions to the reduced space for action as forcefully as the 
security guards and the handling agents (in terms of tuning out, autopilot and 
meaninglessness). They did express, however, frustration over the limitations 
of the system and also a resignation over the cumbersomeness of the system. 
These issues limited possibilities for action and, hence, did not facilitate for 
mindful processes to take place at leader level. 
7.3.5 Summarising comments: prescription, organisation and 
reliability 
By applying the principles of mindfulness from HRO theory, it becomes 
clear that many of the structures that frame procedures at the airports obstruct 
the processes of mindfulness. The most apparent consequence of the security 
regulation is how it limits the possibilities for action or, as I have called it, 
space for action. According to HRO theory of collective mindfulness, action 
is pivotal to facilitating mindful processes. However, prescription in itself is 
not a direct obstacle to mindfulness. This is demonstrated through studies of 
various types of HROs (Roberts, 1993b; Rochlin, 1993; Sills, Wolf, & 
Shelanski, 1982), where prescription is a large part of the job tasks. Weick’s 
counterargument is that it is not the highly standardised routines that make a 
system reliable, but it is the ability to handle unforeseen issues. Hence, he 
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does not dismiss prescription per se but argues that facilitating the cognitive 
processes results in higher reliability. 
Reliability is essential for every organisation with the potential for 
disastrous outcomes. As described in Chapter 3, prescriptive regulation has 
held an important role in safety industries, where there is a belief that 
following prescribed procedures will lead to safety and safe outcomes. 
Prescription in this connection is conceived as a road to reliability. From the 
prescriptive perspective, the human is ‘tamed’ by procedures to ensure 
compliance to a preconceived way to obtain reliability. Of course, prescriptive 
routines are there for a reason:  making sure that procedures maintaining a 
certain security level are carried out. However, as described by Hollnagel 
(2008), through his ‘error-counting paradigm’, automation was prescribed to 
safeguard the system from the people in it, whereas humans are found to 
actually provide safety because of their ability to adapt to unforeseen 
situations. This corresponds well with the fundamental idea of the HRO 
theory, where they found that organisations that facilitated the five cognitive 
processes leading to mindfulness could demonstrate extremely good safety 
records leading to high reliability. It can therefore be reasonable to assume 
that there could be gains for aviation security to enhance the structures that 
are already there to facilitate more mindful processes in security work.  
However, airport security in Norway is part of a much larger system that 
may not be comparable to any other HROs, at least as long as it continues to 
be organised the way it is, wherein regulation shall and must be similar all 
across Europe. As long as the Norwegian strategy is to continue a pure 
implementation of the European regulation, adaptation will be difficult; 
hence, working with local conditions will be very hard. We can say that the 
Icelandic version provides possibilities that the Norwegian system does not 
have. Although the Icelandic CAA did not present it as organisational 
opportunities, it called it ‘to decide in one’s own house’. This will be much 
more difficult in the Norwegian strategy, which is to follow the EU course for 
both the national and international system. If we look at this decision, it is a 
sensible one considering expertise. Giving over power to other entities may 
make sense when better expertise is localised elsewhere, but, as the Icelandic 
approach suggests, these are often not questions of either/or. 
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7.4 Facing forward 
If we consider the EU Regulation 2320/2002 to be highly prescriptive, 
then what has happened after the implementation? If we look briefly at 
Regulation 300/2008, the successor to 2320/2002, there were clear intents to 
move in the direction of a more risk-based regulation for security that was 
anchored more in risk assessments. However, although the intent was 
pronounced, according to Poole, there was still a long way to go to have a 
truly risk-based regime for aviation security with the implementation of 
300/2008 (Poole, 2008). If we look at more recent developments within 
aviation security, this line of progress seems to have continued. For example, 
in July 2011, the government of the United Kingdom consulted 116 agents in 
the British civil aviation system to form a proposal to modernise the current 
regulatory system for aviation security. In its summary, the Department for 
Transport describes that the intention behind this reform is to “give operators 
greater flexibility and responsibility to design security processes that deliver 
specified security outcomes, with greater emphasis placed on the needs of 
their passengers” (Department for Transport UK, 2012b). In the executive 
summary based on all of the collected responses, the department states, “The 
Government believes that the current arrangements are in need of 
modernisation to bring them into line with better regulation principles, 
promote innovation and efficiency and ensure best possible passenger 
experience. The consultation paper set out a proposed way forward which the 
Government believes would achieve this while maintaining and improving 
security standards. This Outcome Focused Risk-Based approach (OFRB) 
would be managed through the progressive introduction of a Security 
Management System (SeMS) developed and operated by each responsible 
organisation, building on international risk management best practice, 
particularly in aviation safety” (Department for Transport UK, 2012a). 
If we look at this statement, we see that the UK Department of Transport 
consider the aviation security regime to be in need of modernisation and that 
aviation security, as a regulatory area, needs to fall into line with what is 
described as ‘better regulation principles’. This corresponds to what seems to 
be a general direction within organisations working with aviation security. At 
The ICAO76 Symposium on Innovation in Aviation Security, Donald Roussel 
                                                     
76 International Civil Aviation Organisation 
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presented clear directions for aviation security, including regulating only 
when necessary, that decisions to regulate should be based on risk and be 
outcome-based and flexible wherever possible. Additionally, he asserted the 
importance of removing outdated regulation (Roussel, 2014).  
There is thus an ongoing development in the direction of risk-based, 
outcome-oriented regulations for security, moving away from the highly 
prescriptive to more flexibility wherever possible. There has been a general 
move in the direction of introducing management systems for security, SeMS, 
which ‘imitates’ safety and quality management systems (Salter, 2007). The 
overall aim for this approach is to “improve the culture of security within an 
organization to help overcome the demands of being a ‘high reliability’ 
organization within a difficult and complex work environment” (Salter, 2007, 
p. 395). Through his study of the implementation of SeMS within Canadian 
aviation, Salter concludes that SeMS offers value to aviation and security 
organisations, while there are some unanswered questions regarding the 
efficiency when it comes to managers and policymakers. These unanswered 
questions have to do with the difficulty of translating systems from safety and 
quality over to security. This issue is about the inherent difference between 
safety and security because security issues cannot be quantified in the same 
ways that safety issues can be. “Consequently, the risk analysis that lies at the 
heart of SeMS has a much greater degree of uncertainty than similar 
management systems” (Salter, 2007, p. 397). 
The interconnectedness and tension between safety and security has played 
a part in lesser and larger degrees throughout this thesis. It is difficult to see 
one without the other, and because safety and security in aviation were more 
or less treated equally only some years back, the fact that these areas became 
differentiated makes them easy to now apply comparatively. In aviation, the 
borders between safety and security are blurry; often, a threat to one may turn 
into a threat to the other. For example, considering maintenance work 
anywhere in the airport, in order to avoid mishaps or accidents, a maintenance 
worker may fix something in the terminal building or in the aircraft. Maybe he 
leaves a door unattended for a moment or leaves a tool behind. In a few 
moments, the door has become a security issue where someone with ill 
intentions can enter unscreened into the ‘clean’ part of the airport, and the tool 
may be picked up by someone and possibly do harm to someone or 
something. This example demonstrates how difficult it is to separate these 
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areas and how threats may convert from one to the other. Still, in several 
ways, this is what happened after 9/11. The two concepts became 
disentangled, for better and for worse. Was this an expedient separation? The 
easy answer to this question is ‘yes’. First of all, it was clear that the 
regulatory system prior to 9/11 was not adequate to handle such risks as 9/11. 
Secondly, and most importantly, there is a large, inherent difference between 
safety and security: uncertainty. As Salter writes, “terrorist and criminal 
threats are not quantifiable in the ways that accidents or customer satisfaction 
may be” (Salter, 2007, p. 397). The answer to this uncertainty became a 
radical restructuring of the regulatory body for security. By applying 
recommendations that were already there and adding to them in volume and 
detail and then making the regulations mandatory and prescribed, safety and 
security moved in different directions. However, these processes of regulatory 
development were founded on regulatory development within safety, which to 
a large extent is retrospective and reactive. Is this appropriate when it comes 
to security regulation, where “[in] the changing dynamic of the aviation 
security environment, security organizations are structurally less 
entrepreneurial than their terrorist and criminal adversaries” (Salter, 2007)? 
The answer to this may not be one of right and wrong but more, as the CEO 
of Avinor expressed: “What should we have done then? Should we have 
waited 2 or 3 or 5 years until it was risk assessed enough? That was maybe 
the alternative” (5.2.3). Presenting the regulatory development the way I have 
done in this thesis may seem like a very rational and well-deliberated process. 
As the informants who have provided information for this thesis described 
and also as the CEO above expressed, the process of the regulation was 
perhaps a bit more hectic than this. First of all, 9/11, unprecedented as it was, 
dramatically demonstrated that the security measures that were in force at the 
time had largely failed. Therefore, there was no time to apply time-consuming 
assessments like what the accident prevention tradition was based on; instead, 
there was an urgent need to develop better measures and to implement them 
more or less immediately. The EU accepted this responsibility and developed 
a system that heightened European security. No one seems to challenge the 
fact that European aviation security largely improved after the implementation 
of Regulation 2320/2002.  
In an attempt to address the counterfactual question this thesis was opened 
with, “What if 9/11 never happened”, the answer may be that the distinct 
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separation between safety and security would not have occurred. Instead, it 
would be more likely that safety and security would have kept their 
interconnectedness and moved in more or less the same direction. It may be 
reasonable to conclude that safety and security would have arrived where they 
both now seem to end up: at a combinatory regulatory type in which the 
strengths of different regulatory types are applied where best suited. Security, 
however, still has a long way to go to catch up to safety.    
Regulation has consequences. Through this study, we have seen some of 
these mostly expressed through what I have called space for action. Shrinking 
the possibilities for space for action has had consequences for involvement 
and adaptation, which again have consequences for the organisation’s 
possibilities to operate mindfully. Based on this information, we can see that 
implementing the EU security regulation in Norway has had consequences on 
all levels, but this still does not say anything about the goodness of the 
security system. This is, of course, not a simple question, and to evaluate the 
quality of the security regulation has not been my aim. However, regardless of 
the system that was implemented, 9/11 and other incidents both before and 
after this event demonstrated that, since attacks were possible, the existing 
security measures were not sufficient. This knowledge resulted in great 
changes in how the Western world organised aviation security. It is difficult to 
measure the effectiveness of the new system since the absence of attacks is 
not a sufficient measurement. To borrow an expression from statistics, this 
can result in a type I error, or a false positive, wherein one is led to conclude 
that a supposed relationship or effect exists, which may not be the case. My 
claim is that a way around this dilemma may be to look at organisational 
factors and create the best possibility for organising for reliability.  
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8 CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
The central theme in this thesis has been the transformation of security 
regulation post 9/11 in the Norwegian setting. In the background of the study 
was the assumption that this transformation of the regulation was influential 
and had consequences for the actors in the Norwegian civil aviation system. 
In order to discern the relationship between the regulatory transition, the type 
of regulation applied and their consequences for the Norwegian aviation 
system, I have performed a qualitative case study in the aviation system. The 
data were collected through interviews of the main actors and authorities 
within Norwegian civil aviation, fieldworks at three Norwegian airports and 
by studying the main documents regarding the regulation of civil aviation and 
international and European cooperation. In addition interviews were 
conducted within the Icelandic civil aviation system for comparative 
purposes. This chapter presents the main conclusions and contributions, in 
addition to the limitations and proposals for further research.  
8.1 Overall conclusions of the study  
The events of 9/11/01 constitute a starting point for a distinct 
transfiguration of aviation security regulation. Prior to 9/11, safety and 
security were treated more similarly within aviation. Although influenced and 
instructed by international civil aviation organisations, Norwegian aviation 
was still regulated through Norwegian laws that were guided by governing 
principles formulated in, among other things, the Public Administration Act. 
After 9/11, safety remained within this same framework, while security was 
transformed and conformed into the EU context, thus relieving the national 
systems and collecting them instead under a singular European banner. By 
moving regulatory work out of the national context, the arena for influence 
and involvement moved from the national context to the international level, 
which entailed a change in how interests (both national and areas of 
operation) were promoted and maintained. 
Although there has not been found any public discourse of the Norwegian 
authorities’ strategy in the transitional phases that followed 9/11, this study 
has revealed some indicators that suggest that remaining a part of the 
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
244 
 
European One-Stop Security system was considered important to the main 
actors within Norwegian civil aviation. However, the Icelandic case has 
accentuated an alternative to the ‘all in’ approach taken by the Norwegian 
authorities by delineating between the national and international system. 
Obtaining an alternative implementation has not seemed to be a preference for 
the Norwegian authorities. This was emphasised by the expressed 
contentment of the current system by informants at the Norwegian Civil 
Aviation Authority and exemplified by the case ‘of exceptions for small 
airports/aircraft’. This case underscored the stance taken by the authorities to 
not except any part of the Norwegian civil aviation system to be governed 
nationally. I find it reasonable, therefore, to conclude that the Norwegian 
strategy was to follow the EU countries in their implementation strategy and, 
thus, to avoid self-governance nationally.  
One result of this national strategy has been that the prescriptive EU 
regulation has been uniformly implemented on all Norwegian airports, 
regardless of size. The implementation has clearly heightened the security 
level on all Norwegian airports when compared to the pre-9/11 system. That 
the EU level of security has been implemented ensures that the level deemed 
acceptable by the EU has, therefore, also been implemented on all national 
airports.  
However, since infrastructural challenges at most of the airports 
necessitated some sort of regulatory adaptation, varieties in implementation 
have occurred. Adaptation in this regulatory landscape seems to imply an 
adaptation that meets the regulatory demand and not an adaptation that 
considers and focuses on the practicalities of the context or possible 
unintended consequences of implementing something not suited for the 
context. This is where the Icelandic authorities expressed contentment with 
their solution, since they saw the differentiated system as an opportunity to 
implement context-specific measures based on the assessed risk level.  
Norwegian authorities expressed that the Kato Air incident demonstrated the 
need for security on all regional airports, thus justifying the necessity to 
implement the complete regulation. In this assessment there seems to be an 
assumption that not implementing the EU regulation entails not implementing 
security measures at all. On the contrary, the Icelandic case demonstrated an 
alternative approach in which the choice to not implement the EU regulation 
entailed implementing measures based on local risk assessments. In this way 
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of handling it, safety and security were considered more simultaneously and 
were intertwined. The New Zealand case also contrasted with the Norwegian 
assessment and provided an alternative implementation on their regional 
airport network. Measures were instead directed at avoiding the specific kinds 
of threats that the Blenheim and Kato Air incidents induced, since the EU 
system (or OECD, as the NZ Government delineated it) was found to be too 
comprehensive and costly and, thus, was considered to not bear any 
relationship to the actual threats facing New Zealand regional aviation.   
That the Norwegian adaptation of the EU regulation has had the objective 
of regulatory compliance and not of contextual adaptation has had 
consequences in the organisational setting. When seen through the theory of 
organisational reliability, in which reliability ensures practices that produce 
secure/safe outcomes, the fact that the procedures were perceived as 
decontextualised, inappropriate in relation to actual threat scenarios, and 
leading to mindless behaviour, suggests that the regulatory system may have 
unintended consequences that could threaten the overall security at the airport. 
In a system that describes and prescribes in detail to avoid variations in 
implementation, this simultaneously limits severely the space for action for 
those who have to operate within it. This accentuates the connectedness 
between the regulatory system and contextual organisational possibilities. It 
also demonstrates that regulation has to provide the possibilities for the 
necessary manoeuvring to fully utilise the potential that lies in operating 
according to mindful processes. In other words, if we accept that 
accommodating mindful processes leads to higher reliability, there is unused 
potential in the airport setting which could further heighten reliability. 
9/11 can be seen as a date for an accentuated separation between safety 
and security, two fields that have large similarities and interconnectedness. In 
hindsight, an opportune question might be to ask if this separation of the two 
fields, as well as the great transformation of the security field, was fruitful. In 
this thesis, it has been revealed that the separation and transformation have 
had consequences. Perhaps the largest consequence has been in what I have 
labelled space for action. The fact that the regulatory trends for security seem 
to move in the direction of safety regulation anew, including alternatives that 
open up possibilities for more space for action, largely coincides with the 
conclusions drawn in this study.  
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8.2 Contributions 
This thesis provides an in-depth analysis of contextual regulatory 
consequences within a field that has not previously been extensively 
investigated. My exploration of the Norwegian civil aviation security system 
provides insights into the different levels of the system. It also gives 
descriptions and accounts of different agents’ work with, and relationship to, 
the regulation. This provides insights into consequences of operating within a 
highly prescriptive regime. The Norwegian system has also been contrasted 
with another European Free Trade Association (EFTA) country’s 
implementation, Iceland, to provide a wider frame for understanding the 
Norwegian implementation of the EU security regulation post 9/11. Although 
the focus has been on aviation security and aviation security regulation, safety 
has been an important factor in this study. Seeing security in relation to safety, 
which were previously handled very similarly, accentuates the difference in 
how we deal with safety and security issues.   
Regulatory consequences from risky industries and safety industries have 
been profoundly studied (Hood, et al., 2001; Kirwan, et al., 2002b), as have 
organisational theories and perspectives on achieving safety and reliability 
(Hollnagel, et al., 2008; Weick, et al., 1999). In this thesis I have applied High 
Reliability Organisation theory, which has been applied, for most parts, on 
safety organisations and industries. Although one can argue that because of 
the inherent properties of safety and security (great difference in degrees of 
uncertainty), applying typical safety literature to security settings may not be 
unproblematic, I argue that because the focus is on processes that enhances 
reliability, this is valuable and applicable. This opens up a literary base for 
future security studies and aids a “de-exoticification” of security as a field by 
placing it alongside the research area of other high-risk industries.  
8.3 Limitations 
An empirical study such as this that aims to create rich, contextualised 
descriptions cannot have an unrestrained span. As the aim for this study has 
been to see the regulatory transition in relation to the Norwegian aviation 
system, this comprises many actors at different levels of the system. I chose to 
include several of these levels to see the system as a connected whole. I also 
included three airports of different sizes and locations. I am aware that I 
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cannot claim the findings to represent the entirety of the Norwegian aviation 
system, but I am convinced that, by choosing three airports, it is reasonable to 
assume that there is some transference. This first limitation is also applicable 
in regards to the organisations where I gathered data. As the time for 
fieldwork in a project such as this always will be limited, a choice must be 
made between the amount of locations chosen for fieldwork against how 
much time one can spend at each location. I chose to divide my time between 
four companies at three locations; hence, the time for fieldwork became 
reduced for each group at each location which would have been different if I 
had chosen one airport (following the four companies) or one work group 
(that I followed on the three airports). A mitigating factor in this choice was, 
however, that the same groups appeared (almost) at every location and, thus, 
were more familiar to me.  
I also see that including the EU context into this study would have 
provided valuable insights, both regarding the work of the Norwegian 
authorities within the EU and EFTA and also the regulatory development in 
the EU. This could have nuanced the view of the assessments behind the 
regulations as well as the direction of the regulatory strategy or strategies that 
guide the regulations I have studied in practice. This point will, however, also 
be presented below as a proposition for further research.   
8.4 Suggestions for further research 
As research includes opening up several doors to relevant and interesting 
issues, thus making the study more complex, it also involves closing some as 
one begins to see that there are limits to what it is possible to include. This 
final part suggests some possibilities for further research, including some of 
the doors that became closed in this project.  
As just mentioned, looking at the processes of regulatory work regarding 
security in the EU and EFTA connection would be highly interesting, 
especially if set in relation to the findings from this thesis. This would provide 
more insights and background into the reasoning and strategies chosen by the 
Norwegian authorities in questions regarding aviation security. An alternative 
approach could be to follow a regulation from its early beginnings all the way 
to its implementation. This would also make it easier to follow these 
processes, especially regarding influence and involvement from different 
actors, thus also democratic processes, within the European aviation system.  
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Also, a more conceptual and theoretical field of research could be to 
investigate the difference in power between safety and security issues. 
Security has, because of its extreme uncertainty, been removed out of ‘normal 
politics’ and into almost a state of exceptionalism. Because secrecy has been 
deemed a necessity in security measures, this will also mute and exclude (to 
uncertain extents) democratic processes, since secrecy ostracises wide 
involvement. Such a study could investigate if this secrecy is justified and, 
also, if this secrecy is justified when considering the costs, for example, in 
terms of the blind faith people on the ‘outside’ of the system must have since 
transparency is so low. 
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